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ABSTRACT 
 
Hannah Arendt once wrote, ‘Love, by its very nature, is unworldly, and it is for this reason 
rather than its rarity that it is not only apolitical but antipolitical, perhaps the most powerful of all 
antipolitical human forces’. Situated in the interstices of intellectual history, international political 
theory and literature, this thesis is my attempt to think through this claim. I do this via an 
engagement with the thought of three liminal literary figures, namely, Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), 
Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) and Albert Camus (1913-1960). Reading their literary work 
alongside their more conventionally understood political writings, I explore how they conceived, 
evoked and ‘mobilised’ love in the context of Russian, British and French imperialism. Further, I 
argue that political conceptions of love in this period (circa 1880-1960) were not rare. Rather, love 
was evoked in the political work of canonical figures associated with International Relations.  
 
In this thesis, I aim to make love a serious object of study in International Relations. 
Indeed, despite the burgeoning literature on aesthetics and emotions, there is no systematic study 
of love in the discipline. I argue a thematic focus on love not only illuminates neglected dimensions 
of the thought of canonical figures, but brings to light the political work of forgotten ones. 
Considering the myriad of ways in which love is ‘mobilised’ in the works of Tolstoy, Tagore, 
Camus and their contemporaries, I offer an account of love as part of a social imaginary – or what 
Charles Taylor describes as the ‘background’ that enables practices and confers legitimacy – 
variously hospitable and hostile to empire and politics. I argue that not all loves are conducive to 
politics. However, to the extent that the polis is populated by plural loves, love is integral to the 
study of International Relations. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
But love, what is it? A side-issue. 
- Albert Camus. 
 
The televised sermon of Bishop Michael Curry at the wedding of the Duke and Duchess 
of Sussex in May 2018 caused some consternation. Central to this was his decision to focus less 
on romantic love and more on the assertion that all love was of the same essence, with the 
‘revolutionary’ ‘power’ to end wars, poverty and injustice.1 In fact, religious evocations of love in 
politics are not uncommon. Despite the differences that divide the British Prime Minister, Theresa 
May, and the opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn, both chose to place ‘love’ at the centre of their 
2017 Christmas messages. Beyond this rare moment of rhetorical unity lay two very different 
conceptions of what ‘loving’ looked like. For Mrs. May, ‘love’ is a Christian value exemplified in 
the acts of service and charity performed by the men and women of the armed forces and volunteer 
services.2 For Mr. Corbyn, it entailed caring for and acting to redress the seeming inevitability of 
homelessness, resource cuts and war.3 These quasi-religious evocations of ‘love’ in Anglo-
American politics abound. Thus, following the 2017 neo-Nazi protests in Charlottesville, President 
Obama, quoting Nelson Mandela, tweeted,  
No one is born hating another person because of the color of his skin or his background 
or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught 
to love. For love comes more naturally to the human heart than its opposite.4 
 
                                                      
1 Rev. Michael Curry, “Royal Wedding 2018: Bishop Michael Curry’s Speech in Full.” BBC Royal Wedding 2018 
(2018): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44186049. 
2 Theresa May, “Prime Minister Theresa May’s Christmas Message.” GOV.UK News (2017): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-theresa-mays-christmas-message-2017. 
3 Jeremy Corbyn, “Show People Love This Christmas - Corbyn.” Labour 2017 Press Archive (2017): 
https://labour.org.uk/press/show-people-love-this-christmas-corbyn/. 
4 Claire Phipps, “Obama’s Anti-Racism Tweet After Charlottesville is Most Liked Ever on Twitter.” The Guardian US 
(2017): https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/16/barack-obama-anti-racism-most-liked-tweet-ever-
charlottesville. 
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This, the most-liked tweet in history taps into a sentiment which Alicia Garza, one of the co-
founders of Black Lives Matter, claims animates the movement. ‘Grounded in love’,5 Black Lives 
Matter’s guiding principles include a commitment to ‘empathy’, which it defines as ‘engaging 
comrades with the intent to learn about and connect with their contexts’ and ‘loving engagement’, 
which it defines as ‘embodying and practicing justice, liberation, and peace in our engagement with 
one another’.6 Characterising violence and political differences in the language of love and hate, 
Barack Obama, Nelson Mandela, and the Black Lives Matter movement appear to place their faith 
in the soteriology of love. The Hillary Clinton campaign turned the same sentiment into a slogan: 
‘Love trumps hate’, which retains its popularity despite (or perhaps because of) Clinton’s 
subsequent electoral defeat.7 Returning across the Atlantic, we encounter a similar sensibility. Love 
was evoked as an antidote following the acts of terror in London,8 Manchester9 and the brutal 
assassination of the Labour Member of Parliament, Jo Cox.10 Similarly, the lack of love was drawn 
on to somehow help account for the inevitability of Brexit. As Guy Verhofstadt, European 
Parliament’s Brexit negotiator said, ‘The relationship between Britain and Europe was never easy. 
It was never a love affair and certainly not wild passion. It was more a marriage of convenience’.11  
 
                                                      
5 Frank Leon Roberts, “Black Lives Matter is a Love Movement.” (2016): 
http://www.blacklivesmattersyllabus.com/black-lives-matter-is-a-love-movement/. See also, Christopher J. Lebron, 
The Making of Black Lives Matter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017)., Chapter 4. 
6 Black Lives Matter, “We Affirm That All Black Lives Matter.” http://blacklivesmatter.com/guiding-principles/. 
7 MJ Lee and Dan Merica, “Clinton’s Last Campaign Speech: ‘Love Trumps Hate’.” CNN Politics (2016): 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/07/politics/hillary-clinton-campaign-final-day/. 
8 Rachel Pistol, “Bridging the Divide in the Face of Terror.” Huffington Post Blog (2017): 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/rachel-pistol/london-bridge-attack_b_16949602.html. 
9 Tim MacFarlan, “Adam Hills Makes Perfect Tribute to Manchester on the Last Leg.” Manchester Evening News News 
(2017): http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/tv/adam-hills-last-leg-manchester-13101217. 
10 Esther Addley, Jessica Elgot, and Frances Perraudin, “Jo Cox: Thousands Pay Tribute on What Should Have Been 
Mp’s Birthday.” The Guardian UK News (2016): https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/22/jo-cox-
murder-inspired-more-love-than-hatred-says-husband-brendan. 
11 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, “Brexit is Not Only About Brexit. Let’s Give Rebirth to Our 
European Project.” News Leaders Speeches (2017): http://alde.eu/en/news/885-brexit-is-not-only-about-brexit-let-
s-give-rebirth-to-our-european-project-guy-verhofstadt/. 
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Even if these examples only signify something about political rhetoric in Anglo-American 
politics, it would seem that there is an inordinate burden placed on love. From problematic 
presidents to acts of terror, from racial violence to failing institutional arrangements, love will 
deliver, fortify and immortalise. Yet, what is love? Why ought it matter to international politics? 
And how may it be conceived to do justice to the myriad of ways in which it is evoked? It is with 
these questions that this introduction, indeed the thesis as a whole, is primarily concerned. The 
introduction comprises four parts. First, I query the absence of love in mainstream accounts of 
International Relations despite the presence of love as a concept in international political theory. 
Second, via an engagement with contemporary and classical ‘Western’12 political thought, I offer a 
schema for understanding love in international politics. Third, narrowing my focus to consider the 
evocation of love in the context of empire, I defend liminal literature as a vital site for theorising 
love. Finally, I articulate my aim, plan and method. 
 
Love and International Relations 
Love is a latecomer to the burgeoning literature on International Relations and emotions.  
The 1970s saw the fields of foreign policy and political psychology first engage with emotions in 
the discipline.13 Since then, Neta C. Crawford and Jonathan Mercer have inspired a widespread 
systematic inquiry into emotions and International Relations.14 The initial work on emotion was 
heavily influenced by psychology and often neo-positivist in form. It largely drew on three 
theoretical traditions: psychoanalysis, social psychology and neuroscience.15 Since then, William 
                                                      
12 The notion of ‘Western’ political thought is itself problematic. For example, Adamson suggests that ‘in 10th-
century Baghdad, readers of Arabic had about the same degree of access to Aristotle that readers of English do 
today’. It also informed, in idiosyncratic forms, the basis of Quranic exegesis.Peter Adamson, “Arabic Translators 
Did Far More Than Just Preserve Greek Philosophy.” (2016): accessed 4 September 2017, 
https://aeon.co/ideas/arabic-translators-did-far-more-than-just-preserve-greek-philosophy. 
13 Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, “Theorizing Emotions in World Politics,” International Theory 6, no. 3 
(2014).,p.495. 
14Ibid.,p.495. 
15 David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds. Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology 2003).,pp.188-196.  
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Reddy suggests social constructivists, and historians of literature and culture have each led parallel 
‘revolutions’ in the study of emotions.16 At the turn of the twenty first century, Roland Bleiker 
pioneered the aesthetic turn as a reaction against Realism’s suppression of ‘the aesthetic quality of 
politics that is the elements which are purely subjective in the representation of an object’.17 The 
study of aesthetics, the embrace of emotions and the re-engagement with classics by authors from 
various traditions within International Relations has led to the study of fear,18 anxiety,19 grief,20  
trauma,21 honour,22 guilt,23 pity,24 humiliation,25 boredom,26 vulnerability27 and moral sentiments.28 
It has formed the basis of empirical work on phenomenon like violence, reconciliation, ‘amity and 
hostility, xenophobia and cosmopolitanism, trust in leadership and institutions, factors that 
stabilize hierarchy and those that undermine it’.29 The ‘dawn of the historiographical turn’30 and 
the growing interest in the history of emotions has inspired conceptual histories on friendship and 
                                                      
16 William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001)., pp. ix-x. 
17 Roland Bleiker, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” Millennium 30, no. 3 (2001).  
18 Richard Ned Lebow, “Fear, Interest and Honour: Outlines of a Theory of International Relations,” International 
Affairs 82, no. 3 (2006).. 
19 Frank Sauer, Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U.s. Nuclear Weapons (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015). 
20 Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, “Grief and the Transformation of Emotions After War,” in Emotions, 
Politics and War, ed. Linda Ahall and Thomas Gregory (London: Routledge, 2015). 
21 Emma Hutchison, Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions After Trauma (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). 
22 Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
23 Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje, Collective Guilt: International Perspectives (Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
24 Gabi Schlag, “Moving Images and the Politics of Pity: A Mutlilevel Approach to the Interpretation of Images and 
Emotions,” in Researching Emotions in International Relations, ed. Maeva Clement and Eric Sangar (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018). 
25 Evelin Lindner, Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict (Contemporary Psychology) (Santa Barbara: Praeger 
Publishers, 2006). 
26 Marjaana Jauhola, “On ‘Being Bored’ - Street Ethnography on Emotions in Banda Aceh After the Tsunami and 
Conflict,” in Emotions, Politics and War, ed. Linda Ahall and Thomas Gregory (London: Routledge, 2015). 
27 Amanda Russell Beattie and Kate Schick, The Vulnerable Subject: Beyond Rationalism in International Relations (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
28 Renée Jeffery, Reason and Emotion in International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
29 George E. Marcus, “The Place of Emotion in International Relations Scholarship.” E-International Relations (2013): 
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/10/02/the-place-of-emotion-in-international-relations-scholarship/. 
30 Duncan S. A. Bell, “International Relations: The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?,” The British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations 3, no. 1 (2001). 
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processes of international friendship and estrangement.31 This work has been right to emphasise 
that ‘politics without passion or principles is hardly the politics of the world in which we live’.32 
Indeed, as Brent Sasley notes, emotion underlies most theories of International Relations: ‘realists 
emphasize fear, institutionalists trust, Marxists greed, constructivists affect’.33 Yet, although what 
we now call ‘love’ has been a significant component of political theorising for millennia, it has 
never formed the subject of a systematic study in International Relations.  
 
Even if international relations is conceived, as Peter Wilson suggests, less as a discipline 
and more as a ‘a socio-intellectual space’ containing a variety of conversations revolving around 
‘how best can we go about explaining or understanding relations between the political 
communities and other significant actors that engage in politics…within that area that we variously 
call the international/world/global system/society’,34 ‘love’ remains side-lined. With the exception 
of literature, this is emblematic of the ‘rejection, ridiculing, or at best marginalization of love as a 
topic for serious studies’ across academia.35 Writing about what they call the new and burgeoning 
interdisciplinary field of ‘Love Studies’, the feminist scholars, Anna Jonasdottir and Ann Ferguson 
argue that until now there has been a chasm between the significance accorded to love in human 
life and that in the academy.36 For the philosopher, Simon May, the mystical reverence for love is 
a testament to its deification in an age of humanism.37 For the political theologian, Eric Gregory, 
                                                      
31 Felix Berenskoetter, “Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 35, no. 3 (2007)., Evgeny Roshchin, Friendship Among Nations: History of a Concept 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009). 
32 Martha Finnemore and Sikkink Kathryn, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998).,p 916. 
33 Brent Sasley, “Emotions in International Relations.” (2013): www.e-ir.info/2013/06/12/emotions-in-international-
relations/. 
34 Peter Wilson, “E.h. Carr’s the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Appearance and Reality in World Politics,” Politik 12, no. 4 
(2009).,p. 21. 
35 Ann Ferguson and Anna G Jonasdottir, “Introduction,” in Love: A Question for Feminism in the Twenty-First Century, 
ed. Ann Ferguson and Anna G. Jonasdottir (New York: Routledge, 2014).,p. 1. 
36Ibid, p. 1 
37 Simon May, Love: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).,p. xiii 
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love has been shunned for being dangerous, unwieldy and anti-liberal, associated with the excesses 
of the twentieth century.38 For the postcolonial scholar, Leela Gandhi, this dismissal, in fact, arises 
from the need to separate ‘adult’ politics from the ‘immature’.39 Jonasdottir, in turn, offers multiple 
reasons for love’s marginalisation. It is variously ‘elusive’;40 ‘merely a subliminated sexual energy’; 
‘an ideological phenomenon of the cultural superstructure (helping maintain the bourgeois 
hegemony)’,41 and the ‘last reservoir of human social and bodily powers’ to be safeguarded from 
exploitation by ‘Power/Knowledge and Power/Science’.42 However, if love is any of these things 
–godlike or violent, immature, oppressive or the last bastion of humanity – then surely its role in 
International Relations warrants examination. Indeed, as Amelie Rorty writes of love or Emma 
Hutchison writes of emotion, it is implicated in action, thought, reason and judgment.43 
 
What makes the absence of love in mainstream narratives of International Relations 
particularly perplexing is the prevalence of love in theories of the international. To offer 
illustrations from the first half of the twentieth century alone – when the vast majority of 
historiographies concur International Relations as a discipline emerged –44 love is evoked to 
                                                      
38 Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011)., pp. 35-6.  
39 Leela Gandhi, Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-De-siecle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006)., p. 12. 
40 Owing to the positivist origins of the study of emotion, love was initially deemed too elusive for scientific study. 
Although an engagement with scientific accounts of emotion are beyond the purview of this study, it is worth noting 
that love’s status remains contested. Thus, facial theorists argue love is an amalgam of emotions; appraisal theorists 
understand love as a ‘complex emotion’; neuroscientists variously consider love a ‘social emotion’ or part of ‘an 
emotional brain’. See, for instance, Carol Izard, The Psychology of Emotions (New York: Plenum Press, 1991)., Richard 
Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991)., Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The 
Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)., Joseph Ledeoux, The Emotional 
Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Phoenix, 1999).. 
41 Anna G. Jonasdottir, ‘Love Studies: A (Re)New(ed) Field of Knowledge Interests’ in Anna G Jonasdottir and Ann 
Ferguson, Love : A Question for Feminism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2014)., pp. 18-19. 
42 Jonasdottir and Ferguson, Love., p. 2. 
43 Amelie Rorty, “The Burdens of Love,” Journal of Ethics 20, no. 4 (2016)., Hutchison, Affective Communtiies in World 
Politics., p. 86. 
44 Lucian M. Ashworth, A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International 
Relations (London: Routledge, 2014)., David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline 
of International Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005)., Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black 
Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations (the United States in the World) (New York: Cornell University 
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theorise empire and internationalism, war and peace, order and revolution. As I argue in the next 
chapter, familial love governs Alfred Zimmern’s conception of the Commonwealth, the 
‘impossible possibility’ of love shapes Reinhold Niebuhr’s notion of coercion, and caritas (or 
charitable love) is central to Herbert Butterfield’s understanding of practical reason. Lest love be 
understood as a remnant of religiosity, it is worth noting that it is also evoked by agnostics and the 
irreligious. Thus, love is implicated (along with hate) in Gilbert Murray’s conception of the 
Cosmos; Arnold J. Toynbee’s post-War syncretic account of civilisations; and the mature 
Morgenthau’s theorising of power ‘under an empty sky’. To whatever extent these figures are 
important to the traditions of institutionalism, realism and international society, love emerges a 
significant but neglected dimension of their political thought. A thematic focus on love promises 
not only to illuminate neglected connections in the work of canonical thinkers but also to bring to 
light the work of thinkers on the discipline’s margins. To offer but a few examples of figures that 
fall beyond the scope of this study, Mohandas Gandhi’s ahimsa,45 Emma Goldman’s anarchism,46 
Simone Weil’s account of justice,47 Ernesto Guevera’s conception of revolution48 and Anna Julia 
Cooper’s Black feminist politics49 are animated by their conceptions of love. Whatever love may 
or may not be, its evocations in theorising the international are not rare.  
 
 
                                                      
Press, 2017)., Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, Race and Racism in International Relations : 
Confronting the Global Colour Line (London: Routledge, 2015)..  
45 Ananya Vajpeyi, “Mohandas Gandhi: Ahimsa, the Self’s Orientation,” in Righteous Republic: The Political Foundations 
of Modern India (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
46 Emma Goldman, “Marriage and Love.” (1911): http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20715/20715-h/20715-h.htm., 
Lori Jo Marson, “A Feminist Search for Love: Emma Goldman on the Politics of Marriage, Love, Sexuality and the 
Feminine,” Feminist Theory 4, no. 3 (2003).,pp. 305-320. 
47 Richard H. Bell, “Reading Simone Weil on Rights, Justice and Love,” in Simone Weil’s Philosophy of Culture: Readings 
Toward a Divine Humanity, ed. Richard H. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
48 David Deutschmann, ed. Che Guevara Reader: Writings By Ernesto Che Guevara on Guerilla Strategy, Politics & Revolution 
(Melbourne: Ocean, 1997).. ,Ernesto Guevera, Guerilla Warfare (Seattle: Stellar Editions, 2016).. 
49 Vivian M. May, “Anna Julia Cooper’s Black Feminist Love-Politics,” Hypatia 32, no. 1 (2017). 
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On Love: A Schema 
If love’s absence from mainstream accounts of International Relations is not owing to its 
rarity, perhaps it is because there is something about love which renders it improper for politics. 
A proponent of this view, Hannah Arendt offers one of the twentieth century’s most sustained 
and systematic critiques of love as a political concept. For Arendt, love ‘is not apolitical but 
antipolitical, perhaps the most powerful of all antipolitical human forces’.50 Arendt’s thought on 
love was shaped by an early engagement with Augustine in her doctoral dissertation Love and Saint 
Augustine. At the crux of her critique is a conception of love as Augustinian caritas (a Graeco-
Christian conception of appetitus or craving)51 and a vision of politics, premised on freedom and 
plurality.52 In The Human Condition, she argues this vision of politics emanates from a tripartite 
distinction between ‘labour’, ‘work’ and ‘action’.53 In effect, she seeks to separate with Locke 
‘working hands (from) a labouring body’54, and with Aristotle poiesis or making from praxis or doing. 
Although ‘labour’, ‘work’ and ‘action’ together constitute the human condition, the polis is the 
realm of action alone.55 An intersubjective space rather than ‘the city-state in its physical location; 
it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true 
space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be’.56 
What makes love anathema to the Arendtian polis is that it destroys her very conditions for politics. 
To the extent love as ‘desire mediates between subject and object,…it annihilates the distance 
between them’.57 To the extent that loving entails forgetting, a yearning for a ‘future that destroys 
                                                      
50 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998)., p. 242. 
51 Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998)., p. 9.  
52 For definitions, see Arendt, The Human Condition., p. 7 and 177.  
53 Arendt, The Human Condition., Chapter 1.  
54Ibid., 80. 
55 Ibid., 220. 
56 Ibid., 198. 
57 Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine., p. 18, 
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the present’, it is unworldly.58 Arendt’s discomfort with love would seem to extend to most 
emotion. Reduced to feeling or ‘craving’ it belongs to ‘the twilight, which illuminates our private 
and intimate lives’ and ‘depends utterly upon appearance and therefore upon the existence of a 
public realm’ to confirm it is real.59 However, most emotion ‘cannot stand the implacable, bright 
light of the constant presence of others on the public scene’.60 Vanishing in public when it is 
displayed, Arendt’s emotion lacks the ‘realness’ necessary to ground it as a form of political praxis.  
 
To be fair to Arendt, her view on emotion was not static.61 Her rejection of Augustine was 
not total.62 Perhaps her call to eradicate poiesis from the polis was not absolute.63 Nonetheless, her 
critique of love – as articulated in the late 1950s and early 1960s –  captures both the ‘liberal’ need 
to distinguish public from private and the ‘critical’ call to curb love’s potential for violence and 
quiescence. I argue, however, there are at least three problems with this account of love as 
antipolitical. First, it conflates three distinct but interrelated questions of what love ‘is’, ‘ought’ and 
‘does’. Second, it is reductive of the kind of contestation that surrounds these questions. Third, the 
interrogation of love’s appropriateness for politics obfuscates the more pertinent question of 
whose loves and which politics are deemed legitimate. Indeed, if Augustine is right that humans 
are constituted by their loves,64 the polis is populated by plural loves. Politics, then, necessarily 
entails the negotiation of plural loves. In what follows, I offer a schema for conceiving love that 
                                                      
58 Ibid., p. 10, p. 28. 
59 Arendt, The Human Condition., p. 51. 
60 Ibid., p. 51. 
61 Dan Dagerman, “Within the Heart’s Darkness: The Role of Emotions in Arendt’s Political Thought,” European 
Journal of Political Theory First Published May 18, 2016 
62 For a detailed discussion of Arendt’s adoption of Augustinian concepts such as ‘natality’, ‘will’ and ‘community’, 
see Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark, ““Thought Trains”,” in Love and Saint Augustine, ed. Joanna 
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64 Raymond Geuss, Reality and Its Dreams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016)., Loc 4916; Also, Gregory, 
Politics and the Order of Love., p. 21.  
 14 
is cognisant of both love’s implication in ‘the international’ and, the kind of contestation that 
surrounds what love ‘is’ and ‘ought’ to do in international politics. For the sake of illustration, I 
draw on two recent evocations of love in international political theorising to illustrate how this 
contestation about love underpins divergent visions of fraternity and internationalism. 
 
At first glance, the projects of Martha Nussbaum, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
appear to have very little in common. Martha Nussbaum, ‘the philosopher of feelings’,65 offers her 
account of liberal cosmopolitan love in Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice.66 Hardt and 
Negri are committed to revolution and are variously described as ‘post-Marxist’ or ‘anarchist’. 
Nonetheless, both projects draw on love’s imagined role in redemption and resistance to animate 
their internationalisms. If Upheavals of Thought made the case for the intelligence of emotions and 
the pivotal role they play in practical judgment,67 Political Emotions is a guidebook for how they 
ought to be properly cultivated by liberalism. Building on her work in Love’s Knowledge,68 Nussbaum 
argues that literature and music, rhetoric, festivals and architecture are central to this sentimental 
education. Nussbaum’s emphasis on love as a liberal cosmopolitan emotion may seem perplexing. 
As Eric Gregory notes, liberalism as a legacy of the Enlightenment is often associated with the 
privatisation of emotion.69 Or as Lester Hunt puts it, ‘Politically, ratiocination tends to be 
progressive, emoting tends to be regressive’.70 Respect rather than love surely is its central tenet. 
Nussbaum acknowledges the existence of a system of judgment grounded in principle, claims her 
                                                      
65 Rachel Aviv, “The Philosopher of Feelings.” The New Yorker Profiles (2016): 
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work is compatible with Rawls and argues on practical and utilitarian grounds that respect is not 
enough.71  
(D)emocratic reciprocity needs love…But, more deeply, the public culture needs to be 
nourished and sustained by something that lies deep in the human heart and taps its most 
powerful sentiments…72 
 
Love then is that which ‘gives respect for humanity its life, making it more than a shell’.73 For 
Nussbaum, love is a “relationship” that 
includes a delighted recognition of the other as valuable, special, and fascinating; a drive 
to understand the point of view of the other; fun and reciprocal play; exchange, and what 
[the psychoanalyst Donald] Winnicot calls “subtle interplay”; gratitude for affectionate 
treatment, and guilt at one’s own aggressive wishes or actions; and finally, and centrally, 
trust and a suspension of anxious demands for control.74  
 
Placing John Stuart Mill and Rabindranath Tagore’s engagements with Auguste Comte’s ‘religion 
of humanity’ at the heart of the liberal canon, Nussbaum’s analyses their works to retrieve and 
develop a template for love and internationalism for an ‘aspiring yet imperfect society’.75  
 
Representing a different set of political commitments, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
make their case for the centrality of love to revolutionary politics in their tetralogy, Empire,76 
Multitude,77 Commonwealth78 and Assembly.79 Rooted in ‘the new biopolitical demand for the 
reconstruction of the commons’,80 Hardt and Negri’s anti-capitalist revolutionary love is unlike 
                                                      
71 Nussbaum, Political Emotions., p. 18 and p. 157.  
72Ibid., p. 43.  
73Ibid., p. 15.  
74Ibid., p. 176.  
75Ibid., p. 6.  
76 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
77 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (London: Penguin Books, 2005). 
78 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
79 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Assembly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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solidarity because it ‘extends beyond the rational calculus of interests’.81 It rejects the public-private 
dichotomy, recuperates notions of the ‘power of becoming defined by difference’ and redefines 
wealth to ‘extend our notion of the common and points towards a process of liberation’.82 Drawing 
at once on a Spinozan conception of ‘love as joy’83 and Judaeo-Christian exegesis of ‘love of 
neighbour’ as entailing a duty to alterity,84 they conceive of love as emancipatory power and praxis. 
As Hardt and Negri elaborate,  
Love – in the production of affective networks, schemes of cooperation, and social 
subjectivities – is an economic power. Conceived in this way love is not, as it is often 
characterized, spontaneous or passive. It does not simply happen to us, as if it were an 
event that mystically arrives from elsewhere. Instead it is an action, a biopolitical event, 
planned and realized in common.85  
 
In addition, it is integral to their vision of a new internationalism. 
…[W]e need also to construct a new mode of life and above all a new community. This 
project leads not toward the naked life of homo tantum but toward homohomo, humanity 
squared, enriched by the collective intelligence and love of the community.86 
 
Implicit in their divergent articulations of fraternity, performing such different work in their 
normative orders, Nussbaum, Hardt and Negri’s projects illustrate the kind of contestation that 
surrounds the questions of what love ‘is’ and ‘ought’ to do in international politics. 
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What Love Is 
As Alan Soble notes, ‘love is…a rich phenomenon, provoking questions in ontology, 
epistemology, the philosophy of mind, theology and philosophy of religion’.87 It is also ‘universal’, 
which in Sudipta Kaviraj’s formulation means recognising 
(T)he idea of universality can have different forms. The kind of universality we ascribe to 
love is like the universality of human languages: all human beings have a language, but not 
the same specific language. Language is present everywhere in the human world, but not 
in the same form. Similarly, in all societies and historical stages, love exists; but the forms 
of social conduct and the conceptual system through which people think about it and 
represent its variations are different.88 
 
To avoid the hubris of trying to offer analysis across multiple traditions or pretending this analysis 
exhausts conceptions of love across the globe, I will focus primarily on (analytic) ‘Western’ 
philosophy and theology. Indeed, the subject of ‘love’ has occupied ‘Western’ philosophy for 
millennia. Hesiod (c 700 BCE) wrote that if there is a god, ‘it is the god Love, who…damages the 
mind’.89 Similarly, Empedocles (c 492-432 BCE) thought love and strife governed the universe.90 
From the Hebrew Bible’s injunction to love God and neighbour to the Johannine proclamation 
that ‘God is love’, love has also preoccupied ‘ethicists and moral theologians, exegetes, 
philosophers and philosophers of religion’.91 In ‘Western’ political thought, discussion of love 
converges around the ideas of eros, philia and agape. 
 
In Hardt and Negri’s thesis, the love that they exalt is a perplexing blend of eros-agape. To 
explore the contradictions that inhere in this combination, it might be worth clarifying how agape 
                                                      
87 Alan Soble, “An Introduction to the Philosophy of Love,” in Eros, Agape, and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love, 
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and eros are classically understood. Agape, or self-giving love, finds its basis in an exegesis of Paul 
and John and is imagined to be epitomised in the idea of Christ. In its Pauline formulation, 
Love is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude. It does 
not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, 
but rejoices in the truth. It bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all 
things. Love never ends.92  
 
Eros, however, finds its epitome in the figure of Socrates. It is associated with the writings of Plato, 
particularly the Symposium, Lysis, Phaedo and Phaedrus. Perhaps the clearest articulation of the 
‘essence’ of eros is to be found in Socrates’ ‘encomium’ of love in the Symposium. Diotima tells 
Socrates that love is the child of Poros (Plenty/Contrivance) and Penia (Poverty) conceived on 
the feast of Aphrodite: 
(S)ince he is the son not only of Poros but also of Penia, he is in this position: he is always 
poor, and far from being the tender and beautiful creature that most people imagine, he is 
in fact hard and rough, without shoes for his feet or a roof over his head. He is always 
sleeping on the bare ground without bedding, lying in the open in doorways and on the 
street, and because he is his mother’s son, want is his constant companion. But on the 
other hand he also resembles his father, scheming to get what is beautiful and good, being 
bold and keen and ready for action, a cunning hunter; always contriving some trick or 
other, an eager searcher after knowledge, resourceful, a lifelong lover of wisdom, clever 
with magic and potions, and a sophist. His nature is neither that of an immortal nor that 
of a mortal, but in the course of a single day he will live and flourish for a while when he 
has the resources, then after a time he will start to fade away, only to come to life again 
through that part of his nature which he has inherited from his father. Yet his resources 
always slip through his fingers, so that although he is never destitute, neither is he rich. He 
is always between the two, just as he is between wisdom and ignorance.93  
 
As the above quotes illustrate, there is much tension between these two forms of love. Thus, while 
eros seeks to acquire, agape seeks to give; while eros is unconstant, agape endures; while eros responds 
to the merit of the value of its object, agape ‘creates value in its object’; while eros is ‘sexual’, agape 
is never characterised as such; while eros is directed at a set of properties, agape is directed at persons; 
while eros is ascending love, agape is descending love.94 This contrast between eros and agape is 
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perhaps most clearly enunciated in the work of Anders Nygren for whom eros essentially becomes 
not-agape, as summarised in the table reproduced below:95 
Eros is an acquisitive desire and longing. Agape is sacrificial giving. 
Eros is an upward movement. Agape comes down. 
Eros is man’s way to God. Agape is God’s way to man. 
Eros is man’s effort: it assumes that man’s 
salvation is his own work. 
Agape is God’s grace: salvation is the work of 
Divine love. 
Eros is egocentric love, a form of self-assertion 
of the highest, noblest, sublimest kind. 
Agape is unselfish love, it ‘seeketh not its own,’ 
it gives itself away. 
Eros us the will to get and possess which 
depends on want and need. 
Agape is freedom in giving, which depends on 
wealth and plenty. 
Eros is primarily man’s love; God is the object 
of Eros. Even when it is attributed to God, Eros 
is patterned on human love.  
Agape is primarily God’s love; God is Agape. 
Even when it is attributed to man, Agape is 
patterned on Divine love. 
Eros is determined by the quality, the beauty 
and worth, of its object, it is not spontaneous, 
but ‘evoked’, ‘motivated’.  
Agape is sovereign in relation to its object, and 
is directed to both ‘the evil and the good’; it is 
spontaneous, ‘overflowing’; unmotivated.  
Eros recognizes value in its object – and loves it. Agape loves – and creates value in its object. 
 
Hardt and Negri’s philosophy of love draws both on the agapic and erosic traditions. 
Therefore, they call for a return to a pre-modern Judaeo-Christian love, where ‘love of neighbour’ 
is understood as a radical openness to alterity.96 However, they also note drawing on Plato that 
love as the child of ‘poverty and invention’ is ‘deeply ambivalent and susceptible to corruption’.97 
Underscoring love’s erosic elements, it is for them ‘a will to power, that is, the ontological 
production of common subjectivities’.98 Their union of eros-agape – despite the absence of the same 
metaphysics and commitment to epistemological humility – is reminiscent of Augustinian caritas. 
Consequently, Arendt’s critique of Augustine, that the person is not valued for their personhood 
per se but for their instrumental value (in this case in realising the revolution), also rings true.99 
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Nonetheless, love in its erosic and agapic forms is compatible with the kind of universalism Hardt 
and Negri espouse. Yet, it is not clear how this love is generative of the subjectivity they imagine. 
Indeed, in Kierkegaard’s formulation, ‘love to one’s neighbour makes a man blind in the deepest 
and holiest sense, so that he blindly loves every man’.100 Or in Camus’ reformulation of Scheler, 
‘Humanity is loved in general in order to avoid loving anyone in particular’.101 Indeed, for all their 
dissimilarities, love in its erosic and agapic forms is compatible with universalism. Further, in both 
erosic and agapic forms, there is little value for the person qua person. As Neera Kapur Badhwar 
elaborates, in agape, ‘every individual is phenomenologically replaceable by any other as the object of 
love’.102 Although the person is valued as an end, it is the act of loving, which confers value on the 
‘Speck of Humanity among other Specks in the Ocean of Humanity’.103 Similarly, in erosic love the 
person is ‘both phenomenologically and numerically replaceable’ and ‘the object of love is not that individual 
with those qualities but rather those qualities in any individual’.104  
 
The only love that values particularity as an end-in-itself is ‘philia’, upon which Nussbaum’s 
project rests. Philia, according to Soble, is the love that is ‘caught in the cracks’ of eros and agape.105 
It is associated chiefly with the philosophy of Aristotle, but also finds articulations in the work of 
Montaigne and Nietzsche. Philia is often translated to friendship. However, for Gregory Vlastos, 
this ‘blunts the force of Aristotle’s Greek’ as ‘love’ is the only English word that is robust and 
versatile enough to cover philia.106 Nussbaum concurs in Fragility, noting,  
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philia includes many relationships that would not be classified as friendships. The love of 
mother and child is a paradigmatic case of philia; all close family relations, including the 
relation of husband and wife, are so characterized…But philia includes the very strongest 
affective relationships that human beings form; it includes, furthermore, relationships that 
have a passionate sexual component.107  
 
Although Nussbaum sees eros as a kind of philia, she notes, ‘the emphasis of philia is less on intensely 
passionate longing than on disinterested benefit, sharing and mutuality; less on madness than on 
a rare kind of balance and harmony’.108 Although Nussbaum calls for the celebration of polyvalent 
loves in her project and seeks to judge loves of their compatibility with liberalism rather than on 
the traditions they arise from, her thought is very much situated in the Aristotelian tradition. As 
she notes in Therapy of Desire, ‘The general rubric under which Aristotle analyses loves is that of 
philia, which, strictly speaking, is not an emotion at all, but a relationship with emotional 
components’. Thus, Nussbaum claims,  
Love is never well imagined as a constant experience; it is a relationship involving 
kaleidoscopically many feelings, actions, and reactions – including intense focus on the 
other person, but also including the solitary cultivations of one’s own personal interests, 
and even sleep.109 
 
If we are to take Nussbaum’s commitment to anthropodenial as radical evil seriously, then surely 
Nussbaum’s project must preclude what Annette Baier calls the ‘theological’ (non-biological) loves 
of eros and agape.110 Indeed, Upheavals of Thought calls for the embrace of the upside-down ladder of 
Ulysses over the ascent narratives of eros, agape and Romanticism.111 However, some contradictions 
remain. In Nussbaum’s own admission, her project wrestles with the general and the particular. 
Perhaps this is most clearly epitomised in the notion that Aristotelian philia would seem like an 
inadequate basis for civic love. Indeed, the intense friendship that Aristotle valorises precludes the 
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possibility of having too many friends. Consequently, any kind of sentimental education that leads 
to a project of philia/ ‘loving in particular’ writ large seems antithetical to Aristotle. Further, 
Nussbaum describes her civic love as unconditional. As Nussbaum herself notes, however, philia 
is not unconditional. Therefore, if any central beliefs are or become false, the love will cease unless 
love develops another basis.112 For Benjamin Bagley, this may be facilitated by ‘mutual 
improvisation’ and openness to identities in construction.113 However, the kind of intimate 
knowledge and interaction this hinges on is unfathomable in a polity the size of a nation, let alone 
the globe. 
 
The question of whether love is constituted by three ideas that share a family resemblance 
or is properly constituted by one or two of these distinct ideas remains contested. However, if 
Simon May is right that the concept of love today is associated with unconditionally, particularity, 
selflessness, benevolence, eternity, perfection and redemption then it would seem that the three 
ideas have been conflated.114 Indeed, recent work on love in analytic philosophy is more focused 
on the reasons for love, treating the essence of love as settled.115 Nonetheless, the inherent 
contestation about what love is permeates discussions of love as a political concept, highlighting 
at best the follies of systematisation and at worst the incoherence of any notion of a universal love. 
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What Love Ought 
 The contestation over what love is is amplified by the debate surrounding what work love 
ought to perform in politics. Engaging with Nussbaum, Hardt and Negri’s projects and their 
criticisms, I argue that envisaging love’s evocation in politics has been met by a range of responses, 
that I broadly categorise as ‘retrieval’, ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘rejection’. 
 
Exemplifying the first approach, Martha Nussbaum’s collective works, prima facie, call for 
the retrieval of love in its polyvalence. However, as Lester Hunt argues in his engagement with 
Upheavals, it is worth questioning whether the ‘emotional thinking’ Nussbaum endorses is 
compatible with her commitment to ‘liberalism’.116 Drawing on Wagner’s anti-Semitic 
autobiographical account in Judaism in Music, he argues that ‘other emotion-based thinking can be 
profoundly inimical to liberalism’.117 Indeed, Nussbaum can only circumvent this problem by 
designating some emotions ‘good’ and others ‘bad’.118 Nussbaum does indeed elevate love, 
compassion, sympathy and relegate shame, resentment and disgust. In her own admission in 
Political Emotions, ‘The project I envisage will succeed only if it finds ways to make humans lovable, 
inhibiting disgust and shame’.119 However, this systematisation sits uneasily with Nussbaum’s 
conception of anthropodenial as radical evil.120 As Hunt notes, it is this ‘gap that yawns between 
her insistence that we accept our frailty and her apparent hope that it can be wiped out 
altogether’.121 Although Sara Ahmed does not explicitly engage with Nussbaum, her work ‘In the 
Name of Love’ complements Holt’s critique.122 Writing of fascist appropriation of ‘hate’ as love, 
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Ahmed problematizes the equation of love with goodness and its conflation with ‘right action’.123 
In exploring how ‘love becomes a way of bonding with others in relation to an ideal’, Ahmed 
argues that political projects grounded in love are necessarily exclusionary.124 Thus, ‘(l)ove is crucial 
to how individuals become aligned in collectives through their identification with an ideal, an 
alignment that relies on the existence of others who have failed that ideal’.125 Ahmed suggests that 
making love crucial to the promise of cohesion, places the onus on the ‘other’ to have ‘the right 
emotion…to pass into the community: in this case, by displaying ‘my love’, I show that I am ‘with 
you’.126 Indeed, much of Nussbaum’s project is predicated on this educative, perhaps even 
assimilative, impulse: ‘Perhaps most important, (nations) can build cultures of empathy, 
encouraging the ability to see the world through the eyes of others and to recognize their 
individuality’.127 However, this recognition of ‘others’ hinges on the re-making of the other in our 
own image in order to transcend the Aristotlean problem of ‘watery motivation’. As Nussbaum 
argues, 
There are two things above all that make people love and care for something, the thought 
that it is all theirs, and the thought that it is the only one they have…To make people care, 
you have to make them see the object of potential care in some way as ‘theirs’ and ‘them’.128  
 
This emphasis on education and assimilation into a hierarchy of loves would suggest that rather 
than embrace loves in their plurality, Nussbaum’s project hinges on the rehabilitation of love. 
 
Typifying the second approach or ‘rehabilitation’, Hardt and Negri’s project claims to 
‘recuperate’ love, to challenge ‘the modern concept of love…(as) exclusively limited to the 
                                                      
123Ibid., paragraph 48. 
124Ibid., paragraph 5. 
125Ibid., paragraph 47. 
126Ibid., paragraph 32. 
127 Nussbaum, Political Emotions., p. 198. 
128Ibid., p. 219. 
 25 
bourgeois couple and the claustrophobic confines of the nuclear family’.129 In their most recent 
book Assembly, they further seek to disentangle this love from capitalist appropriation. Hardt and 
Negri’s conception of love has been criticised by feminist and queer scholars who have sought to 
rehabilitate rather than reject their concept of revolutionary love. Ann Ferguson argues their 
disregard of gender, race, ethnicity and sexuality; their conflation of ‘caring labour’ with ‘immaterial 
labour’ and their failure to ‘theorize the ongoing conflict between and within various forms of 
personal and political loves’ renders their project deeply problematic.130 Instead, she calls for the 
prioritisation of power-with rather than power-over relations.131 This necessitates a love that 
engages  
in playful and loving practices across class, race, and national divides to create new social 
relationships and group solidarities to challenge old social relations of racial, ethnic, class, 
national and sexual domination.132  
 
Similarly, Eleanor Wilkinson argues that Hardt and Negri appropriate the language of feminist and 
queer critique for conservative ends.133 They extend private loves to the public sphere without ever 
interrogating the embeddedness of these loves in patriarchy and neoliberalism.134 Although 
Wilkinson labels love ‘an improperly political concept’, she really seeks to challenge Hardt and 
Negri’s prioritisation of eros-agape over philia in their articulation of ‘revolutionary love’. As she 
notes,  
From a queer perspective, my aim is to destabilize these distinctions between friendship 
and love. I argue these hierarchies of love may be preventing people from imagining new 
ways of loving and living, and that these distinctions are exactly what needs to be 
challenged in order to truly rediscover the political function of love.135  
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Thus, Hardt, Negri, and the scholars that highlight the limitations of their project are all engaged 
in an attempt to ‘rehabilitate’ love and make it suitable for their vision of politics.   
  
To return to Arendt, her ‘rejection’ of love as ‘antipolitical’ hinges on the reduction of love 
(with Augustine) to appetitus or craving, distinct from action or judgment. While this may not 
detract from Arendt’s compelling critique of Augustinian caritas or his Pauline Christianity, it does 
not exhaust other formulations and evocations of love. Further, Arendt’s own conception of love 
is implicated in her conception of politics. Arendt’s human’s ‘essential nature’ is ‘a lack of self-
sufficiency’.136 To the extent that love is the appetitus that animates the attempt to escape from this 
nature, to the extent that the object of love constitutes a home, Arendt asks, ‘Would it not be 
better to love the world in cupiditas and be at home?’.137 Not only does amor mundi or love of the 
world make individuals ‘denizens of the world’,138 it is the precondition of their participation in 
politics. Animated by respect for alterity rather than universal fraternal love, Arendt’s political 
project rests on a Kantian-mediated reading of Aristotle’s philia politike.139 Distinct from the 
vulnerability Nussbaum places at the centre of her project, Arendt advocates friendship without 
intimacy or closeness, based on ‘regard for the person from the distance which the space of the 
world puts between us’.140 In a similar vein, Sara Ahmed’s thoughtful critique of love as a ‘humanist 
fantasy’ does not negate the fact that love is still central to her praxis of politics. In her words: ‘A 
politics of love is necessary in the sense that how one loves matters; it has effects on the texture 
of everyday life and on the intimate ‘withness’ of social relations’.141 What Ahmed resists is the 
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notion that ‘love can provide the foundation for political action’ or is a ‘sign of good politics’.142 
In sum, it is a critique of the ‘essentialising’ of love, its equation with goodness and its reduction 
to a (sole) basis of right action. Recognising the propensity of love for violence and hate, Ahmed 
actually offers another theory of love. In this pluralist form, love does not offer ontological 
grounding but becomes cognisant of vulnerability and difference. And yet it continues to be a 
form of thinking, acting, valuing and creating. 
We need to be invested in the images of a different kind of world and act upon those 
investments in how we love our loves, and how we live our lives, at the same time, as we 
give ourselves up and over to the possibility that we might get it wrong, or that the world 
that we are in might change its shape. There is no good love that, in speaking its name, can 
change the world into the referent for that name. But in the resistance to speaking in the 
name of love, in the recognition that we do not simply act out of love, we can find perhaps 
a different way of orientating ourselves towards others. Such orientations may be about 
inhabiting forms of love that do not speak their name.143  
   
Although framed as rejecting love as improper for politics, so many of these critiques may 
be seen as engaging (sometimes restating) the same classical discussions of what love is and ought. 
Ahmed’s observations about love not equating to goodness is entirely compatible with Diotima’s 
portrayal of eros as the offspring of ‘Poros’ and ‘Penia’. Her critique of love as ideal, in turn, is 
really a critique of conditional love. Similarly, her openness to multiple loves and resistance to a 
rule-based love is compatible with the radical particularity Aristotle envisages in philia. Calls for an 
‘embodied’, ‘nature-affirming’ love echo the concerns of Aristotle and Hume. Finally, a love that 
is cognisant of power, preoccupied Plato; forms the subject of Nietzschean philosophy and 
culminates in the German Romantic notion of Liebestodt. If all these critiques are but alternate 
theories of love, it would appear that for better or worse, love is implicated in the realm of politics.  
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What Love Does 
 Whether retrieved, rehabilitated or rejected, it would appear love is part of the polis, integral 
to the international. To avoid the dual dangers of reductionism and hubris, I therefore suggest we 
abandon grand narratives about love altogether. This is because any engagement with love in 
general is ultimately an engagement with an abstraction without reference to time, space, agents 
and context. Instead, I propose we borrow from Duncan Bell’s ‘ideal-typical distinction between 
theory, ideology and imaginary’ noting that in reality ‘the three blur together’.144 Bell defines 
theories as ‘systematic articulated bodies of argumentation’; draws on Michael Freeden, to define 
ideologies as 
clusters of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values and attitudes usually held by identifiable groups, 
that provide directives, even plans, of action for public policy-making in an endeavour to 
uphold, justify, change or criticize the social and political arrangements of a state or other 
political community.145 
 
Finally, evoking Charles Taylor he defines social imaginaries as 
the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how 
things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met and 
the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.146  
 
Essentially, Bell clarifies the system at the heart of Taylor’s Modern Social Imaginaries.147 
Understanding theories to be nested within ideologies and ideologies within imaginaries, he argues,  
Imaginaries are more basic than ideologies insofar as they establish the background cultural 
and cognitive conventions that structure and animate them. Just as ideologies contain 
multiple and often competing theories, so imaginaries are compatible with varied 
ideologies.148  
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Conceiving love as an integral part of the social imaginary captures its seeming universality 
and implication in ‘the moral order’. Indeed, love would seem central to much of Taylor’s 
description of the ‘modern’ ‘Western’ social imaginary. As part of the ‘background’ or ‘common 
understanding’ shared by ‘large groups of people’, it is ‘carried in images, stories and legends’, 
making possible ‘common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy’.149 If we pretend it is 
possible to bracket the ideological commitments of Nussbaum (liberal cosmopolitanism) on the 
one hand, and Hardt and Negri (post-Marxism) on the other, it appears that love forms part of 
the social imaginary which both shapes and contains their thought. Reflecting on the continuities 
between Nussbaum, and Hardt and Negri’s project, love constitutes part of ‘the micromappings 
of social and political space through which we perceive, judge and act in the world’.150 Thus, love 
for Nussbaum is a form of emotional appraisal;151 ‘intellectual love’ for Hardt and Negri is ‘the 
supreme form of the expression of intelligence’.152 Nussbaum’s ‘civic love’ hinges on the creation 
and extension of circles of concern;153 Hardt and Negri’s revolutionary zeal is premised on their 
belief that ‘the creation of a new humanity is the ultimate act of love’.154 Viewing love, thus, as part 
of an imaginary, helps clarify two things. First, it explains how love is compatible with the 
liberalism of Nussbaum and the post-Marxism of Hardt and Negri. Consequently, love is no longer 
imagined as some unwieldy anthropomorphic force but a source deliberately drawn on to 
legitimise seemingly conflictual ideologies and theories. Second, envisaging love as part of an 
imaginary, helps shift an emphasis away from what love is or ought to what an agent mobilises love 
to ‘do’ in international politics. 
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Love, Literature and Liminality 
If love forms part of a social imaginary – the ‘largely unstructured and inarticulate 
understanding of our whole situation’ that precedes formal theorising – it follows that it is ‘carried 
in images, stories and legends’.155 Literature, then, would seem an appropriate site for its 
contemplation. Annette Baier would seem to concur when she claims that ‘the ones who have 
taught us the most insightful things about love are poets and novelists’.156 For Raimond Gaita, 
literature offers what ‘political or moral philosophy that seeks universal principles abstracted from 
the concrete circumstances of people who are intellectually and spiritually nourished by the way 
they have been rooted in this or that culture’ simply cannot.157 Charles Taylor is right to admit his 
‘modern’ ‘Western’ social imaginary – with its privileging of Grotian-Lockean natural law and its 
elevation of a ‘network of agape’ as sacral order – is bounded and ought to be provincialized.158 
However, engaging with literature with its embeddedness in context, contingency and cultures 
does not promise an Archimedean point from which to understand or transcend imaginaries. It 
merely offers a glimpse into concurrent ones. 
 
Literature is not merely descriptive, it is also prescriptive. Perhaps this is most clearly 
articulated in the programmes of sentimental education that Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty 
espouse.159 Indeed, literature and sentiments have also been implicated in ‘civilizational’ projects. 
As Margit Pernau and Helde Jordheim have sought to argue, from the time of the Scottish 
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Enlightenment, ‘emotion’ along with politics and economics became ‘markers’ of progress.160 
Consequently, ‘observing how people love’ became ‘a good indicator of how civilized they are’.161 
That literature is involved in this education of emotions, is evident in the postcolonial charge that 
it has advanced the interests of empire, operating as it were as a ‘mask of conquest’.162 Drawing on 
Gramscian analysis of ‘cultural hegemony’, Gauri Viswanathan thus elaborates,  
‘that certain humanistic functions traditionally associated with literature – for example, the 
shaping of character or the development of the aesthetic sense or the disciplines of ethical 
thinking – were considered essential to the processes of [imperial] socio-political control’163  
 
Engaging with liminal figures, or thinkers who are deemed to be on the threshold of 
imaginaries, I seek to illuminate another history. Operating on the peripheries of the ‘West’ and 
non ‘West’, I posit liminal spaces are rich sites of creativity, critique and concurrence. Indebted to 
the work of Elleke Boehmer and Leela Gandhi, I argue that anti-imperialism as an activity was not 
always performed by the ‘non-West’ upon the ‘West’, that literature as a world-making activity did 
not always serve as a weapon of imperialism and that love was mobilised as a praxis of dissent.164 
If twentieth century narratives of the ‘international’ have somehow become concomitant with the 
history of realism and liberalism or indeed Marxism, then writing about liminal literary figures who 
elude classification also illuminates another kind of politics. Variously anarchist, pacifist, socialist 
and libertarian over their lifetimes, they are representative perhaps of what Leela Gandhi describes 
as an ‘immature’ politics expunged from the annals of international history.165  
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This thesis focuses on the period that spans from circa 1880 to 1960. As already discussed, 
it coincides with many narratives of the emergence of the ‘international’. Spanning from the high-
tide of imperialism to the high-tide of decolonisation, it encompasses the imperial wars in South 
Africa, the Philippines and Japan, the decline of the Russian Empire, the beginning of the swadeshi 
(own country) movement in India, the First World War, the founding of the League of Nations, 
the Second World War, the founding of the United Nations, the rise of the Iron Curtain and the 
Algerian Independence Movement. The three literary figures I study, namely Leo Tolstoy (1828-
1910), Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) and Albert Camus’ (1913-1960) literary and political 
writings engage with most of these epochal events. Although love is central to all their ethics, none 
of these figures share the same conception of love or indeed espouse the same conception of love 
over their lifetimes. Nonetheless, they were all internationally renowned, politically engaged, 
liminal literary figures who mobilised a ‘presentist’ conception of love as praxis in their aesthetics 
and politics.  
 
Focusing on the Anglosphere alone, at the turn of the nineteenth century, Tolstoy was the 
most translated author in the English language.166 Tagore enjoyed a moment of unparalleled 
international celebrity in the 1910s, a period which coincided with him becoming the Nobel 
Laureate in Literature in 1913 and his prominence on the speaker circuit in the United States and 
the United Kingdom. Camus’ The Plague was translated into nine languages within a year of 
publication and was a celebrated classic even before his untimely death in 1960.167 He too was the 
recipient of the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1957 and was renowned both because of his proximity 
and distance from the French existential circle. All three literary figures were engaged in politics 
as activists or critics. Toward the latter half of his life, Tolstoy was an anarcho-pacifist and anti-
imperialist, Tagore was critical of nationalist and imperial violence, Camus was involved in the 
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French resistance and was an ardent advocate for the equality of Arabs and Berbers in Algeria 
even when he failed to support a particular political model of Algerian independence.  
 
Writing from one of the three most significant empires of the twentieth century prior to 
decolonisation, each figure occupies a distinct relation to it. The Russian Tolstoy was an aristocrat 
in the metropole, the British subject Tagore was of the landed gentry in the colonial city and pied-
noir Camus was from the working class in Algeria. Like Michael Walzer’s archetypical ‘critic’, then, 
they may be described as both ‘ “insiders”, men…mindful of and committed to the society whose 
policies and practices they call into question – who care about what happens to it’ and ‘heroes’ 
whose critical distance represents a ‘wilful break with the fellowship of the city’.168 None subaltern, 
the pied-noir, pirali Brahmin,169 and the aristocrat of a lower echelon, have a relationship of 
antagonism rather than alienation to the polis, that Walzer (and indeed Michael Sandel or Alisdair 
McIntyre) sees as so central to the role of the social critic.170 This relationship of antagonism 
problematizes the sharp binary Leela Gandhi imagines between haemophilia or love of fellow 
citizens and Epicurean xenophilia or love of strangers.171 It also produces a political thought that is 
not, indeed cannot, be systematic. Between their aesthetics and activism, their engagement with 
and eschewal of politics, all three figures represent the contradictions that arise from the constant 
negotiation of what to conserve and what to challenge.  
 
Their antagonism with the polis is in part formed by their liminal status. Although Tolstoy 
is now read as part of the Western canon, his Russia had an ambivalent, antagonistic relationship 
to it. Indeed, in his early career, Tolstoy subscribed neither to the Westernizer nor the Slavophile 
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camp.172 In the decade and a half before his death, he increasingly identified Russia as an ‘Eastern’ 
nation.173 Yet for all his creative engagements with Daoism, Buddhism, Sufism, Hinduism and 
Eastern non-conformist theology, his thought is unintelligible without recognising a debt to 
Rousseau, Schopenhauer and Kant. While Tagore’s moment of celebrity coincided largely with his 
veneration as some kind of Eastern sage, for most of his life in Bengal and India he was criticised 
for being Western and modern. In his own admission, his work was the product of the confluence 
of cultures. Although Martha Nussbaum and Isaiah Berlin translate him with ease into a liberal 
canon, much is lost from ignoring his embeddedness in a Hindu universalism. Though few would 
question Camus’ place in a Western canon, Camus regarded himself an Algerian and consequently 
‘out of place’ among the French existential elite. Although fruitfully read as contributing to ‘post-
foundational’ literature, Camus was also engaged in a distinctively pied-noir literary tradition of 
theorising a colonised Mediterranean.  
 
None of the literary figures I study subscribe to a sharp demarcation between the 
Aristotelian categories of poiesis or the ‘making’ of literature and praxis or the ‘doing’ of politics or 
what Arendt described as the distinction between ‘work’ and ‘action’. Thus, art is central to 
Tolstoy’s anarcho-pacifist or rationalist Christian politics of ‘truth telling’. 
Every work of art results in the one who receives it entering into a certain kind of 
communion with the one produced or is producing the art, and with all those who, 
simultaneously with him, before him, or after him, have received or will receive the same 
artistic impression.174  
In his highly-prescriptive polemic What is Art?, Tolstoy envisions aesthetics as that which unites 
rather than divides. Consequently, it is ‘universalist’ in its celebration of Vedic hymns, Shakya muni 
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(Buddha), Japanese art, Indian architecture and Arabian tales.175 Similarly, it denounces art that 
breeds hierarchy and violence.176 Tolstoy’s emphasis ‘on what art is’ is intrinsically bound to ‘what 
art does’. What art can or cannot be is dictated, in turn, by how the polis is conceived. Tolstoy’s 
polis is Christian and is based on a universal conception of humanity and radical obedience to a 
‘law of love’ characterised by non-resistance to violence. Consequently, only aesthetics which 
embody or advance these aims constitute ‘art’ in Tolstoy’s frame. 
 
For Tagore, art’s role lies in the sentimental education of the citizen. Enabling ‘the 
disinterested perception of the real’, he suggests aesthetics are ‘not about beauty in its ordinary 
meaning but in the deeper meaning which a poet has expressed in his utterance: truth is beauty, 
beauty truth’.177 Drawing on Indic rasa tradition, Tagore suggests ‘taste’ is the foundation for ethical 
judgment.178 He suggests it forms the portal through which the world of appearance and intimate 
world of sentiment interact transforming each other.179 Rather than ‘art’ operating as a form of 
creation imposed upon the world, in Tagore’s monist frame, creation entails and presupposes the 
recognition of ‘the other’.  
When the singer has his inspiration he makes himself into two; he has within him his other 
self as the hearer, and the outside audience is merely an extension of this other self of his. 
The lover seeks his own other self in his beloved. It is the joy that creates this separation, 
in order to realise through obstacles the union.180  
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For Camus, art as ‘creation’ or poiesis is central to rebellion. As he notes, ‘The demands of 
rebellion are really, in part aesthetic demands’.181 However, in it the paradox of the absurdity of 
the world and one’s love for it are reconciled. Camus summarises the paradox thus: ‘artistic 
creation is a demand for unity and a rejection of the world. But it rejects the world on account of 
what it lacks and in the name of what it sometimes is’.182 The novel becomes a site for rebellion. 
Its power lies in the fact that it offers an avenue for thinking or reasoning in the full knowledge 
that life is absurd and all meaning is of its creation. Recognising that there is making in the doing 
and doing in the making, Camus begins to see rebellion as the middle way between the ‘frenzy of 
annihilation and the acceptance of totality’.183 It allows him to see creativity as political and 
rebellion as part of the human condition. Unlike Arendt, Camus can appreciate creation as central 
to rebellion without assuming the artist ought to become legislator. He is explicit about this:  
This formula certainly does not authorize the ridiculous illusion of a civilization controlled 
by artists. It only illuminates the drama of our times in which work, entirely subordinated 
by production has ceased to be creative.184 
 
Without calling for the artist to be legislator, as Tolstoy arguably does, Camus merely notes art can 
be political.  
 
These literary figures’ liminality informs their articulations of an ‘ethico-politics’ of love in 
the context of empire. Over the course of his career, Tolstoy variously advocated some form of 
agape that was affirmed in Romantic, familial or universal love. Tagore’s work shifted from 
celebrating the ethico-political potential of plural loves in the Indic rasa (aesthetic) tradition to 
examining the extent to which freedom is a precondition to love’s soteriological promise. Finally, 
I read Camus’ life’s works as an attempt to critique and rehabilitate agape via an engagement with 
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two fellow Mediterraneans: Plotinus and Augustine. Despite their differences, what all three figures 
share in common is their attempt to articulate a love that is (sometimes despite their protestations) 
both ‘presentist’ and modern. Contrary to Arendt’s admonitions of love as unworldly, all seemingly 
reject metaphysics and a concern for another world in their bid to articulate an ethico-politics for 
living and acting in this one. Although Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus’ theorising of love in the 
context of empire forms the focus of this study, it is worth noting that love also creates a space 
for their participation in politics that transcends the binaries of coloniser and colonised. 
Embodying what Leela Gandhi and Michael Collins term ‘the politics of friendship’,185 Tolstoy 
corresponded with Mohandas Gandhi, Ku-Hung Ming and Jane Addams; Tagore collaborated 
with Gilbert Murray, corresponded with W.B Yeats and W.E.B. Du Bois and Camus collaborated 
with and critiqued French existentialists and individuals who were to become members of the 
Algerian National Liberation Front.  
 
Aims, Plan and Method 
Setting the burgeoning literature on aesthetics and emotions in conversation, I seek to 
make love the subject of serious, systematic study. I argue that to the extent that plural loves 
populate the polis, love is integral to international relations. My thesis’ offerings to international 
relations are theoretical and historical. My theoretical offering is a schema for examining love’s 
work in international relations, cognisant both of the plurality of loves and the contestation 
surrounding what love is and ought. Having offered this broad framework, I turn my focus in the 
rest of the thesis to the period extending roughly from 1880-1960 and its twin thematic of empire 
and internationalism, which is increasingly understood as integral to the birth of International 
Relations as a discipline. My historical offering is to argue that love has played a significant role in 
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this period, evoked in ways variously hospitable and hostile to empire. Chapter 2 examines how 
love formed an important site for theorising and navigating the relationship between the imperial 
and the international, even for canonical figures in the academy. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 engage with 
the aesthetics and other political work of Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus in order to highlight how 
they conceived, evoked and mobilised love in the context of empire. Although there is now 
growing interest in Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus’ contributions to political thought, the integral role 
love plays in their international thought in general, and in their critique of empire in particular, 
remains neglected. In bringing to light these neglected dimensions of their thought, I also hope to 
illuminate another history. It is a history where love (and emotion) was summoned to perform the 
work of imperialism and internationalism; where even liminal literary figures were involved as 
agents in theorising, conserving, resisting and transforming transnational relations in ways that the 
discipline’s standard narratives that centre on liberalism, realism and Marxism simply do not 
capture. My engagement with these three literary figures and six canonical figures is not so much 
to endorse their thought, but to illuminate these neglected histories. The conclusion sets Tolstoy, 
Tagore and Camus in conversation and asks what is missed by studying these figures rather than 
a host of others. Understanding politics as the negotiation of plural loves, I ask in the conclusion 
what forms of action and what visions of politics, a large scale, thematic engagement with love 
might render visible. 
 
This thesis is interdisciplinary. Arguably any work that takes emotion seriously as a human 
phenomenon must necessarily be so. Situated in the interstices of political theory, intellectual 
history and literature, my approach is interpretivist. In sum, I ‘analyse the meanings that political 
concepts, practices and behaviours have for agents’ and focus ‘on the traditions, beliefs and 
theories that agents inherit, modify and utilise’ to understand their world, their ‘concepts, practices 
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and behaviour’.186 My methods are historical. Broadly attuned to context, I read literary works 
alongside political writings, interpreting literature as (I believe these three authors intended) as 
forms of political action. In seeking to understand an author’s interpretation, I do not rely on texts 
alone but read biographies, correspondence, diaries and other works by the author in the same 
period. In sum, I seek to follow the advice of J.G.A Pocock: 
There may be evidence, unreliable and treacherous but still usable, from the author’s other 
writings or his private correspondence…The more evidence the historian can mobilise in 
the construction of hypothesis regarding the author’s intentions, which can then be applied 
to or tested against the text itself, the better his chances of escaping from the hermeneutic 
circle.187  
 
However, while I think these methods allow me to construct some kind of hypothesis I do not 
believe they offer me some kind of Archimedean viewpoint about authorial intent. Although I do 
not consider myself a Skinnerian, I concur entirely with his observation that 
(T)he literary historian must I think concede that [s]he can never hope, however much 
[s]he works with the contextual aids, to arrive simply by this process at the best reading of 
what a given writer might have meant. It is always for us, bringing our own experience and 
sensibility to bear, to say finally how we think a work must be taken.188  
 
This thesis has a number of limitations. First, I read Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus in 
translation rather than in the original Russian, Bengali and French. Perhaps this is less significant 
in the case of Tagore who was a polyglot, oversaw the translation of his novels, and corresponded 
and delivered most of his speeches in English. Owing to the popularity of all three figures, I also 
think this problem is somewhat mitigated by the availability of translations that are widely regarded 
as authoritative. Second, although my research on Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus engages with their 
primary work, I draw extensively on secondary sources to understand and explain their historical 
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context. However, I note my core contribution in this thesis does not lie in the discovery of new 
material by established literary figures, but in the articulation and analysis of neglected themes in 
their work. Finally, despite my attempts to be sensitive to identity and alterity, I recognise that the 
three literary figures and the six canonical figures I study are all men. If I were seeking to offer a 
systematic definition of love based on an uncritical engagement with their thought, perhaps I could 
be prone to perpetuating a gendered, heteronormative, ableist theory of love. However, this is not 
what I am doing. In conversation with the many individuals that appear in my bibliography, I 
merely seek to illustrate some of the work love ‘does’ in international politics. 
 
CHAPTER 2: LOVE AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ‘CANON’ 
 
That Leo Tolstoy, Rabindranath Tagore or Albert Camus chose to engage with love as a 
site of ethico-politics is in some ways unremarkable. Perhaps owing to the lingering influence of 
nineteenth century ‘religions of humanity’; the popularity of theosophy; the post-war rise in 
religiosity and the sexual and cultural revolution, love remained in the public square in the period 
when they wrote. Indeed, in the same timeframe, individuals deemed canonical to the discipline 
of International Relations also evoked love in their theorising of the international. In this chapter, 
I focus on three conceptual pairs and offer a brief exposition of how their understanding of love 
intersects with their understanding of order, history and power respectively. The figures I study 
are Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern; Herbert Butterfield and Arnold J. Toynbee, and Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau. Each conceptual pair is respectively associated with the traditions 
of institutionalism, international society and realism. Although each theorist was a prolific writer, 
the work I focus on in this chapter offers only a brief engagement with a specific set of their 
concerns at a specific moment of early twentieth century history. Thus, Murray and Zimmern’s 
writings – much like the work I emphasise of Tolstoy and Tagore’s – corresponds with the high-
noon of empire. Like Camus, Butterfield and Toynbee’s writings broadly correspond with the 
post-Second World War fracture of empires. Niebuhr and Morgenthau’s post-Second World War 
writings, like Camus’ late works are concerned with the rise of American and Soviet empires in a 
nuclear age. Although each of these ‘canonical’ thinkers conceive love differently, for all, love 
constitutes and/or legitimises their normative vision of international order and their related 
prescriptions for political praxis. Engaging with these figures’ work on love not only illuminates 
neglected dimensions of their thought but brings to light the role love plays across disparate 
‘traditions’ in the negotiation of the imperial and the international, the universal and the particular.  
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Of Cosmos and Commonwealth: Love and Order in Murray and Zimmern’s Thought  
Gilbert Murray (1866-1957) was Regius Professor of Greek at the University of Oxford, a 
classicist, an internationalist and key architect of the League of Nations Society. He was a 
campaigner for peace and reconciliation and an advocate of intellectual cooperation and cultural 
internationalism.1 As his son-in-law, A.J. Toynbee attested, liberalism and Hellenism formed the 
two pillars of his thought.2 
(L)iberalism was the link between his public work and his scholarship. He identified both 
the Hellenic genius and the modern Western genius with the liberal spirit, and so identified 
them with each other. This was the master idea that gave unity to all his pursuits and 
inspiration to each of them…3 
 
Indeed, Murray was a self-proclaimed advocate of what he termed ‘Liberality’, which was ‘not a 
doctrine’ but  
a spirit or attitude of mind, constantly changing in its outer manifestation according to the 
circumstances it has to meet, but always essentially the same in itself, an effort to get rid 
of prejudice so as to see the truth, to get rid of selfish passions as to do the right’.4 
 
And, he was a Hellenist to the extent that he understood this ‘liberality’ to be first articulated in 
the example of Ancient Greece. His vision of classicism as liberalism was shared by his younger 
protégé, Alfred Eckhard Zimmern (1879-1957). Zimmern is perhaps best known today by E.H. 
Carr’s errant description of him as an ‘inter-war idealist’ evangelising the doctrine of the ‘harmony 
of interests’.5 However, as Morgenthau acknowledged, Zimmern exerted considerable influence 
                                                      
1 Peter Wilson, “Gilbert Murray and International Relations: Hellenism, Liberalism, and International Intellectual 
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on the development of International Relations as a discipline.6 Not only was he the first professor 
of international politics in the world at Aberystwyth; the Montague Burton professor of 
International Relations at the University of Oxford; the architect of the League of Nations 
Covenant; co-founder of the (later Royal) Institute of International Affairs and the Geneva 
Institute of International Affairs, but many of his students such as Arnold Toynbee, Reginald 
Coupland and others went on to have a profound influence on the emergence of the discipline.7 
 
For Jeanne Morefield, Murray and Zimmern subscribed to the muddled liberalism of 
Oxford, which bore the mark of T.H. Green’s struggle ‘to reconcile individualism and collectivism, 
spirituality and rationality, capitalism and morality, and a deep fear of the state with a belief in 
limited state intervention’.8 In sum, they embraced Hegel’s notion of a dialectic of spirit capable 
of reconciling ‘individual freedom with the social and communal whole’, but rejected his state 
theory.9 Peter Wilson queries whether Murray could be called a neo-Hegelian in any meaningful 
sense,10 and Julia Stapleton argues Zimmern’s thought was more influenced by his engagement 
with the Jewish philosopher Asher Ginzberg (Ahad Ha-am) and his time in the Mediterranean 
writing The Greek Commonwealth.11 Nonetheless, both Murray and Zimmern’s projects are premised 
on the ‘muddled’ temporality of liberal conservatism, which entails a simultaneous moving 
forward, or progress, via a moving back to the example of Ancient Greece. Perhaps this is most 
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evident in Murray’s description of the relationship between the ‘Liberality’ and ‘Conservatism’ as 
one of ‘complementarity’. 
Conservatism is…based upon the truth that mankind in the civilized nations has by 
centuries of trial and error, experiment and struggle, built up a social order which is 
extremely precious and whose destruction would mean the loss of all that has been 
painfully won by the great reforms of the past. The object of Conservatism is to save the 
social order. The object of Liberality is to bring that order a little nearer to what reformers 
aimed at and to what the judgment of a free man – free from selfishness, free from passion, 
free from prejudice – would require, and by that very change to save it the more 
effectively.12  
 
Similarly, it is implicit in Zimmern’s vision of liberty which emanates from custom and what he 
describes as the ‘patriarchal system’.13 In both instances, Murray and Zimmern seek the union of 
conservatism and liberalism in their theory of community.14 
 
The notion of ‘Cosmos’ is central to Murray’s vision of community and world order. He 
argues with his Hellenists 
(T)hat human society, rightly conceived, was not a chaos of warring interests, but a 
Cosmos, an ordered whole, in which every individual had his due share of both privilege 
and service. The whole inhabited world was by rights one great City, not a discordant 
jumble of Greek and barbarian, or slave and free; not, as we might now say, a mere 
battleground of Fascist and Communist, or a mere mob of white, yellow, and black; one 
Great City of which all men are free citizens.15 
 
This Cosmos, this ‘one great City of Men and Gods’ is a ‘moral and spiritual order’.16 Constructing 
his tradition to include ‘Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, St Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Kant and 
J.S. Mill, and Comte and T.H Green’, he argues all ‘what is good is in harmony with this Order, 
and what is bad is in discord against it’.17 As Peter Wilson notes, Murray’s Cosmos ‘was 
                                                      
12 Murray, Liberality and Civilization., p. 46. 
13 Alfred Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1931)., p. 72. 
14 Morefield, Covenants Without Swords., p. 5.  
15 Murray, Liberality and Civilization., p. 43. 
16 Ibid., p. 44 and 46.  
17 Gilbert Murray, Satanism and the World Order (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1920)., p. 9. 
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predominantly an Anglo-Saxon Cosmos’,18 which imagined the British Empire and Western 
civilisation as inextricably linked and inherently good.19 Consequently, he regarded anarchy as 
anathema, naturalised the hierarchical relation of ‘leader and led’,20 and saw no contradiction 
between ‘brotherhood’ and beneficence.21 Although Murray often used liberal and rational as 
synonyms,22 he suggested the emotions of love and hate were implicated in the Cosmos and its 
antithesis, chaos. Thus, in Murray’s Satanism and World Order, he rightly understands ‘Satanism; as 
the philosophical critique of entrenched order that is not incompatible with the thought of 
Christian evangelists and martyrs’.23 However, he imagines it as animated, indeed indistinguishable 
from hatred. As he elaborates,  
(T)he spirit that I have called Satanism, the spirit which hates the World Order wherever 
it exists and seeks to vent its hate without further plan24  
 
For Murray, this Satanism constitutes a threat to both British Empire and the League of Nations.25 
If hatred is implicated in chaos, for Murray, love ‘works like a leaven transforming the whole mass’, 
in service of the Cosmos.26 In his Halley Stewart Lecture of 1928, The Ordeal of This Generation, he 
argued that love is neither a panacea nor synonymous with peace. Rather, it is ‘a source of hope’, 
intrinsic to the ‘struggle for life’.27  
We are gregarious animals. And if such animals cannot live without killing, it is also true 
they cannot live without loving one another and sacrificing themselves for one another.28 
 
                                                      
18 Wilson, “Retrieving Cosmos.”, p. 251. 
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Consequently, ‘kill to live’ and ‘cooperate to live’ constitute two forms of strife, one is premised 
on ‘self-protection’ the other on sacrificial love.29 
Murray writes of ‘loyalty’, ‘sacrifice’ and ‘brotherhood’ rather than ‘sacrificial love’ 
elsewhere, although he appears to use these terms interchangeably. Sacrificial love forms the 
capstone of his Cosmos. It co-opts the imperial officer who must selflessly bear the ‘white man’s 
burden’, holding colonies in ‘sacred trust’ rather than as ‘an estate to be exploited’.30 Evoking 
Cobden, Macaulay, Mill, Salisbury and Gladstone,31 he articulates his vision of equality within 
hierarchy. 
Above all, in our government and our administration of justice, we try to act without fear 
or favour, treating the poor man with as much respect as the rich man, the coloured man 
as the white, the alien as the Englishman.32 
 
However, this condemns the colonised to accept their inferiority as natural.33 For Murray, this 
inferiority was racially determined.  
It is a thing abundantly proved by experience that on the whole white men are ‘superior’ 
to black, brown, red, and yellow men – that is to say, that on the whole the first mentioned 
colour tends to rule and the other colours to obey34  
 
Murray’s conflation of moral and (constructed) racial hierarchies leads him to conclude the work 
of empire is ultimately good. 
The cruelties perpetrated by white men upon coloured men are, almost wherever and 
however they meet, stupendous. But the coloured men who are worked under definite 
rules and indentures are far better off than those who cannot be worked at all, or those 
who, under conditions of nominal equality, are forced to work, unprotected, beneath the 
hand of any chance master.35 
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Equating empire with Cosmos, Murray imagines decolonisation as ‘Satanism’, animated by hatred 
and concomitant with chaos.36 
 
Notwithstanding Murray’s imperial anxieties, he was not an uncritical imperialist. In part, 
this is because as Martin Ceadal argues, his political trajectory was characterised by a movement 
from apologia to internationalism to apologia.37 For Ceadal this largely corresponds with his early 
support for Edward Grey in the lead up to the Great War, his subsequent emphasis on 
institutionalism and internationalism, and his later support for Anthony Eden’s Suez intervention 
of 1956.38 Whether or not one conceives of Murray as an imperialist, then, depends a little on 
where one encounters him on this trajectory. Indeed, Murray’s defence of the Suez interventionism 
coincided with his disdain for the United Nations and its ‘egalitarianism’ towards the former 
colonies.39 In part, however, this is because Murray maintained – at least until the 1950s – a 
commitment to the reform of British Empire. Perhaps this is best summed up in his admission ‘at 
home England is Greek. In the Empire she is Roman’.40 An Australian descendent of Irish 
Catholics, Murray was an ardent supporter of Irish Home Rule. Speaking to the Oxford Indian 
Majlis Club, he argued his Irish nationalism made him sympathetic to the cause of Indian 
nationalism.41 Writing to Rabindranath Tagore in 1934, he sympathised with his decision to 
renounce his knighthood.42 Further, Murray was professionally penalised for his views on Irish 
Home Rule and his perceived anti-imperialism. For example, although he was an eminent classics 
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scholar, his lectures were boycotted by the majority of Oxford colleges, including his own.43 
Murray, also, did much to condemn the crimes of colonialism. Writing of ancient Greece and 
Rome, he likened the exploitation of colonial subjects to slavery.44 Condemning the atrocities in 
Amritsar, Mesopotamia, Ceylon and Rhodesia, he expressed sympathy for colonial subjects.45 
Nonetheless, Murray’s faith in the British empire led him to regard these acts of violence as 
exceptional rather than systemic.46 To the extent that his dualisms of love and hate, Cosmos and 
chaos elevated the exoneration of empire over a critique of her crimes, his conception of love 
served to conserve even as it sought to reform an imperial world order.  
 
Alfred Zimmern is credited with re-conceiving the British empire as a Commonwealth. 
Crucially, for Zimmern, the Commonwealth did not connote the empire from its inception. Rather 
the third British Empire or the Commonwealth was superior to its antecedents: the first version 
of empire which ended with American independence and the second version which culminated in 
the Great War.47 Zimmern’s Commonwealth offered a template for internationalism and 
nationalism. It is hard to overstate the role that sentiment in general, and love in particular played 
in Zimmern’s conception of order. Indeed, he proclaimed that ‘the commonwealth is an 
organisation designed with the ruling motive of love and brotherhood’.48The fullest articulation of 
this can be found in Zimmern’s The Greek Commonwealth, which was written during the high-noon 
of empire. Zimmern’s thought was syncretic. Although he envisaged as exemplar the Athens of 
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Ancient Greece, he interpreted this Athens via Hegel, Kant, Zionism and evangelical Christianity.49 
For Zimmern Athens was organised around concentric circles of loyalty or love. 
The life of the early Greeks was enclosed, for political purposes, within what may be 
described as concentric circles of loyalty. Outside they had the nation (or what in Jewish 
history is called the Tribe); within that nation the tribe in the narrower sense; within that 
the ‘brotherhood’ or ‘companionship’ of tent and messmates; and within that the still 
narrower circle of immediate family….It was with these inner circles, and above all, with 
the family, that the individual was in closest touch in daily life; and it was here that the 
Greek received his first training in citizenship.50  
 
As Jeanne Morefield elaborates, Zimmern’s understanding of these ‘distinct but interrelated 
spheres’ – much like Hegel’s conception of Sittlichkeit – allowed the Athenian to ‘distinguish 
between a primordial love for family and the rational, civic love for the community.51 It is what 
enabled, the ‘civilized man’ 
not merely in the hour of danger but in the work and leisure of every day, to set country 
before wife and family, or lifelong companions, or fellow-craftsmen and fellow-
worshippers, ‘to bring the dispositions that are lovely in private life into the service and 
conduct of the commonwealth’, to ‘spend their bodies, as mere external tools, in the city’s 
service, and count their minds as most truly their own when employed on her behalf’ 52 
 
Returning to his times, Zimmern imagined the British Commonwealth as a modern day Athens, 
similarly organised around loyalties and loves. Unlike the Germans, he noted the ‘British tendency 
is to develop habits of service and responsibility through devotion to smaller and more intimate 
associations, to build on a foundation of lesser loyalties and duties’.53 Britain was the epitome of 
the Burkean vision -  
‘To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society,’ said 
Burke long ago, ‘is the first principle, the germ, as it were, of public affections. It is the 
first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love of our country and 
mankind….We begin our public affections in our families. No cold relation is a zealous 
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citizen. We pass on to our neighbourhoods, to our habitual provincial connections. These 
are the inns and resting places…so many images of the great country, in which the heart 
found something with which it could fill.54 
 
Thus, Zimmern concludes, ‘A school, a ship, a club, a Trade Union, any free association of 
Englishmen, is all England in miniature’.55  
 
Zimmern mobilises love to assert that the imperial and the international are co-constituted. 
This assertion is premised on a conception of love that at once emphasises alterity and universality, 
the individual and the community, the liberal and the conservative. It animates his notion of a 
nation which is neither a ‘state nor a church nor a race nor a geographical or linguistic unity’ but 
rather a ‘body of people united by a corporate sentiment of peculiar intensity, intimacy and dignity, 
related to a definite home country’.56 This emphasis on sentiment allows him to achieve what 
Tomohito Baji claims is his greatest achievement: the replacement of ‘race’ with ‘nation’ as the 
‘basic ontological category of world ordering’.57 Much like membership of a family, Zimmern 
argues membership of nations are both voluntary and hereditary, governed both by marriage and 
natality.58 If the former is the standard in the New World, the latter was the standard in the Old. 
In Zimmern’s ‘post-racial Commonwealth,59 loves and loyalty rather than race or ethnicity formed 
the basis of community. Consequently, he claimed ‘in my political philosophy the bond between 
London and Nigeria is closer than the bond between London and Dusseldorf’.60 Zimmern’s vision 
of the international is likewise predicated on the image of nations in all their diversity and 
particularity. As he elaborates, ‘True internationalism is contact between nations in their highest 
                                                      
54 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
55 Ibid., p. 13. 
56 Alfred Zimmern, “Nationalism and Internationalism,” Foreign Affairs 1, no. 4 (1922)., p. 120.  
57 Baji, “Zionist Internationalism?”, p. 623. 
58 Zimmern, “Nationalism and Internationalism.”, p. 120.  
59 Baji, “Zionist Internationalism?” 
60 Morefield, Covenants Without Swords., p. 69. 
 51 
and best and most distinctive representatives and manifestations’.61 Yet, for all its inclusivity and 
celebration of plurality, Zimmern’s vision of the international and the loves that animate it are 
deeply hierarchical. Like Murray, Zimmern understood the rule of Athens as distinct from that of 
Rome’s.62 For him, it was synonymous with ‘the rule of freedom’ and ushered an era of liberty. 
Given these convictions, it is unsurprising that he saw no contradiction between the League of 
Nations advancing the interests of empire on the one hand, and humanity on the other.63 This 
hierarchical, imperial vision emanated from Zimmern’s conception of familial love, which in his 
own admission constitutes the foundation of the ‘patriarchal system’.64 In fact, so entwined were 
his conceptions of love and order that any union of fraternity and anarchy was inconceivable: 
Fraternity sits ill on the banner of the anarchist; there is no true fraternity which does not 
grow, as it grew in Greece, out of the plain primaeval emotions of friendship and family.65 
 
For Morefield, Zimmern’s fixation with familial love allowed him  
to champion a liberal doctrine based on universal equality while denying political autonomy 
to millions by relocating political power from the realm of liberal civil equality and positing 
it in the loving, but deeply hierarchical, shelter of the family.66  
 
The shelter of family allowed him to cast colonial subjects as children,67 just as it allowed him to 
obfuscate that imperial relations were neither hereditary nor voluntary. However, all of this was 
facilitated by his elision of the fact that while families might be spheres of love, they are also 
sometimes sites of violence. 
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Although Murray’s Cosmos is an undifferentiated whole and Zimmern’s Commonwealth 
is differentiated but integrated,68 both their conceptions of order hinge on loves that are sacrificial 
or familial. In Murray’s case, it animates his critique of imperial exploitation. Murray’s conception 
of love also underscores what his frontispiece to Liberality and Civilization proclaims: ‘the ethical 
basis of all politics is humanity…a new word for the old love of our fellow-men’.69 Similarly, 
Zimmern attempts to mobilise an inclusive vision of familial love as a corrective to a social order 
based on race. However, both their conceptions of love as sacrificial and familial are ultimately 
hierarchical. Consequently, their visions of the international are imperial.  
 
History and Christianity: Love and ‘Civilisation’ in the Thought of Butterfield and 
Toynbee 
Herbert Butterfield (1900-1979) was a Regius Professor of History and later Vice 
Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. He was the chairman of the British Committee of the 
Theory of International Politics, which was integral to the development of the English School of 
International Relations. Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889-1975) was Stevenson Professor of 
International History at the University of London, a public intellectual and arguably one of the 
most influential historians of the twentieth century. As Ian Hall notes, his name ‘was synonymous 
with the Royal Institute of International Affairs for the first half of its history’.70 Although not part 
of the proceedings of the British Committee, his concept of ‘civilisation’ came to play a significant 
role in theorising ‘international society’.71 As Charles Jones notes, ‘Butterfield was a Wesleyan, 
Toynbee was a pious agnostic’…and neither kept ‘religion sequestered away from his professional 
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work of thinking about history’.72 Somewhat unsurprisingly, then, love features prominently in 
both their works. Evident in their engagement with history and their divergent prescriptions of 
political action, love for them explicates an order that transcends the demise of ‘Western’ 
civilisation.  
 
That love was integral to Herbert Butterfield’s theorising of international relations may 
seem surprising. Indeed, to the extent love features prominently in any of his major works, he 
seems preoccupied with cupidity rather than charity, eros rather than agape. However, C.T. McIntire 
argues that despite this focus, Butterfield was rather more interested ‘in the essentials of 
Christianity, such as love and spirituality’.73 As he confided in a letter to his mistress, Joy Marc: 
I regard as the very basis of life and of all ethics the Christian teaching about love – and 
love is the only ethical law, that the increase of love is the only ethical end…74 
 
His biographer, Michael Bentley, confirms, 
Christian love dominated Butterfield’s consciousness and gave his life meaning. It 
anchored his theology and lent it a deep sense of charity towards sinner; it illuminated his 
history and turned the practice of historical writing into a form of ethics; it controlled his 
political views in ways that took him beyond party; it told him how international relations 
should be configured.75  
 
The pivotal role love comes to play in Butterfield’s thought emanates from his belief ‘that a loving 
God made the universe and that a historical Jesus was is earthly embodiment’.76 God, then, for 
him was revealed in history as self-giving, charitable, agapic love. This God, this love was manifested 
in the normative order: 
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(T)he principle of love which is the final touchstone and which reigns in the universe, 
keeping the planets in motion and holding the solar system in a network of harmonious 
relationships.77  
 
Consequently, he understood love, rightly conceived, to be ‘the grand and mighty exorcism’,78 
redemptive and inherently good: 
If all men were to become as unselfish as St Francis, and were to do so in time to remove 
the present causes of stumbling, the problems would be solved, and a profound Christian 
message would be vindicated.79  
 
Nonetheless, Butterfield’s acceptance of Lapsarian theology led him to regard faith in human 
nature as disastrous and heretical. Although this militated against utopianism, love remained for 
him an important form of political action.  
 
Much like his fellow Augustinians, variously termed Christian realists or Christian 
pragmatists, Butterfield’s conception of love was intrinsically bound to order. Conceived such, 
history revealed that the relationship between God, humans and the world was ordered by love. 
Loving God and the world entailed acting to privilege and conserve this order. It required ‘a 
disposition not to seek to direct affairs as though one had a right to assert a sovereign will in the 
world – a disposition rather to see that one’s action takes the form of a co-operation with 
Providence’.80 In its engagement with history, it therefore necessitated moral humility 
All of this seems to be the final effect of the reading of history upon me…The historian 
cannot give a judgment on particular human beings that can be admitted as final and moral 
judgment on their personalities, save in the sense that he can say: ‘All men are sinners’.81 
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Similarly, it entailed epistemological humility to ‘look upon each generation as…an end in itself, a 
world of people existing in their own right’.82 Butterfield thought this disposition toward history 
ought to be transposed toward diplomacy. In fact, he sought to universalise this disposition 
altogether.   
The statesman, like the scientist or the poet, will constantly be confronted by the 
alternative between an act that is more moral and an act that is less moral. But we must 
not allow that there can be a difference in the quality of the decision in these cases, or a 
difference in the ethical principles involved.83 
 
Butterfield’s universalising impulse arose from his belief that love was an absolute, ultimate 
law.84 In keeping with his non-conformism, he understood this love not to be monolithic, rigid or 
uniform. Rather it emphasised ‘freedom’, ‘differentiation’ and ‘diversification’.85 It was, in sum, a 
form of practical reason. 
Here is a law, then, which cannot really be broken up into specific injunctions, for its 
implications are developed anew in every fresh human situation that arises; and all that can 
be done even in the New Testament – even in the Gospels – is to illustrate its workings in 
certain types of conjecture, as in the case of praying for your persecutors or turning the 
other check. St Augustine could formulate the whole aspect of the resulting situation in 
the injunction: ‘Love God and do what you like’.86  
 
Abstraction, thus, was the antithesis of Christian charity. As Butterfield elaborated, the injunction 
‘Love of neighbour’ prioritised the pragmatic and the particular.  
The pith and marrow of the injunction are in its concreteness and its immediacy – its 
avoidance of the abstract noun.87  
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The ‘neighbour’, in turn, could not be construed to encapsulate state, society or mankind. Instead, 
it referred to ‘any man as he actually comes into our orbit, however indirect the relationship that 
is established with him, and however momentary the contact’.88  
 
For Butterfield, loving also cultivated, indeed was, the ‘equivalent of creative 
imagination’,89 a ‘thinking with our sympathies’.90  
And since it means thinking with our sympathies, and actually feeling with the other party 
– means giving something of our personalities so that we may comprehend the men not 
like-minded without ourselves – it is to Christian thought in particular that the problem is 
most likely to be presented. Little by little we may hope that Christian thought will turn 
into communicable knowledge those forms of intellectual exploration which are accessible 
only to men in a certain frame of mind, to human beings in love, human beings willing to 
make fools of themselves for love.91 
 
Applied to the realm of politics, it’s chief political implication was to emphasise human creativity 
in ‘mundane history’ by ‘transcending nuclear deadlock’, minimising ‘the area of evil’ in conflict, 
restricting conflict to ‘merely defending the victims of attack’, of making ‘the world a safe place 
for smaller nations’.92  
  
An expression of order; a call to moral and epistemological humility; a form of practical 
reason, and ‘creative imagination’, Butterfield’s love was his God. This universalist, totalising 
conception of love as order is perhaps most evident in Regis Cabral’s claim that Butterfield’s life’s 
work attests to his chief conviction that ‘the meaning of history is Christianity’.93 Perhaps 
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Butterfield’s faith in love as sacral order, expressed in history, is evident in his engagement with 
civilisation. As Kenneth McIntyre argues, Butterfield came to equate his conception of love with 
all he regarded best about ‘European civilisation’ from ‘modern liberty’ to a respect for ‘human 
personality’ and social reform.94 Mirroring his Methodism, its essence lay not in institutions but in 
the evangelisation of ‘New Testament Love’.95 Whereas Wight initially despaired over the demise 
of Western (which he equated with Christian) ‘civilisation’, Butterfield did not share the same 
concerns.96 Cabral suggests that Butterfield believed that ‘agents of secularisation, as good ‘lapsed 
Christians’, kept alive the ideals and values of Christianity.97 This faith underpinned what Ian Hall 
describes as Butterfield’s conviction that modern Whiggish Liberalism was ‘really just a secularized, 
political expression of Christian ethics’ or in the sense of irony that secular, rationalist liberalism 
arose from the Christian tradition’.98 This optimism in love betrayed a confusion of the existing 
order with sacral order; his Christian convictions with universalism. His prescription of a praxis of 
love although promoting practical reason and creativity, offered scope for little more than 
incremental political change. Indeed, to the extent loving was ultimately a form of reverence for 
order, it served to conserve the status quo.  
 
Toynbee was raised Anglican but espoused rather idiosyncratic views about religion for 
much of his life. He rejected Christianity twice: first as an undergraduate and again in the 1940s 
after his divorce from Rosalind (Murray) Toynbee.99 Perhaps owing to his 37-year-long 
correspondence with the Ampleforth monk, Columba Cary-Elwes,100 or his self-description as a 
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philo-Catholic,101 Charles Jones argues Toynbee was an agnostic who ‘moved easily in the thought-
world of Catholicism’.102 For Cornelia Navari, Toynbee subscribed to the ‘broad church’ 
Anglicanism prevalent at the time: ‘immanentist’; unfettered by the doctrine of original sin; 
‘conceiving multiple paths to God and multiple revelations of God’.103 Whatever his personal 
convictions, religions in general and love in particular came to play a significant role in his thought. 
This was not always the case. As Ian Hall notes, Toynbee’s apocalyptic post-1914 anxieties about 
a ‘Time of Trouble’s’ provided the impetus for his decision to privilege religion over politics.104 As 
Elie Kedouri notes, religion contained for Toynbee 
The promise of overcoming discord, the promise of revealing a spiritual meaning in 
history, the promise of inspiring an effective ideal of conduct, and the promise of 
exorcising the perilousness of mimesis.105  
 
The shift in Toynbee’s thinking about religion is perhaps most evident in his multi-volume The 
Study of History. In sum, whereas Toynbee initially conceived civilisations as chrysalises for religions 
by Volume 7, these roles were reversed.106 Envisaging European civilisation imperilled, his synoptic 
study sought to show ‘that there was a “unity” between the “history of all known civilizations”, 
culminating in the emergence of higher religions.107 The demise of Western civilisation – indeed 
any civilisation – mattered little. An ‘oecumenical house of many mansions’ would remain.108 If 
love was the foundation of this ecumenical house, the four ‘higher religions’ of Christianity, 
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Mahayana Buddhism, Islam and Hinduism comprised its many mansions.109 In his Gifford 
Lectures, he elaborated: 
The Prophetic Vision that has made its epiphany in the higher religions – pre-eminently, 
perhaps in Christianity and in the Mahayana – consists, if we are right, of two intuitions. 
The first of these is that Suffering is something to be accepted as the price of acting on the 
promptings of Love, and indeed to be embraced as an opportunity for thus following 
Love’s lead. The second intuition is that this attitude towards Suffering is practicable. The 
ideal has been put into practice by a Supreme Being; and this means that a human being 
who tries to do the same will be swimming with the current of the Absolute Reality while 
swimming against the current of his own self-centredness.110  
 
Toynbee’s conception of Love was agapic: self-giving, suffering, humbled and detached.111 In 
Toynbee’s admission, his conception of love was Marcionite rather than Iranean, beneficient rather 
than omnipotent.112 Similarly, his preferred use of “swimming” and “current” as metaphors 
conjures what he refers to as his preference for the Indic over the Judaic,113 of the monist over 
dualist. However abstract, this Love entailed the renunciation of lesser loves of self and 
community, of liberalism, nationalism and empire. It is implicit in his critique of Stoic and 
Epicurean self-sufficiency premised on a relegation of emotion and a consequent denial of human 
relations.114 Similarly, it is evident in his equation of nationalism with ‘community worship’, 
inhibiting ‘any living creature that fails to break away from it loving its neighbour as itself’.115 It 
also coincides with his critique of the idolatry of imperialism in The World and the West and his 
Civilization on Trial, and its concomitant call for atonement.116  
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Toynbee’s thesis of the spiritual equivalence of ‘higher religions’ seems less a history and 
more a prayer for a plural, equal, peaceful world. It betrays a hope that ‘the diversity of the living 
higher religions would cease to be a moral stumbling block and would reveal itself as a necessary 
corollary of the diversity of the Human Psyche’.117 It seeks to universalise grace, 
If we believe that the true end of Man is “to glorify God and fully enjoy Him forever”, we 
must believe that this glorious opportunity of attaining communion with God and 
beholding the Beatific Vision had been open to every creature that had been ever raised 
by God to the spiritual stature of Humanity.118  
 
Toynbee’s vision of history as revealing a (right) religiosity of Love has been criticised from a 
number of quarters. For the historian, Pieter Geyl, the work was historically deficient, a ‘pretence 
of an empirical investigation’.119 In his scathing critique of The Study of History, he elaborates, 
But when a man comes to the past with a compelling vision, a principle, or dogma, of such 
a magnitude and emotional potency as Toynbee’s unity in the love of God; with a system 
which causes him to reduce the multitudinous movement of history to one single, divinely 
inspired current, and to judge civilizations and generations by one single criterion, rejecting 
most of them, and incidentally his own, as unimportant; than man can write a work full of 
colour and striking theories, glowing with conviction and eloquence, but no history. The 
Study of History is no history. The student of history, as Toynbee calls himself, may know 
more of history than I shall ever do, but he is no historian. He is a prophet.120  
 
Martin Wight opined Toynbee’s account was theologically naïve.121 Although Wight conceded a 
Christian would read Toynbee’s exercise ‘with sympathy and admiration’ for seeing ‘all Higher 
Religions sub specie aeternitatis’, he took umbrage at Toynbee’s reductive reading of Judaism and 
Christianity, his misrepresentations of the Christian doctrine of God and his exaggeration of the 
similarities between higher religions’ aims and contents.122 Wight argued,  
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The central declaration of Christianity is not that God is something, but that God has done 
something. He has acted in history to show the meaning of history.123 
 
For the conservative, high-Anglican historian Maurice Cowling, Toynbee was 
one of the most significant monuments to that resentful, self-destructive, post-Christian 
Liberalism which, though designed to absorb the idolatry of parochial religion into a 
properly constituted oecumenicity, succeeded only in replacing the one sort of religion that 
is possible in a disordered world by the oecumenical requirements of social justice.124 
 
Yet for all this emphasis on ecumenism, and despite his own claim that ‘any existing higher religion 
that aspires to become the Universal Religion is doomed to disappointment’,125 Toynbee’s vision 
of unity overwhelms his commitment to alterity. Much like his conception of history, propelled by 
a relationship of ‘leadership and deference – of leadership on the part of the creative genius or 
minority, of deference on the part of ‘ordinary human beings’,126 his conception of civilisations 
and the religions they bore are hierarchical. Reminiscent of 19th Century religions of humanity, 
Toynbee’s God as the ‘relation between each human member and Himself’ and ‘the relation 
between each human member and every other human member’ is reduced to Love.127 Further, in 
a manner reminiscent of Tolstoy, Toynbee’s turn to religiosity entailed a retreat from politics.  
 
For all their differences, Toynbee and Butterfield’s conception of Love as the order 
revealed in history impelled them to prescribe love as a form of – even as Toynbee eschewed the 
realm –  political action. Even as he imagined it as a form of atonement, this faith in love as the 
order of history abated Toynbee’s apocalyptic anxieties about the demise of Western civilisation 
and rendered Butterfield largely unperturbed by it. For Butterfield, this was because Europe and 
modern Whiggish liberalism were premised on a secularised Christian ethics. For Toynbee, this 
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was because all ‘higher religions’ and civilisations they gave rise to proclaimed the same message. 
Similarly, both their conceptions of love shape their understanding of history. Although this is 
more evident in Toynbee’s quest to narrate a history that accords with his revelation of love, for 
Butterfield, it is evident in his emphasis in the Protestant privileging of ‘individuals, personalism, 
voluntary choice, interior spirituality, and dissent’.128In both instances, their conception of love 
and their understanding of history was made in the image of their religiosity.  
 
Between Agape and Eros: Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau on Love and Power 
 
Reinhold Niebuhr was a pastor and one of the most influential public intellectuals and 
political theologians in America in the first half of the twentieth century.129 In fact, George Kennan 
once described Niebuhr as the ‘father of us all’.130 Along with Hans Morgenthau – whose influence 
on post-WWII International Relations needs little introduction –  Niebuhr is widely regarded as 
one of the founding figures of political realism. Niebuhr and Morgenthau met in 1944 and shared 
a ‘profound intellectual kinship’.131 As Daniel Rice recounts, Morgenthau referred to Niebuhr as 
‘perhaps the greatest living political philosopher in America’, Niebuhr referred to Morgenthau as 
‘the most brilliant and authoritative political realist’ and both confessed themselves unable to 
disentangle each other’s thoughts from their own.132 Yet, Morgenthau once claimed, ‘I do not need 
all his (Niebuhr’s) metaphysics to get where we both get’ highlighting that for all their similarities, 
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their differences were understated.133 Perhaps this is most evident in Niebuhr and Morgenthau’s 
differing conceptions of love, power and the desirability of world state. 
 
Over the course of his fifty-year career, there were several radical shifts in Niebuhr’s 
thought. Ronald Stone summarises these as a movement from liberalism to socialism to Christian 
realism to liberal pragmatism.134 Even if this is somewhat of an oversimplification, it accords well 
with the many positions Niebuhr held over his lifetime from pacifism to advocacy of American 
involvement in World Wars, his staunch anti-communism, his architecture of vital-centre 
liberalism, his early support and later critique of American involvement in Vietnam.135 Although 
Niebuhr claimed to detest consistency,136 his post-1930s writings reveal a discernible theological 
‘system’, which centred on the dialectic between love and justice. Niebuhr’s theology is shaped by 
a Christian commitment to paradox, which permeates his understanding of love and justice, 
anthropology and history. Thus, in his Gifford Lectures, he describes humans as ‘both strong and 
weak, both free and bound, both blind and far-seeing…at the juncture of nature and spirit’,137 
equal in sin but unequal in responsibility.138 This conception of anthropology is premised on his 
acceptance of both the doctrines of imago dei and ‘the doctrine of man as creature’.139 If the former 
offers the promise of self-transcendence, denial of the latter is the source of ‘sin’. This conception 
of anthropology, in turn, shapes his view of history. If the capacity for self-transcendence provides 
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the basis for being a co-creator of history,140 human finitude makes it impossible to fully discern 
or fulfil the meaning of the historical process.141 Evil, again, arises not from this finitude but its 
denial. For Niebuhr, this has epistemological consequences. Consequently, all knowledge claims 
are partial:  
All human knowledge is tainted with an ‘ideological’ taint. It pretends to be more true than 
it is. It is finite knowledge, gained from a particular perspective; but it pretends to be final 
and ultimate knowledge.142  
 
Similarly, all universalisms contain the seed of evil: 
The explicit character of this pride is fully revealed in all cases in which the universalistic 
note in human knowledge becomes the basis of an imperial desire for domination over life 
which does not conform to it.143 
 
For Niebuhr, these factors coalesced to amplify human finitude rather than the capacity for self-
transcendence in groups. This hinged partly on Augustinian conviction: ‘To the end of history the 
peace of the world…must be gained by strife’,144and partly on empirical observation that: 
For all the centuries of experience, men have not yet learned how to live together without 
compounding their vices and covering each other with mud and blood .145 
 
 
Niebuhr’s engagement with human nature and history is grounded in a religious conviction 
that the Cross, or the crucifixion of Jesus, reveals something about the possibilities and limits of 
history. Consequently, it becomes central to his articulation of what role love – ‘the end term of 
any system of morals’ – 146 could play in politics. Niebuhr’s argument about the significance of the 
Cross proceeds in three parts. First, the sacrificial or agapic love of the Cross underscores the 
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limitations of mutual love or eros.147 To the extent that mutual love emphasises reciprocity and 
conditionality, it is limited. What agape offers the world is a vision of universal love, which ‘makes 
it impossible to set any limits of race, sex, or social condition upon the brotherhood which may 
be achieved in history’.148 It also affirms secular and religious hopes and aspirations across the 
political spectrum that 
There are no limits to be set in history for the achievement of more universal brotherhood, 
for the development of more perfect and more inclusive mutual relations.149 
 
Second, the Cross ‘defines the limits of what is possible in historic development’.150 Agape appears 
in history, ‘only to be crucified’.151 Consequently, it acts as a corrective to the notion that 
Sanctifying grace (as in sectarian interpretations) or by the cumulative force of universal 
education (as in secular liberalism) or by a catastrophic reorganization of society (as in 
Marxism), it is possible to lift historic life to the plane upon which all distinctions between 
mutual love and disinterested and sacrificing love vanish.152  
 
Finally, to the extent that it highlights the stark contrast between the egoistic and the agapic, 
between the will-to-live and sacrificial love, it ‘contradicts the false pretensions of virtue’.153  
 
Although Niebuhr envisaged a role for love in interpersonal relations, his distinction 
between group and individual morality rendered love an entirely impossible, inappropriate ethic 
for groups. As he elaborated,  
Nations, classes, and races do not love one another. They may have a high sense of 
obligation to one another. They must express this sense of obligation in the desire to give 
each one his due.154  
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Rather than reject love as entirely inappropriate for politics, Niebuhr calls for its approximation: 
justice. Niebuhr contends that justice is more suitable for political ethics for three chief reasons. 
First, to the extent that it ‘admits the claims of the self, it is something less than love’.155 Second, 
it is inherently social because it ‘arbitrates not merely between the self and the other, but between 
the competing claims upon the self by various ‘others’.156 Finally, it necessarily belongs to ‘the 
realm of tragic choices’.157 However, the embrace of justice does not negate the need for love in 
politics. Instead, Niebuhr claims love remains relevant both as a motive and a form of judgment,158 
without which ‘justice always degenerates into something less than justice’.159 Hence, love ‘which 
is at once the negation and fulfilment of justice’ must constantly inspire justice to reach greater 
heights.160 
 
 Niebuhr understood animus dominadi or the will to power as universal but not final.161 
Intrinsic to this, is his conviction that whatever the commonalities between Christianity and 
tragedy, Christianity always transcends it.162 The role of love as leaven, the human capacity for self-
transcendence while not sources for utopian hope made justice possible. However, this conception 
of justice – to the extent that it was worldly and possible – did not preclude power. In fact, as 
Niebuhr articulates, the balance of power was the ‘organising centre’ or foundation upon which 
justice ought to rest.163 Niebuhr expresses the relationship between these three notions as follows:  
A balance of power is something different from, and inferior to, the harmony of love. It 
is a basic condition of justice, given the sinfulness of man. Such a balance of power does 
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not exclude love. In fact, without love the frictions and tensions of balance of power would 
become intolerable. But without the balance of power even the most loving relations may 
degenerate into unjust relations, and love may become the screen which hides the 
injustice.164  
 
For Niebuhr, maintaining the balance of power is integral to the striving for justice. It 
forms the crux of Niebuhr’s prescriptions on coercion, the use of force and I suggest the 
desirability of world government. As Or Rosenboim notes, despite Niebuhr’s interest in world 
democratic federation, Niebuhr’s vision of world order, much like Butterfield’s, ‘was minimalist 
and pluralist’.165 Despite his early involvement in the Chicago Committee to Frame a World 
Constitution, he remained deeply cynical about the project.166 In part, Niebuhr’s resistance was 
animated by his scepticism about ‘the moral ability to mankind to create a world government by 
an act of will’ and ‘the political ability of such a government to integrate a world community in 
advance of a more gradual growth of the “social tissue” which every community requires”.167In 
part, however, Niebuhr’s resistance was animated by a concern about the totalitarian or imperial 
tendencies of world government. Thus, rightly recognising the Chicago Committee’s intellectual 
debt to the American Constitution and Federalist papers, he had misgivings about what he saw as 
the expansion of American constitutionalism masquerading as universalism.168 In any case, the 
realities of the Cold War, for Niebuhr further revealed the ideological stakes of such a project: 
The unity of Greece was finally achieved under Philip and Alexander of Macedon. But this 
imperial unity was also a tyrannical nemesis for Greek culture. The analogy in present 
global terms would be the final unification of the world through the preponderant power 
of either America or Russia, whoever proved herself victorious in a final global struggle. 
The analogy teaches us nothing about the possibilities of a constitutional world state. It 
may teach us that though the perils of international anarchy are very great, they may still 
be preferable to international tyranny.169 
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Unlike Niebuhr, love does not feature as prominently in Morgenthau’s thought. In fact, 
his most sustained engagement with the topic is to be found in his 1962 Commentary essay, ‘Love 
and Power’. When first published, the essay was deemed somewhat of an aberration, irrelevant to 
Morgenthau’s larger corpus on the realpolitik.170 However, I argue that Morgenthau’s more 
renowned writings are, in fact, not bereft of references to emotion. Further, to the extent that 
Morgenthau was a contextual rather than systematic thinker, his 1962 essay offers insight into what 
Alison McQueen describes as a shift in his preoccupation in the 1960s from the tragic to the 
apocalyptic.171 Perhaps, this is most evident in his hope that power constituted by love might offer 
the basis for a world community. 
 
Morgenthau’s American writings reveal that he did not conceive of the relation between 
reason and emotion in stark terms. His earliest English work, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, is 
primarily a critique of the ‘disease’ of rationalism and its misunderstanding of the political and 
ethical.172 Morgenthau’s Commentary essay would appear to arise from the same critique of 
rationalism, which ‘misunderstood the nature of man; the nature of the social world, and the nature 
of reason itself’.173 In addition, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, sought to highlight the importance 
of philosophy that recognises how emotion animates reason. He argued, philosophy which 
elevates the purity and primacy of reason was inherently flawed, because 
(r)eason is like a light which by its own inner force can move nowhere. It must be carried 
in order to move. It is carried by the irrational forces of interest and emotion to where 
those forces want it to move, regardless of what the inner logic of abstract reason would 
require. To trust in reason pure and simple is to leave the field to the stronger irrational 
                                                      
170 Ty Solomon, “Human Nature and the Limits of the Self: Hans Morgenthau on Love and Power,” International 
Studies Review 14(2012)., p. 202. 
171 Alison McQueen, Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017)., p. 148. 
172 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago press, 1946)., p. 5.  
173 Ibid., p. 5. 
 69 
forces which all reason will serve. The triumph of reason is, in truth the triumph of 
irrational forces which succeed in using the processes of reason to satisfy themselves.174 
 
Animating reason, emotion in general, and love in particular, operate as categories of 
explanation in the political world. In Politics Among Nations, for example, Morgenthau draws on 
love to explain phenomena like the stability of institutions and leaders.  
Without taking into account the charisma of a man, such as Napoleon or Hitler, or of an 
institution, such as the government of the United States Constitution, evoking trust and 
love through which the wills of men submit themselves to the will of such a man or 
institution, it is impossible to understand certain phenomena of international politics that 
have been particularly prominent in modern times.175 
 
This is evident again when he endorses the analysis of John Durie in a 1632 letter to British 
Ambassador, John Roe, explaining the decline of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. 
The increase of his authority is the ground of his abode; and love is the ground of his 
authority; it must be love; for it cannot be through power; for his power is not in his own 
subjects but in strangers; not in his money, but in theirs; not in their good will; but in mere 
necessity as things stand now betwixt him and them; therefore if the necessity be not so 
urgent as it is, or if any other means be shown by God (who is able to do as much by 
another man as him) to avoid this necessity; the money and the power and the assistance 
which it yieldeth unto him will fall from him and so his authority is lost, and his abode will 
be no longer; for the Love which was at first is gone.176 
 
Morgenthau’s Commentary essay develops both his critique of rationality and the political 
promise of power constituted by love. For Morgenthau, the liberal faith of rationalism and the 
Marxist faith in history represents as an evasion of what he understands to be ‘human nature’.177 
He argues that while these philosophies betray a lack of understanding of the pervasiveness of 
power in human life, they demonstrate ignorance of love altogether.178 Situating the problem in 
modernity, he argues, ‘What the modern understanding misses is the totality of the commitment 
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that characterizes the pure phenomenon of love’.179 Demonstrating his debt to Nietzsche, Freud 
and indeed, his close colleague, Hannah Arendt, he understands love and power as ‘organically 
connected’, arising from the ‘same root of existential loneliness’.180 He characterises them both as 
‘psychological relationships’, driven by the realisation that man ‘cannot fulfil himself…cannot 
become what he is destined to be, by his own effort, in isolation from other beings’.181 Despite this 
interrelation, he suggests love and power are conceptually distinct. Whereas love ‘volunteers’, 
power ‘dominates; while love is pleasurable, power is painful; love ‘discovers’ and power ‘creates’; 
love is marked by ‘mutuality’, power by ‘unilateral imposition’.182 Nonetheless, as human 
phenomena, power and love are paradoxically bound. Thus, 
It is the common quality of love and power that each contains an element of the other. 
Power points toward love as its fulfilment, as love starts form power and is always 
threatened with corruption by it. Power, in its ultimate consummation, is the same as love, 
albeit love is corrupted by an irreducible residue of power. Love, in its ultimate corruption, 
is the same as power, albeit power is redeemed by an irreducible residue of love’.183 
 
Evident from his references to Shakespeare’s Richard III and Wagnerian Liebestod, Morgenthau’s 
conception of love is erosic. In the final analysis, this love is also tragic. Thus, Morgenthau concludes 
his essay with the line: ‘Yet whatever he expects of the other world, he must leave this world as he 
entered it: alone’.184 As Alison McQueen notes, Morgenthau’s post-war thought represents a shift 
in his concern from the tragic to apocalyptic.185 His Commentary essay, ‘Death in the Nuclear Age’, 
written only a year prior to ‘Love and Power’ indicates this transition is complete. In it he argued, 
‘The significance of the possibility of nuclear death is that it radically affects the meaning of death, 
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of immortality, of life itself’.186 Living in this apocalyptic age called for a ‘radical transformation 
of…thought and action’.187 McQueen argues this coincided with his commitment to a world 
state.188 Like Niebuhr, Morgenthau argued that absence of the conditions for a world state 
rendered its realization a tragic impossibility. Like Niebuhr, Morgenthau argued the existence of a 
world community was a precondition for a world state.189 However, unlike Niebuhr, he asserted 
the creation of these conditions in an apocalyptic age was a moral necessity.  
There is no shirking the conclusion that international peace cannot be permanent without 
a world state, and that a world state cannot be established under the present moral, social, 
and political conditions of the world…(I)n no period of modern history was civilization in 
more need of permanent peace and, hence, of a world state, and that in no period of 
modern history were the moral, social, and political conditions of the world less favourable 
for the establishment of the world state.190 
 
Albeit ill articulated and poorly developed, what Morgenthau’s essay on ‘Love and Power’ does is 
offer insight into how this community may be constituted. People inhabiting Morgenthau’s 
apocalyptic age might see the World State or ‘the promised land’ only ‘in their longing’s 
imagination’.191 Nonetheless, to the extent that love facilitates political order and stability through 
the spontaneous duplication of will, ‘not through inducement from without but through 
spontaneous consent from within’,192 it would seem that Morgenthau’s vision for world 
community, much like the Arendtian vision of amor mundi, rests on a conception of power 
sustained by love.  
While Niebuhr’s love idealises agape, Morgenthau’s thought idealises eros. Daniel Rice 
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argues that Morgenthau’s conception of love leads him to understand power as final and 
destructive, in contrast to Niebuhr, who understood love to act as a leaven to power.193 
Morgenthau’s ‘apocalyptic’ anxieties articulated in his advocacy of world community, however, 
reveal he came to espouse a distinct – perhaps Arendtian –  conception of power. This emphasis 
on world community might seem uncharacteristic, even utopian, for a classical realist. However, it 
is worth questioning to what extent this was necessitated by his metaphysics. Niebuhr’s thought 
allowed for the possibility of redemption, for Christianity to transcend tragedy. Consequently, he 
could defer what may be either regarded as utopianism or political action in a way that 
Morgenthau’s secular thought manifestly could not. Morgenthau’s shared concerns with Niebuhr 
about human nature might have led him to advocate world community rather than a world state. 
Contrary to popular wisdom, however, living ‘under an empty sky’ meant his notion of erosic love 
did not merely make power total, it animated and transformed it. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to illustrate that despite its neglect, love has played a 
significant role in International Relations theorising in the first half of the twentieth century. This 
chapter’s focus on six ‘canonical’ figures in no way presents an exhaustive survey of the loves 
evoked in international politics or indeed the complexity of their work on love. Rather, they serve 
to illustrate four points. First, there are a multitude of loves, variously theological and secular, that 
populate international politics. Second, in the period extending from the fin-de-siecle to 1962, the 
evocation of these loves in international theorising was not uncommon. Third, Murray’s Cosmos, 
Zimmern’s Commonwealth; Butterfield and Toynbee’s faith in post-civilisational order, and 
Niebuhr and Morgenthau’s engagement with the question of the world state illustrate how 
different loves are drawn on to theorise, negotiate and legitimise visions of international order. 
Fourth, these thinkers evoke love to legitimise visions of world order that are not simply imperial 
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or anti-imperial. Rather, Murray’s simultaneous defence and critique of empire, Zimmern’s post-
racial imperial internationalism, Butterfield and Toynbee’s religious pluralisms, Niebuhr’s anti-
imperial defence of the status quo and Morgenthau’s utopian and universalist defence of world 
community highlight the utility of thinking of imperialism and anti-imperialism less as binaries and 
more as a continuum.  
The next three chapters offer a detailed engagement with how three liminal literary figures 
evoke and mobilise love in the context of imperialism and internationalism in ways this chapter 
anticipates. Tolstoy’s thought shifts from an emphasis on familial love to love conceived as a law, 
in ways that are profoundly different from both Zimmern and Butterfield. It animates his pacifisms 
in ways Niebuhr finds deeply problematic, and facilitates a retreat from politics in ways echoed in 
Toynbee. Camus like Morgenthau seeks to theorize ‘love under an empty sky’, returning like 
Murray and Zimmern to the utopia of ‘Ancient Greece’ to advocate a love that looks very much 
like a Niebuhrian via media between nostalgia and nihilism, tragedy and hope. Tagore’s vision of 
love resembles Murray’s monism and Toynbee’s syncreticism. However, anticipating themes in 
Morgenthau he interrogates both love’s propensity for violence and power. For all their 
differences, the six canonical figures I studied would appear – in their reproducing the imperial as 
international; their reverence of order, and their retreat from politics – to evoke love to ultimately 
privilege the status quo. The next three chapters ask if Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus seek to do 
otherwise. 
CHAPTER 3: TOLSTOY’S LAW OF LOVE 
 
Government is violence, Christianity is meekness, non-resistance, love. 
- Leo Tolstoy. 
 
Leo Tolstoy’s career is characterised by contradiction. Whether as Apollon Grigore’ev’s 
nihilist in search of meaning;1 Isaiah Berlin’s fox who sought to be a hedgehog;2 Richard 
Gustafson’s resident and stranger;3 Gary Saul Morson’s systematising pluralist4 or Donna Tussing 
Orwin’s literary realist in search of metaphysical ideals,5 Tolstoy studies are replete with analyses 
of his divided self. Perhaps nothing bears greater testament to this division than the tension 
between Tolstoy’s role as ‘artist’ and ‘prophet’.6 If the former elevated Tolstoy to the company of 
‘Homer, the Yahwist, Dante and Shakespeare’,7 the latter saw his dismissal as a ‘holy fool’. 
Tolstoy’s religious ‘conversion’ to a practical Christianity around 1880 and his purgatorial theory 
of aesthetics that entailed the denunciation of (most of) his own literary works further consolidated 
the divide. For many, the prophet thus annihilated the artist. Although it would be erroneous to 
claim that Tolstoy’s views remained static over his fifty-eight-year career, imagining Tolstoy’s 
legacy as so sharply divided ignores the confluence of politics, theology and aesthetics in his life’s 
works. It also disregards his abiding concern with love on the one hand, and violence and empire 
on the other. Tolstoy’s early concerns, in fact, are implicated in his post-‘conversion’ political 
legacy: his espousal and evangelisation of anarcho-pacifism and anti-imperialism; his association 
with the Russian Revolution and, his role in inspiring the transnational ‘Tolstoyan’ movement that 
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‘emerged in Britain, the United States of America, the Netherlands, Finland, Hungary, Japan, South 
Africa and Chile’.8  
In this chapter, I read Tolstoy’s literary works alongside his more conventionally 
understood political and religious writings in order to provide an account of Tolstoy’s 
understanding of love and the role it plays in his political thought. The chapter comprises three 
sections. The first section provides an overview of Tolstoy’s international influence and offers a 
method for approaching the continuities and discontinuities in his work. The second section offers 
an account of Tolstoy’s shifting conception of the object and praxis of love, focusing on his 
representation of love in the context of Russian imperial projects in The Cossacks, the epilogue in 
Anna Karenina and, Hadji Murat. The last section examines how Tolstoy’s ‘law of love’ animates his 
political thought in general and anti-imperialism in particular, in his post-1880 works. 
 
A Tale of Two Tolstoys?: Tolstoy’s Political and Literary Influence 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, Tolstoy was the author whose works were most read 
in translation across the world.9 After the death of the American economist and social reformer, 
Henry George, he was the most prominent proponent of Georgism globally.10 Tolstoy’s writings 
about love and non-resistance offered a template for pacifist political action that continues to be 
deployed in anti-imperial struggles internationally.11 In his homeland of Russia, Tolstoy’s influence 
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was so great in the early twentieth century that he was known colloquially as the Second Tsar.12 
Whatever the merits for emphasising Tolstoy’s pre-‘conversion’ writings for studying his literature 
or his post-‘conversion’ writings for studying his anarcho-pacifism, I argue such a distinction is 
entirely unhelpful for explaining Tolstoy’s international political influence or understanding his 
thought on love and empire. Partly, this is because Tolstoy’s international political influence is 
inextricably linked to his literary success. Moreover, for all the discontinuities in Tolstoy’s thought, 
his life’s works bear witness to an attempt to articulate an ethico-politics of love in the context of 
empire.  
 
 George Orwell held that but for War and Peace and Anna Karenina, Tolstoy’s pamphlets 
would be largely left unread.13 Orwell was quite right to insist that Tolstoy’s political influence 
stemmed from his literary success. However, owing to an accident of history, Tolstoy’s 
prominence as a literary figure in the ‘Anglosphere’ coincided with his turn to religiosity. As Russia 
did not subscribe to the 1887 Berne Convention on copyright, publishers were able to respond to 
the growing interest in Russian literature by printing a mixture of Tolstoy’s pre- and post-
‘conversion’ writings.14 As Charlotte Alston elaborates, 
in the 1880s and 1890s, just as literary critics introduced Tolstoy’s works as a package, his 
philosophical tracts appeared alongside his literary works in publishers’ catalogues. T.Y. 
Cromwell of New York produced a slew of Tolstoy editions, including Anna Karenina and 
Childhood, Boyhood, Youth in 1886; My Confessions and What to Do? in 1887; and extracts from 
War and Peace and On Life in 1888. In Britain, the most prominent publisher of Tolstoy’s 
works in the late 1880s and early 1890s was Walter Scott. In 1899 alone Scott put out 
editions of Anna Karenina; War and Peace; Childhood, Boyhood, Youth; If You Neglect the Fire, You 
Don’t Put it Out; The Two Pilgrims; On Life; What I Believe; What Men Live By; and What to Do? 
[What Then Must We Do?] – a real mixture of Tolstoy’s novels, stories and philosophical 
tracts.15  
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Consequently, for many of Tolstoy’s Anglophone readers, the boundaries between his pre- and 
post-conversion work were blurred. That Tolstoy’s moment of celebrity coincided with his 
conversion proved rather fortuitous for him. It offered him a global platform for political critique. 
 
While Tolstoy’s literary celebrity offered him a platform to proselytise about politics, he 
was an important national and international political figure in his own right. Tolstoy’s biographer, 
A.N. Wilson’s account of Tolstoy’s funeral offers a jarring contrast to Orwell’s thesis: 
It was one of the most extraordinary demonstrations of public sympathy in the history of 
the world. No novelist has ever been given such a funeral, but it was not for his novels 
that they honoured him. It was for the deeds which now seem to us half mad and half 
quixotic, it was for those volumes of his work which most readers now left unread. Of the 
thousands of people who stood and watched as Tolstoy’s coffin was carried through the 
glade and buried in his famous childhood spot, no more than a handful had so much heard 
of War and Peace.16  
 
Tolstoy was also reluctantly one of Russia’s great humanitarians. He sought to educate ‘his’ 
peasants and redistribute his land. Despite his disdain for philanthropy as a ‘cheap means for the 
wealthy to ease their conscience’17 and his conviction that ‘it was more important to love than 
feed’,18 Tolstoy set aside his abstractions and worked with his family to provide famine relief. 
Along with his family, he raised nearly 2 million roubles and 344 kilograms of grain,19 and ‘set up 
two thousand and forty-six kitchens feeding three thousand daily’.20 He set up makeshift hospitals, 
kindergartens and dining homes, all the while writing scathing critiques of the government for 
international audiences.21 While his international reputation protected him from exile, his 1899 
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publication of Resurrection – which he wrote to fund the exile of 7,000 religiously persecuted 
Dukhobours to Canada – provided the grounds for his excommunication.22  
 
So great was Tolstoy’s political influence, that the Russian revolution of 1917 was often 
(wrongly) interpreted as a victory of Tolstoyanism.23 As Soviet critic and novelist, Dmitry 
Merzshovsky, declared ‘Tolstoy began it, and Lenin finished it off’.24 Likewise, in England, 
Tolstoy’s translator and biographer Maude had no doubt about Tolstoy’s role in the defeat of the 
Romanovs.25 His view was echoed in the U.S. where Tolstoy was heralded as the ‘Great Patriarch 
of the Bolsheviki Family’.26 Lenin himself wrote several articles about Tolstoy, the most famous 
of which saw Tolstoy as a mirror of the Russian revolution.27 However, Tolstoy’s doctrine of non-
resistance to evil was in fact anathema to the revolutionaries. In fact, in 1924, over a decade after 
Tolstoy’s death, Tolstoyanism was considered ‘one of the greatest threats facing the fledgling 
Communist state’.28 Lunacharksy, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Education, claimed that 
Tolstoyanism and Marxism were the two ideologies dividing the Russian people.29 Constrained by 
Tolstoy’s international celebrity, the Bolsheviks sought to appropriate his works. Around the time 
of Tolstoy’s centenary, a list of Tolstoy’s acceptable fiction was drawn up and articles by political 
figures like Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky were published to portray Tolstoy’s thought as 
compatible with the regime while condemning his philosophical views.30 Tolstoy’s accommodation 
and misappropriation, in fact, ‘marked a shift from Trotskyist schemes for world revolution to a 
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strategy of building socialism in one country’.31 In Stalinist Russia, Tolstoy’s works were mobilised 
in the war effort against the Nazis. As Colm McKeogh elaborates, 
Within weeks (of the Nazi invasion), 15,000 copies of Tales of Sevasatpol were reprinted, 
along with 100,000 copies of War and Peace’s description of the Battle of Borodino, and 
200,000 copies of an extract from War and Peace describing the peasant guerrillas of 1812. 
In 1941, with Leningrad under siege and its population starving, it was not speeches that 
were broadcast from the loudspeakers in Palace Square to mark the twenty-fourth 
anniversary of the October Revolution and to rally the people to even greater sacrifices in 
defense of motherland and revolution, but extracts from Tolstoy’s takes of heroism in the 
Crimea.32 
 
By the end of the war, the Soviets effectively elevated Tolstoy’s nationalism burying his work on 
anarchism and pacifism.  
 
Internationally, Tolstoy’s legacy fared better. He inspired, but did not approve of, the 
transnational ‘Tolstoyan’ movement that ‘emerged in Britain, the United States of America, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Hungary, Japan, South Africa and Chile’.33 Amongst prominent individuals 
who claimed to be influenced by Tolstoy’s thought were Jane Addams, Ernest Crosby, W.E.B 
DuBois, Mohandas Gandhi, Vincent Van Gogh, Stephen Hobhouse, Romain Rolland, Robert 
Louis Stevenson, Alfred Tennyson, Booker T. Washington and Ludwig Wittgenstein.34 Although 
a detailed account of this influence is beyond the scope of this chapter, Tolstoy made a profound 
contribution to anti-imperialist, civil rights and anti-war movements via some of these individuals. 
                                                      
31 Ibid., p. 216. 
32 Ibid., p. 216. 
33 Alston, Tolstoy and His Disciples., p. 1-2. 
34 For fuller accounts, see, Jane Addams, ‘Introduction’, Leo Tolstoy, What Then Must We Do?, trans. Aylmer Maude 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934). James Cracraft, Two Shining Souls : Jane Addams, Leo Tolstoy, and the Quest for 
Global Peace (Lanham, [Md.]: Lexington Books, 2012). Donna Tussing Orwin, “Introduction: Tolstoy as Artist and 
Public Figure,” in The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002)., p. 57. Cynthia Wachtell, “Ernest Howard Crosby’s Swords and Plowshares: A Lost Anti-Imperialism, 
Anti-Militarism and Anti-War Classic,” South Central Review 30, no. 1 (2013). Thomas Weber, Gandhi as Disciple and 
Mentor (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2004). Alston, Tolstoy and His Disciples. Marks, How Russia Shaped the 
Modern World., Chapter 5. Stuart Greenstreet, “Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Folly of Logical Postivism.” Philosophy 
Now: A Magazine of Ideas (2014): 
https://philosophynow.org/issues/103/WittgensteinTolstoy_and_the_Folly_of_Logical_Positivism.. Bartlett, 
Tolstoy: A Russian Life., Loc. 5435, G.H. Von Wright, “A Biographical Sketch,” in Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, ed. 
Norman Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001)., p. 10. Caleb Thompson, “Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Meaning 
of Life,” Philosophical Investigations 20, no. 2 (1997)., p. 97. 
 80 
Thus, the young Mohandas Gandhi claimed the influence of reading A Kingdom of God is Within 
You was total: 
When I went to England, I was a votary of violence, I had faith in it and none in non-
violence. After I read this book, that lack of faith in non-violence vanished. 35 
 
Indeed, Gandhi’s first ashram in South Africa was aptly named, ‘Tolstoy Farm’.36 According to 
Thomas Weber, it ‘formed the prototype for his future ashrams and contributed to his future 
methodology’.37 Gandhi may have transmuted Tolstoy’s doctrine of non-resistance to non-violent 
resistance and modified Tolstoy’s anarchist teachings in service of a nation-state, but it was 
Tolstoy’s influence that led to Gandhi’s adoption of non-violence as a strategy against British 
imperialism in India. Via Gandhi and figures like Booker T. Washington, W.E.B DuBois and 
American Christian clergy, Tolstoy’s doctrine of non-resistance was introduced to the U.S. civil 
rights movement.38 Tolstoy’s writings also inspired Ernest Howard Crosby, the American judge of 
the Court of First Instance in Alexandria.39 After reading a French translation of On Life while 
stationed in Egypt, he resigned from his post. Upon his return to the U.S., he became a fervent 
advocate on Tolstoy’s writings and ideals. In addition to working with democratic and labour 
organisations on social reforms,40 Crosby was the founding president of the New York Anti-
Imperialist League, member of the American Peace Society and the most prolific ant-imperialist 
writer of his era.41 Conscientious objection in the first half of the twentieth century appears 
indelibly indebted to Tolstoy’s work. In 1919, Cherktov presided over the Congress of Religious 
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Sects which had considered applications from over 40,000 conscientious objectors.42 In fact, so 
great were the number of objectors who identified as Tolstoyan that in 1923, the Bolsheviks no 
longer classified Tolstoyans as a religious sect.43 In England, even the pro-war Gilbert Murray 
noted that the conscientious objection clause in the Military Service Act 1916 failed to appreciate 
Tolstoy’s influence.  
More important still, though perhaps not quite appreciated in War Office circles, the 
greatest of all modern men of letters, whose books sold by the hundred-thousand in almost 
every country in Europe, and devoted himself to a spiritual crusade against war and 
violence in any shape. Tolstoy’s doctrines were so extreme that actual Tolstoyans were 
rare; but almost every young man and woman in Europe who possessed any free religious 
life at all had been to some extent influenced by Tolstoy.44 
 
 
If Tolstoy was a significant figure in his own right, the question remains why any study of 
his post-‘conversion’ politics necessitates an engagement with the aesthetics he sought to 
renounce. Indeed, in 1897 – eighteen years after Tolstoy’s ‘conversion’ – he articulated a theory of 
aesthetics which was marked by an emphasis on moralising rather than mimesis. Given Tolstoy’s 
vociferous repudiation of (most of) his early works, this might endorse the carving up of Tolstoy’s 
literary canon to coincide with his pre- and post-conversion thought and activism. However, I 
argue that such an exercise is limited for at least three reasons. First, the periodisation of Tolstoy’s 
work is largely arbitrary. Second, for all the discontinuities in Tolstoy’s thought, all his works are 
animated by a quest to enunciate an ethico-politics of love. Third, ignoring Tolstoy’s early 
aesthetics effectively reduces a lifelong engagement with the ethics of empire to a mere footnote 
to his post-‘conversion’ writings on ‘anarchism’ and pacifism. 
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Inessa Medzhibovskaya has persuasively argued that Tolstoy’s conversion was both long 
and gradual, commencing in 1845.45 Indeed the literary historian, Boris Eikhenbaum rightly notes 
that Tolstoy’s life was in fact dominated by a series of ‘crises’.46 The tendency to view Tolstoy’s 
conversion as a sudden, dramatic moment coinciding with the publication of his Confesssion, tends 
to understate the extent to which Tolstoy’s Confession was also a planned literary work modelled on 
the Confessions of Rousseau and Augustine and the Autobiography of Mill.47 Imagining a stark 
‘conversion’ also obscures the many continuities in Tolstoy’s thought. A common anecdote about 
Tolstoy’s life is his metaphorical quest for ‘the green stick’, which contained the secret to happiness 
and peace.48 As a child, Tolstoy’s older brother Nicholas told him that there was a green stick in 
the woods in their family estate that contained this secret. Finding it would end war and illness, 
and unite the world. So captivated was Tolstoy by this tale that he requested to be buried, and is 
in fact buried, alongside where this stick supposedly lay. Tolstoy’s aesthetics are animated by the 
same sort of preoccupations. As Alston notes,  
In The Cossacks, published in 1861, the character Olenin undergoes a moral awakening in 
which he realizes that happiness consists not in ‘seeking wealth, fame, comforts of life, and 
love’, but in living for others. In War and Peace, the simple and unquestioning peasant 
Platon Karataev inspires Pierre Bezukhov with calm and certainty in place of his misery 
and confusion. And in Anna Karenina, the reader follows Konstantin Levin’s spiritual 
development as he searches for happiness not in high society but through his family and 
on the land, and he concludes that such happiness can only be achieved by living for others 
and not for one’s selfish desires.49  
 
In sum, Tolstoy’s literary works bear witness to his faith in the soteriology of love and his 
conception of this love as agapic or self-giving.  
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Acknowledging continuities is not tantamount to W.B. Gallie’s claim that there is a 
fundamental unity to Tolstoy’s work that spans from War and Peace to The Kingdom of God is Within 
You.50 Tolstoy did, in fact, change his mind about the legitimacy of violence, patriotism and the 
state in rather dynamic ways. Over the course of his life, he also found divergent philosophies 
compelling. A brief survey of Tolstoy’s three best-known works reveals as much. The classically 
Rousseaunian War and Peace denounces Hegelian progress and determinism, expresses its faith in 
natural law and understands romantic love as an extension of divine love.51 Anna Karenina is 
Tolstoy’s conservative treatise on the “woman question” and a response to Madame Bovary. 
Written under a Schopenhauerian spell,52 the novel is about the dangers of eros and the redemptive 
promise of familial love. Finally, Tolstoy’s post-‘conversion’ classic, The Death of Ivan Il’ich testifies 
to his embrace of a Kantian Christianity and his understanding of the supreme importance of an 
‘unconditional ought’, which paves the way for his conception of love as duty.53 Although Tolstoy’s 
conception of what loving entails shifts rather dramatically over his career, the fact remains that 
‘the fundamental action and value in Tolstoy’s fiction is the quest for love’.54  
 
 Partly because of Tolstoy’s abiding concerns and partly because of the time in which he 
wrote, Tolstoy’s work was always manifestly political, theological and concerned with empire. 
There was nothing, in fact, particularly unique about this convergence in Tolstoy’s literature. The 
climate of censorship in imperial Russia and the increasing state control of the Russian Orthodox 
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Church made literature a creative outlet for dissent, heterodoxy and political commentary. In 
modernising, Westernising Russia where iconography was in decline; where the slightly dressed up 
version of Western Catholicism and Protestantism were found wanting and, where a distinctively 
Orthodox systematic theology was yet to take root, Russian literature was read as political 
theology.55 This context of a modernising, Westernising Russia and an increasingly state controlled 
Church are integral to Tolstoy’s shifting understanding of the legitimacy of empire and the object 
and praxis of love. To be clear, ‘empire’ forms the context of Tolstoy’s work, rather than a structure 
he interrogates. Nonetheless, Tolstoy’s diaries and correspondence evince his deep sympathy for 
the plight of the colonised. As far back as April 1857, when travelling through England, Tolstoy 
became embroiled in an altercation about the British treatment of the Chinese.56 It was not until 
the turn of the twentieth century, however, that Tolstoy became very vocal in his criticism of 
British imperialism in China, South Africa, India and American imperialism in the Philippines.57 
Yet, as I posit in the next section, even before Tolstoy’s ‘conversion’, the high-noon of Russian 
empire forms his aesthetics. Thus, The Cossacks (and indeed, The Prisoner of the Caucuses) are 
Rousseaunian engagements with love and empire. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
War and Peace is a Rouseaunnian affirmation of ‘natural law’ and Russian resistance to Napoleonic 
imperial expansion. Anna Karenina is an ode to Schopenhauerian subjectivism and contains an 
epilogue with Tolstoy’s critique of the Balkan Question and the Russian Volunteer Movement. 
That the anti-imperialist writings of Mahfouz, Premchand, Woolf and Joyce draw inspiration from 
these literary works suggests that both the substance and style these works mattered.58 That 
Tolstoy’s museum and statute still stand unscathed after two wars in modern day Chechnya suggest 
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that Tolstoy’s representation of the Caucasus did as much to bolster his standing as an anti-
imperialist figure as any of his essays or correspondence.59 
 
From Amour De Soi to The Law of Love: The Aesthetics and Ethics of Empire 
In 1922, Boris Eikhenbaum, the pre-eminent Russian formalist and literary critic, argued 
that Tolstoy’s preoccupation with representing the Caucasus was predominantly aesthetic. Inspired 
by Stendhal’s realism, he claimed Tolstoy’s affinity for Rousseau led him to turn to the 18th Century 
to refute the Romanticism of the 19th Century.60 Tolstoy acknowledged Stendhal’s influence on his 
works in a 1904 interview with Paul Boyer, where he said,   
More than anyone else I am obliged to Stendhal for a great deal. He taught me to 
understand war….Who before him described war that way, i.e., the way it actually is? 
…Later my brother, who served in the Caucasus before me, confirmed to me the veracity 
of Stendhal’s descriptions…Shortly after this in the Crimea it was easy for me to see all 
this with my own eyes. But, I repeat to you, all that I know about war I first of all learned 
from Stendhal.61  
 
Almost a century later in the seminal work, Russian Literature and Empire, Susan Layton largely 
affirms Eikhenbaum’s reading. Categorising his early Caucasian works as part of his ‘politically 
non-committal ouevre’, she argues that over the course of Tolstoy’s career, his concern with 
empire shifts from the realm of aesthetics to political ethics.62 My contribution to this literature is 
to offer an account of how Tolstoy’s conception of the legitimacy of empire is intrinsically linked 
to his shifting conception of the object and praxis of love. In this section, I examine, The Cossacks 
(1863), Anna Karenina (1879) and Hadji Murat (completed in 1904, published in 1912). I have 
selected these texts because they were written at key moments of Russia’s imperial history: during 
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the Crimean War, the Russian Volunteer Movement and the imperial wars of the fin-de-siècle, 
respectively. In addition, each text’s engagement with empire is shaped by a distinct conception of 
the ethico-political category of love. By including Anna Karenina in this analysis, I suggest that 
Tolstoy’s concern with Russian imperialism was not merely limited to the Caucasus but extended 
to Russia’s Eastern-Slavic neighbours. As my primary aim is to offer an account of Tolstoy’s ethical 
engagement with Russian imperialism, I do not examine War and Peace. Nonetheless, considering 
War and Peace recounts Russia’s triumph over a Napoleonic (imperial) invasion, it becomes evident 
that the question of empire preoccupied Tolstoy for much of his literary career.  
 
The Cossacks 
Tolstoy’s The Cossacks(1863) is set in a Cossack village along the Terek across from the 
Chechen highlands. Tolstoy began writing the novel when he was a military volunteer in the 
Caucasus and continued to re-write the work over the 1850s when he was stationed by the Danube 
and in Crimea.63 The novel is part bildungsroman and part parody of Russian Romantic literature 
and its representation of the Caucasus. Originally intended to form the final part of Tolstoy’s 
autobiographical triology Childhood, Boyhood and Youth,64 The Cossacks tells the tale of Dmitry 
Andreich Olenin and his self-imposed exile as a military volunteer in what he imagines to be the 
‘utopia’ of the Caucasus. I agree with Eikhenbaum and others that Tolstoy’s preoccupation with 
empire in The Cossacks was predominantly aesthetic. Therefore, whatever political or ethical 
function his parody of Orientalist representations of the Caucasus might serve is ultimately 
undermined by his ethics which rest on the objectification of the ‘noble savage’. 
As Boris Eikhenbaum notes, Tolstoy’s aim in his early Caucasian works was to: 
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(follow) in the footsteps of the romantics with the conscious intention of thoroughly 
destroying their poetics. He happens in the Caucasus for the apparent purpose of 
confronting Marlinsky and Lermontov, exposing their ‘untruth’ and liquidating the 
romantic contrivance’65 
That Tolstoy was animated by this aim, is evident in his 1852 essay ‘Notes on the Caucasus’, where 
he laments the lost poetry of his youth: 
…it happened so long ago that all I remember is the poetic feeling which I experienced 
while reading, and the evocation of poetic images of bellicose Circassians, sloe-eyed 
Circassian women, mountains, cliffs, snows, rapid streams, the plane tree…The burka, 
dagger and sword also held a far from peripheral place in my mind. These images took 
shape in my imagination in an extraordinarily poetic way, being embellished upon each 
recollection. I had already forgotten the poems of Bestuzhev-Marlinsky and Lermontov 
long before, but each time my mind returned to the images, new poems came into being, 
each one a thousand times more alluring than the last….For a long time the Caucasus for 
me was that poem in an unknown language; and when I delved into its actual significance, 
I regretted the loss of the invented poem in many respects, while in many other ways I 
became convinced that reality was better than what I had imagined.66  
 
Consequently, in The Cossacks, Tolstoy subverts the ‘stock characters of the Caucasian Romantic 
tale, namely, the local girl, her lover and the village elder’.67 Instead of the submissive Circassian 
‘concubine’ he yearns for, Olenin encounters the strong-willed Maryana who regards him with 
bemusement. Instead of the loyal kunak to educate and patronise, he encounters Lukashka, a 
Homeric hero who treats him with distrust and disdain. Instead of the figure of the sage, he 
encounters the hedonist Uncle Yeroshka who smells of ‘wine, vodka, gunpowder and congealed 
blood’.68 A naïve at best, and ethnocentric and egotistical at worst, Olenin embarks on his journey 
somewhat convinced ‘these people…are not people’.69 And yet, in the station in which he is billeted, 
he is surprised to discover that he is not even regarded as ‘human’.70 Miscommunication and 
misunderstanding pervade the text. Notably, Olenin moralises about the ease at which Cossacks 
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kill entirely impervious to their indictment of the excesses of Tsarist violence and war-time 
infanticide. Consequently, despite Olenin’s romantic beliefs about his oneness with the Caucasus 
or his revelation about love, he is at the very least confused about the nature of his transformation. 
At the novel’s denouement, he is under no illusion that any of the characters he encounters in the 
Caucasus understand him or regard him as having any significance. 
Tolstoy initially intended for The Cossacks to expound ‘that the good is good in every 
sphere, that the same passions exist everywhere and that the primitive state is good’.71 Towards 
the end of August 1857, as the standard narrative goes, Tolstoy was reading Homer’s Illiad 
alongside drafting The Cossacks. Upon completing the Illiad, he re-read the Gospels and wrote in 
his diary ‘How could Homer not have known that goodness is love! It’s a revelation! There is no 
better explanation.’72 Following this, Tolstoy re-wrote the character of Lukashka depicting him as 
a Homeric hero, removing any reference of his romantic love for Maryana.73 Albeit an important 
account of Tolstoy’s need to depict the Homeric and Christian worlds as distinct, it largely excludes 
the intervening influence of Rousseau. Indeed, when the plot for The Cossacks was first conceived 
in 1852, Tolstoy was re-reading Rousseau and was particularly moved by the Profession of Faith of 
the Savoyard Vicar in Book 4 of Emile.74 So profound was the impact of Rousseau on the young 
Tolstoy that he wrote a letter to his Aunt, which many interpret as foreshadowing his subsequent 
conversion and pursuit of practical Christianity, 
And everything that I discovered then will remain my belief forever. I cannot do otherwise. 
From two years of mental work, I discovered a simple, old thing, but one which I know as 
no one else knows it; I discovered that there is immortality, that there is love, and that one 
must live for another in order to be eternally happy. These discoveries amazed me by their 
resemblance to the Christian religion and instead of uncovering them myself I began to 
search for them in the Gospels, but I found little. I found neither God, nor the Saviour, 
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nor the mysteries, nothing; and I searched with all, all, all the strength of my soul, and I 
wept, and I tortured myself, and I wanted nothing but the truth.75 
 
 
Rousseau profoundly shaped Tolstoy’s ethics in The Cossacks from his understanding of 
time and progress to the relation between nature and culture. However, this understanding 
ultimately derives from Tolstoy’s engagement with Rousseau’s conceptions of self-love as amour de 
soi and amour propre. As Rousseau elaborates in his Discourses 
Amour-propre and love of oneself [amour de soi], two passions very different in their Nature 
and their effects, must not be confused. Love of oneself is a natural sentiment which 
inclines every animal to watch over its own preservation, and which, directed in man by 
reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Amour-propre is only a relative 
sentiment, artificial and born in Society, which inclines each individual to have a greater 
esteem for himself than for anyone else, inspires in men all the harm they do to one 
another, and is the true source of honour.76  
 
Indeed, Rousseau is famous for his association of civilisation with regress rather than progress.  
For him, ‘humanity’s task is not to move forward but to move back’.77 Central to this narrative is 
Rousseau’s Orientalist exaltation of the ‘noble savage’ and his/her inherent goodness in the state 
of nature. However, as Simon May notes, Rousseau  
is not advising us to ‘return’ to a primitive state and abolish all society. Nor is he saying 
that amour propre is always bad or that it cannot fruitfully coexist with amour de soi. 
Instead he wants to build a society on the basis of a rediscovery of our natural goodness 
and its uncorrupted will.78 
 
This ‘rediscovery’ rests on a metaphorical movement back in time, which Olenin assumes he 
embarks on when he leaves to live with the ‘noble savages’ of the Caucasus.  
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That Tolstoy might be engaging in this Rousseaunian exercise is evident in Olenin’s three 
shifting conceptions of love from amour propre to amour de soi to a form where they are reconciled. 
Thus, the novel begins with Olenin, surrounded by Russian high society, moved to tears by amour 
propre or the self-love inspired by others’ estimation of him. 
I love them! Love them dearly! They’re splendid! First-rate!’ he kept repeating and felt like 
crying. But why did he feel like crying? Who were splendid? Whom did he love so dearly? 
He did not really know…He remembered all the sincere – so it had seemed to him – words 
of friendship that had been shyly, almost spontaneously uttered to him before his 
departure. He remembered the handshakes, the glances, the silences, the sound of a voice 
saying: ‘Goodbye Mitya!’….He remembered his own determined, frank sincerity. And it 
all had a touching significance for him….But it was not love for his friends that softened 
and exalted his heart to a point where he was unable to repress meaningless words that 
uttered themselves of their own accord, and it was not love for a woman (he had never yet 
been in love) that had put him into this state of mind. Love for himself, ardent, full of 
hope, a young love for all that was good in his soul (and now he felt that there was nothing 
but good in it), made him weep and mutter incoherent words.79 
 
Living in the Caucasus, Olenin spends time with Uncle Yeroshka and is moved by his natural 
morality. ‘In other words, everyone has his own law. And in my opinion it’s all the same. God 
made everything for the delight of man. There’s no sin in anything’.80 Desperately seeking meaning 
in a simpler love, amour de soi, Olenin has a transient experience of it in a stag’s (olen) lair. For a 
brief moment, his self-love and the self-love he attributes to the Cossacks are one. 
He felt cool, comfortable; there was nothing in his mind, he had no desires. And suddenly 
he was assailed by such a strange feeling of causeless happiness and love for everything 
that, following an old habit from childhood, he began to cross himself and thank someone. 
It suddenly occurred to him with great clarity that ‘here am I, Dmitry Olenin, a being so 
separate from all others: now I lie alone, God knows where, in the place where a stag lived, 
an old stag, a beautiful one, that may never have seen a human being, and in a place where 
no human being has ever sat and thought this. I sit, and around me stand trees young and 
old, and one of them is twined with a lattice of wild vines; around me pheasants are 
moving,….And it became clear to him that he was not a Russian nobleman at all, a member 
of Moscow society, the friend and relative of such and such a person, but just a gnat, or a 
pheasant, or a stag, like the one that were living now, all around him. ‘Like them, like Uncle 
Yeroshka, I shall live and die. And what he says is true: ‘the grass will grow on your grave, 
and that’s it’.81 
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However, that moment of abandon was short-lived. Interrupted by his self-consciousness, he 
returns to the village with a renewed fervour for self-sacrifice. In a grandiose gesture, he gifts a 
horse to Lukashka ostensibly as a symbol that he has relinquished his interest in Maryana. In the 
course of time, however, Olenin comes to abandon his initial self-sacrifice as a rational abstraction 
and delusional form of self-love. In an epiphanic moment that speaks more of his Rousseaunian 
sentimentalism than Christian charity, he comes to see Maryana in Layton’s reading as ‘the 
embodiment of the wilderness which the civilized man ambivalently yearns to merge’82 
Perhaps in her I love nature, the personification of all that is beautiful in nature; but I do 
not have a will of my own, and what loves her is some elemental force passing through 
me; all of God’s world, all of nature presses this love into my soul and says: “Love”. I love 
her not with my mind, not with my imagination, but with all my being. Loving her, I feel 
myself to be an inseparable part of all God’s happy world. I wrote earlier about my new 
convictions, which I derived from my solitary life; but no one can know the toil with which 
they were elaborated in me, with what joy I became conscious of them and saw a new, 
open path in life. Nothing was dearer to me than those convictions…Well…Love has 
come, and they are no longer here, nor even any regret for them. Even the thought that I 
could have prized such a cold, one-sided, cerebral state of mind is difficult for me to 
entertain. Beauty came and scattered into ash the whole of the Egyptian labour of my inner 
world. And I have no regret for what has gone! Self-denial – all that is nonsense, rubbish. 
It is all pride, a refuge from deserved unhappiness, a running away from envy of the 
happiness of others. Live for others, do good! Why? When in my soul there is only love 
for myself and the desire to love her and live with her, with her life. Not for others, not 
for Lukashka do I now desire happiness. Now I do not love those others. Before, I would 
have told myself that this is wrong. I would have tormented myself with the questions: 
‘What will become of her, of myself, of Lukashka?’ Now I don’t care. I live not by my 
own, and there is something stronger than me that is leading me. I am suffering, but before 
I was dead, and only now I am alive’.83 
 
The cultural gap between Maryana and Olenin remains unbridgeable and she spurns him. 
This was inevitable in Rousseau’s frame. As Kimberly Hutchings notes, for Rousseau, any 
exaltation of the ‘noble savage’ rests on the notion that because they are ‘undeveloped – their 
human potential has yet to, and may never, be realised’.84 Maryana cannot understand or love 
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Olenin the way he imagines he understands and loves her. Either owing to Olenin’s self-
consciousness or the incommensurability of nature and culture, he is expelled from his imagined 
Eden. Indeed, in seeking to counter Russian Romanticism with Rousseaunian sentimentalism, 
Tolstoy fails to interrogate the basis of his ethics. In part this is because Rousseaunian 
sentimentalism does not necessarily preclude Russian Romanticism.85 As Carol Anscheutz 
elaborates, ‘When Tolstoi parodies the romantic situation of the European among savages, he 
merely disguises his ideological affinity, if not for the individual romantics he parodies, at least for 
the myth of exile to which the traditional romantic situation respond’.86 The Cossacks then betrays 
a two-tiered moral system. 87 The Cossacks of a Homeric world with their capacity for amour de soi 
are represented as possessing a natural morality attuned to the law of necessity, of moderation and 
self-restraint. However, the ‘civilised’ Christians of the metropole albeit bereft of amour de soi have 
access to the higher morality of self-sacrifice. Via Olenin’s ‘return’ to the past, his Christianity 
enables him to learn from the Cossacks (in a way he suggests they cannot) rehabilitating his amour 
propre and placing it in right relation with his amour de soi. The gap between the naïve Olenin and 
cynical narrator leaves the reader ambivalent about what normative significance Tolstoy attributes 
to this conclusion. Nonetheless, Tolstoy developed these themes in War and Peace where he argued 
that Christian ‘revelation’ can harmonise the relationship between nature and civilisation via 
natural law.88  
 
Anna Karenina 
The epilogue or Part VIII to Anna Karenina, which offers Konstantin Levin’s thoughts on 
the Russian volunteer movement and the Slavonic question, might seem at first an out-of-place, if 
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not self-indulgent conclusion to a novel that was seemingly about marriage, adultery and the 
parallel portraits of Anna and Levin. The conservative, pan-Slavist editor, Mikhail Nikiforovich 
Katov, claimed to think as much when he refused to print the final instalment of Anna Karenina in 
his journal, Russkkii Vestnik.89 Tolstoy, for his part, argued that the novel was held together by a 
‘labyrinth of linkages’.90 I read Anna Karenina as organised around the theme of familial love. If its 
conservation is central to Tolstoy’s Slavophilism, its erosion is associated with his apocalyptic fin-
de-siècle anxieties.91  
 
That familial love is the central motif of Anna Karenina is evident in the opening sentence 
‘All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way’.92 Indeed, around the 
time of the novel’s completion, Tolstoy’s wife, Sofya recorded his words ‘In order for a work to 
be good, one must love its main basic idea, as in Anna Karenina I love the idea of family’.93 In what 
I read as a conservative morality tale, the tragic fate of the adulterous Anna and Vronsky are 
contrasted with the happy, fulfilled marriage of Kitty and Levin. Anna Karenina, therefore, 
expresses what Irving Singer describes as Tolstoy’s disdain for the ideology of romantic love or,94 
what Gary Saul Morson depicts as the elevation of prosaic love over the passionate.95 Given 
Tolstoy was reading Schopenhauer and Kant at the time, it is not surprising that the novel 
articulates the evils of eros on the one hand, or distinguishes between a love that is pathological 
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and practical, on the other. I argue, however, that the conservative family unit operates as a 
shibboleth in Tolstoy’s thought distinguishing ‘good’ loves from ‘bad’. Rather than being restricted 
to the private sphere, Tolstoy’s Slavophilism leads him to imagine Russia as a family. Anna’s affair 
with Vronsky which led to the disintegration of her family and her own dismemberment then 
comes to represent Tolstoy’s fin-de-siècle fears about the fate of Russia whose private citizens 
chose to fund and partake in the Balkan war against the Ottoman empire.96 
 
Anna Karenina may be Tolstoy’s conservative riposte to Zola, Dumas and Flaubert about 
the ‘woman question’.97 It may have begun with Tolstoy’s engagement with the theme of adultery 
and family, but it soon morphed into ‘a full-fledged ideological statement suffused with political 
commentary on the most urgent contemporary events of the decade’.98 Although the plight of 
fellow Orthodox Slavs under Ottoman rule was ostensibly a source of concern to Russians since 
the Crimean war, these anxieties became pressing in the 1870s.99 Following the threat of famine 
and growing awareness about the decline of Ottoman power, there were uprisings in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro, in turn, declared war on Turkey in 1876. The 
outbreak of war led to the rise of the Russian volunteer movement which saw churches partake in 
a war appeal and private citizens finance and participate in the war effort, without state sanction 
or involvement. Caving to public pressure, the Russian state finally declared war on the Ottoman 
empire a month before Tolstoy’s epilogue was due to be published. Anna Karenina, then, expresses 
Tolstoy’s anti-war stance and his vehement denunciation of the Russian Volunteer Movement. At 
the heart of Tolstoy’s critique is his Slavophilism. Although Tolstoy remained largely agnostic in 
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the Westernizer-Slavophile debate in his early career, his celebration of Russian peasantry in Anna 
Karenina is generally read as signifying his commitment to the Slavophile cause.100 Whereas 
Slavophilism subscribed to an ‘ahistorical, peaceful and circular worldview’, the Pan-Slavism that 
animated the Russian Volunteer movement took a ‘more outward-looking, aggressive, and linear 
approach to Russian history’.101 Consequently, each interpreted family differently. Konstantin 
Levin’s conversation with his half-brother, Sergei Ivanovich and his father-in-law, Prince 
Shcherbatsky, sheds light on these two competing conceptions of kinship and is worth 
reproducing at length 
…There is no declaration of war here, but simply the expression of human, Christian 
feeling. They’re killing our brothers, of the same blood, of the same religion. Well, suppose 
they weren’t even our brothers, our co-religionists, but simply children, women, old men; 
indignation is aroused, and the Russian people run to help stop these horrors. Imagine 
yourself going down the street and seeing some drunk beating a woman or a child, I don’t 
think you’d start asking whether war had or had not been declared on the man, but would 
fall upon him and protect the victim.  
 
But I wouldn’t kill him, said Levin. 
 
‘Yes, you would’.  
 
‘I don’t know. If I saw it, I would yield to my immediate feeling, but I can’t say beforehand. 
And there is not and cannot be such an immediate feeling about the oppression of the 
Slavs.; 
 
‘Maybe not for you. But for others there is,’ said Sergei Ivanovich, with a frown of 
displeasure. ‘There are stories alive among the people about Orthodox Christians suffering 
under the yoke of the “infidel Hagarenes”. The people heard about their brothers’ 
suffering and spoke out’. 
 
‘Maybe so,’ Levin said evasively, ‘but I don’t see it. I’m the people myself, and I don’t feel 
it’.  
 
‘Neither do I,’ said the prince. ‘I was living aboard and reading the newspapers, and I 
confess, before the Bulgarian atrocities I simply couldn’t understand why the Russians all 
suddenly loved their brother Slavs so much, while I felt no love for them. I was very upset, 
thought I was a monster, or that Karlsbad affected me that way. But I came here and was 
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reassured – I see there are people interested just in Russia and not in our brother Slavs. 
Konstantin for one’.102 
 
Levin – who Dostoevsky disdainfully dismissed as a mouthpiece for Tolstoy – espouses a 
narrow conception of family. If as Liza Knapp notes, the novel is Tolstoy’s grappling with the 
question, ‘who is my neighbour?’,103 Levin (and therefore the Tolstoy of Anna Karenina) would 
seem to respond, ‘my family’. There is much in the epilogue to support this. Levin understands his 
happiness with Kitty and their infant’s innate ability to recognise his own as supporting his belief 
that what is moral is intuitively known. Together it affirms his view of Russia’s kinship with the 
Balkan states. For the Tolstoy of Anna Karenina, the Balkan states are too remote and too abstract 
to legitimise military action by private citizens. Years later in The Kingdom of God is Within You, 
Tolstoy develops this argument to critique a love of humanity or ‘fraternity’ as abstract and 
meaningless. 
The social conception of life has led men, by a natural transition from love of self and then 
of family, tribe, nation, and state, to a consciousness of the necessity of love for humanity, 
a conception which has no definite limits and extends to all living things. And this necessity 
for love of what awakens no kind of sentiment in a man is a contradiction which cannot 
be solved by the social theory of life.104 
 
Levin’s inward gaze also reflects the novel’s association of the modern, foreign or unrooted as 
threatening. Thus, a certain anxiety of ‘rootlessness’ and ‘otherness’ permeates Anna Karenina. As 
Tatiana Kuzmic argues, an affair with a French woman leads to the disintegration of Prince 
Oblonsky’s marriage; an English governess is the source of household strife in the Oblonsky 
household; Betsy seeks to ease Anna’s conscience by introducing her to ‘adulterous’ foreign 
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(Turkish and Graeco-German) women.105 Similarly, while Levin’s stability is traced to his 
aristocratic roots, Vronsky is depicted as ‘common’, lacking a clear family lineage.106 At the centre 
of the novel’s anxiety about the disappearance of boundaries is the symbol of the railway. 
Mentioned no less than 32 times in the novel,107 it is the ‘site of death, disfigured bodies and the 
disruption of family life’: ‘it plows blindly over Anna’s body and the watchman’s, it brings 
adulterous lovers together, and it carries soldiers toward possible death on the battlefield’.108 
 
Anna Karenina may articulate Tolstoy’s elevation of the ‘familial’ over the ‘foreign’, but it also 
gives voice to his incipient pacifism. Levin’s critique of the Russian Volunteer Movement was not 
a critique of state-sanctioned military intervention. As he clarifies, 
‘…war is such a beastly, cruel and terrible thing that no man, to say nothing of a Christian, 
can personally take upon himself the responsibility for starting a war. That can only be 
done by a government…’.109 
 
Nonetheless, this distinction highlights what Tolstoy came to see as a fundamental dissonance 
between the pursuits of ‘politics’ and ‘religion’, of ‘the state’ and ‘the soul’. It came to underpin his 
philosophy of non-violence: ‘The people sacrifice and are always prepared to sacrifice themselves 
for their soul, not for murder’.110 The reasons Levin offers for his latent pacifism shed light on 
Tolstoy’s seemingly contradictory commitments to metaphysical idealism, epistemological 
humility and universalism. 
He could not agree with it, because he did not see the expression of these thoughts in the 
people amongst whom he lived, nor did he find these thoughts in himself (and he could 
not consider himself anything else but one of those persons who made up the Russian 
people), and above all because, while neither he nor the people knew or could know what 
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the common good consisted in, he knew firmly that it was only possible to attain that 
common good by strictly fulfilling the law of the good that was open to every man, and 
therefore he could not desire war and preach it for any common purposes whatsoever.111  
 
This faith that even in the absence of a knowable ‘common good’, the self could somehow discern 
‘the law of the good’ formed the basis of what was to become Tolsoy’s ‘law of love’. 
 
Whereas The Cossacks articulated the Rousseaunian need to rehabilitate amour-propre, Anna 
Karenina was shaped by a Schopenhauerian suspicion of eros. It is no coincidence then that the 
novel opens with Vronsky’s quest to seduce Anna and closes with Vronsky financing and leading 
a squadron in the Balkans. Tolstoy’s association of eros with evil was to culminate in the 
misanthropic Kreutzer Sonata, where echoing Augustine and Tertullian he comes to commend 
celibacy and chaste marriages.112 However, Levin’s curiosity about revelation and the relation of 
‘the Deity’ and ‘the laws of the good’ to the ‘Jews, Mohammedans, the Confucians, the 
Buddhists’,113 culminated in his masterpiece, Hadji Murat. 
 
Hadji Murat 
Between the writing of Anna Karenina and Hadji Murat much had changed in Tolstoy’s life. 
His novel Resurrection had called into question the virgin birth, the divinity of Christ and the 
doctrines of resurrection and transubstantiation.114 It denounced the judiciary, the penal system, 
war, lampooned the Russian Orthodox church and led to Tolstoy’s excommunication. The period 
also coincided with Tolstoy’s renunciation of money, property, ‘high art’ and his gradual embrace 
of vegetarianism, chastity, temperance and absolute non-violence. That the Christian anarcho-
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pacifist who decried his own literary works chose to celebrate ‘the archaic hero, combining in 
himself all of the virtues and none of the flaws of Odysseus, Achilles and Aenas’115 in the style of 
War and Peace and Anna Karenina may seem perplexing. Hadji Murat, after all, is a semi-fictional 
novella that celebrates the Avar chief and his ghazavat (holy war) against the Russians. Yet, the 
imperial wars of the fin-de-siècle – which saw Tolstoy sympathise with the Boxers and Boers –116 
form the backdrop to this novella. In addition, there is a growing body of literature which reads 
Tolstoy’s religiosity, ecumenism and aesthetics as entirely consonant with Hadji Murat.117 Building 
on this work, I argue that the anti-imperialism of Hadji Murat is animated by a shift in Tolstoy’s 
conception of love. 
 
Hadji Murat is set in 1851 which happens to coincide with Tolstoy’s time as a junker 
(volunteer of noble birth with private’s rank) in the Caucasus. During that time, Tolstoy had visited 
Tiflis and was acquainted with many of the historical characters that feature in his novella including 
the Viceroy Vorontsov and Bariatsky.118 In the 1850s, Tolstoy was aware of Hadji Murat and 
judged him for defecting to the Russians. In a letter to his brother, he wrote,  
If you wish to show off with news from the Caucasus, you may recount that a certain Hadji 
Murat (the second man in importance to Shamil himself) surrenders a few days ago to the 
Russian Government. He was the leading daredevil and “brave” in all Circassia, but was 
led to commit a mean action.119  
 
There is no evidence to suggest that Tolstoy thought deeply about Hadji Murat or Russian 
imperialism at the time. Whatever discomfort Tolstoy expressed about violence and war in the 
1850s did not appear to extend to the question of empire. Thus, in The Cossacks, Tolstoy’s primary 
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concern is the parodying of the romantic trope. In Anna Karenina, Tolstoy posits that eros rather 
than an agape (or self-giving love for an abstract Slavic neighbour) animated the Russian Volunteer 
Movement. Nonetheless, the novel remains ambivalent about whether such an intervention would 
be justified if sanctioned by the State. In Hadji Murat, however, Tolstoy’s condemnation of empire 
is unequivocal. Whereas in the 1850s he saw Hadji Murat as a defector, at the turn of the twentieth 
century he understands him as entrapped. His shifting loyalties from the khans of Khunzakh to 
the imam Hamzat to the Russians to the Imam Shamil to the Russians again is sympathetically 
portrayed as a function of self-defence and self-preservation. Beyond illuminating the plight of the 
Avar hero, the novella also operates to implicate Tolstoy and the reader in the ‘sin’ of imperialism. 
For Susan Layton, Tolstoy achieves this stylistically in two ways. First, he juxtaposes the image of 
a Tartar thistle (representing Hadji Murat) despoiled by a farmer mowing a field and a Tartar thistle 
despoiled by a narrator in his assembling of a bouquet. If ‘the wanton plunder of wild fields’ is the 
‘analogue of Russia’s war against the Caucasian tribes’, the author’s ‘despoilment, followed by 
atonement’ becomes ‘a confessional action which puts him in the position of a reformed sinner 
who has won the right to preach to others in the hope of prodding them into a similar experience 
of guilt and moral conversion’.120 Second, given Tolstoy’s recognition of ‘language’s embedment 
in imperial power’, his decision to return to the stylistic conventions of War and Peace and Anna 
Karenina represents his commission of ‘aesthetic sin’ in order to turn book culture against itself.121 
The novella, set during the high-tide of Russian imperialism in the Caucasus and written during 
the high-tide of Russia’s imperialism in the East, thus seeks to morally and aesthetically implicate 
those that participate and benefit from Russian imperialism. 
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Tolstoy’s denunciation of empire, however, is largely tied to his shifting ethico-politics of 
love. Central to this is Tolstoy’s rejection of Schopenhauer and embrace of Kant. In Confessions, 
Tolstoy begins to acknowledge his conversion or faith entailed a movement away from 
Schopenhauer. 
 The…method of escape is to live like Solomon and Schopenhauer, knowing that life is a 
stupid joke being played on us, by nevertheless continuing to live, to wash, to dress, to eat, 
to talk, and even to write books. Although I found it offensive and painful I remained in 
this position122  
 
However, by the time he begins Hadji Murat, he ‘shuts the door forever on Schopenhauer’.123 By 
1889 in the midst of drafting his work on aesthetics and Hadji Murat, Tolstoy comes to regard 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetics as ‘flippancy’ and ‘trash’.124 Tolstoy’s interview with Paul Boyer around 
the time he finished Hadji Murat suggests Rousseau remained a constant influence. 
I have read all of Rousseau, all twenty volumes, including the Dictionary of Music. I did 
more than admire him – I worshipped him. When I was fifteen, I wore next to my skin a 
medallion with his portrait rather than a cross. Many of his pages are so close to me that 
it feels like I wrote them myself. 125 
 
And yet later in his diary, he was able to more clearly articulate how he differed from Rousseau. 
They compare me with Rousseau. I owe much to Rousseau and I love him, but there is a 
great difference between us. The difference is that Rousseau rejects all civilization whereas 
I reject pseudo- Christian civilization.126 
 
Rousseau inspired Tolstoy’s practical Christianity and its ‘rejection of organized religion in 
favour of belief based on personal conscience’.127 However, the form this Christianity came to take 
was ultimately Kantian. Perhaps the greatest testament to the influence of Kant is the role 
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rationality comes to play in Tolstoy’s later thought. In Tolstoy’s articulation of Christianity, reason 
becomes the essence of human life.128 In his re-writing of the Bible, reason or knowledge of life as 
razumenie is literally deified. Rosamund Bartlett’s description of his reworking of the first line of 
the Gospel of John ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word 
was God’ is particularly revealing: 
Tolstoy “fairly swiftly decided to interpret the Greek logos as “reasoning” rather than “the 
word” (the Russian word razumenie implying both rational enquiry and understanding), but 
then he came up against the problem of translating pros ton theon (with God), which the first 
Church Slavonic Bible renders as “from God”. Dismissing the literal meaning of “towards 
God” as meaningless, and condemning the Vulgate ‘apud Deum’ and Luther’s ‘bei Gott’ as 
meaningless and also inaccurate, Tolstoy’s far more radical version, on the basis of a 
lengthy discussion of the preposition pros was “and reasoning replaced God”.129 
 
In Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief, it is rendered, 
In the beginning stood the knowledge of life, as the foundation of all things. Knowledge 
of life stood in the place of God. Knowledge of life is God. According to Jesus’ 
proclamation, it stands as the source of all things, in the place of God.130  
Even Tolstoy’s conception of, ‘resurrection’ becomes ‘the survival of reasonable consciousness’ 
in eternal time.131 Tolstoy’s embrace of Kantian rationalism led to his embrace of his Categorical 
Imperative. ‘After a long history of rejecting the Categorical Imperative for fear of its abstraction’, 
Tolstoy ‘embraced Kant’s moral law and reinforced John’s…injunction to love each other’.132 In 
his essays on Religion and Morality and The Law of Love and The Law of Violence, religion’s offering to 
morality therefore becomes the ‘law of love’: ‘to do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you’.133 Tolstoy’s Kantian turn led to an ecumenism which sees all ‘true’ religion as rational, self-
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denying articulations of this ‘law of love’. For Tolstoy, at the base of all religions were a series of 
‘very simple, comprehensible and uncomplicated’ principles. 
They are as follows: that there is a God who is the origin of everything; that there is an 
element of this divine origin in every person, which he can diminish or increase through 
his way of living that in order for someone to increase this source he must suppress his 
passions and increase the love within himself; that the practical means of achieving this 
consist in doing to others as you would wish to do to you. All these principles are common 
to Brahmanism, Hebraism, Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity and 
Mohammedanism.134 
 
Tolstoy’s Kantian Christianity eradicates an ambivalence that categorises his early 
engagements with the question ‘Who is my neighbour?’ In The Cossacks, the ‘noble savage’ is the 
object rather than subject in the morality tale. Despite Olenin’s best intentions, nature renders 
them beyond the reach of Christian morality. Although the tragic and tenuous conclusion might 
create some ambiguity about Tolstoy’s intention, the love of abstract humanity is portrayed as 
inherently problematic. At best, we are left with what Carol Anschuetz describes as Rousseau’s 
reworking of the Categorical imperative: Do what is good for you with the least possible harm to others.135 
In Anna Karenina, Tolstoy asserts both that the killing of an unknown Ottoman is murder and that 
any sacrificial or self-giving love for an unknown Slav is an abstraction. Instead, he seems to 
prescribe a prosaic, particular love that is grounded in intuition. By the time he writes Hadji Murat, 
there is no ambiguity about the love or duty owed to the Avar tribesman. As Tolstoy noted in his 
diary, in the year of his death, 
I thought how necessary it is to preach to people an equal love for ALL, for negroes, 
savages and one’s enemies, because if you don’t preach that, there won’t be and can’t be 
any deliverance from evil, there will only be what comes most naturally: one’s fatherland, 
one’s people, its defence, armies, and war. And if there are armies and war there will be no 
limits to evil.  
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In What is Art? which was drafted alongside Hadji Murat, Tolstoy comments that the 
purpose of religious art is to convey ‘positive feelings (the love of God and one’s neighbour) as 
well as negative ones (indignation, horror at the violation of this love)….136 That the story was told 
to promote judgment and indignation is reflected in the horror of Marya Dimitrievna when she 
hears of Hadji Murat’s death and beheading: ‘You’re all butchers….Real butchers’.137 It is also 
intimated in Tolstoy’s diary entry from when he wrote Hadji Murat. At the time it occurred to him 
to write a ‘pendant [counterpart] to Hadji Murat…about another Russian brigand – Grigory 
Nikolayev – in such a way that he should see the whole lawlessness of the life of the rich’.138 
Considered together, Tolstoy’s anti-imperial sympathies, his diary entries and, aesthetic theory 
suggest that perhaps Hadji Murat’s primary purpose was to illustrate the Russian violation of the 
‘law of love’. While the Tolstoy of Anna Karenina might have regarded love for Hadji Murat too 
remote, Tolstoy’s Kantian turn transforms loving into a general duty.  
  
Hadji Murat meets his end in a battle to the death. That Tolstoy should sympathetically 
portray a man who resorted to violence until the very end raises questions about Tolstoy’s pacifism 
and the moral status of the protagonist in the story. The problem is that it is particularly hard to 
discern what Tolstoy made of his ‘hero’. Indeed, unlike War and Peace or Anna Karenina, neither the 
narrator nor the protagonist moralise. Consequently, a number of literary theorists read the text in 
seemingly opposing ways. For Inessa Medzhibovskaya, Hadji Murat is an exceptional case in 
Tolstoy’s denunciation of political violence and terrorism.  
Hadji Murad fighting against other treacherous warlords and Russian colonizers who 
betray him is no terrorist; he is a “wild thistle” never to be uprooted from his native soil 
or interfered with – his retaliation to the Russian patrol during armed escape is not for the 
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sake of coercive intimidation. This is not terrorism but a form of partisan defense against 
the aggressor.139 
 
For Ani Kokobo, Tolstoy’s parallel project on the study of world religions, Path to Life, underscores 
Tolstoy’s commitment to pluralism in general and his sensitivity to Sufi mysticism in particular.140  
Indeed, the story tells of Hadji Murat’s journey from a self-preserving love of ‘honour’ to a self-
giving, sacrificial love for family. This movement from love of ‘self’ to ‘other’ would seem to mirror 
the movement through Tolstoy’s schema in The Kingdom of God is Within You from a ‘personal’ stage 
characterised by love of self to a ‘social’ stage characterised by love of other (family, tribe, race, 
State or humanity) to a ‘universal’ stage where ‘understanding of life is found, not in the individual 
personality or in a group of personalities, but in the ‘source of eternal, undying life, God’.141 In 
fact, writing of Tolstoy’s early works, Gustafson suggests all of Tolstoy’s major (male) characters, 
including Olenin, are subjected to this movement. They enter life at the ‘personal’ stage, move to 
the ‘social stage’ and experience conflict before transcendence or ‘rational’ resurrection.142 
However, whether Hadji Murat comes to epitomise this resurrection remains in question. Reading 
Hadji Murat through Ani Kokobobo’s ecumenical lens would suggest that Hadji Murat’s 
movement from self love to sacrificial love mirrors his journey from the ‘lesser jihad of the sword’ 
(ghazavat) to the ‘higher jihad of the spirit’.143 As Kokobobo elaborates, Murat’s decision to 
emulate ‘Hamzat’s legendary fight to the death is so obviously spiritual that it brings us into the 
territory of the greater jihad of the spirit’.144 This disinterested spirituality is conveyed in Hadji 
Murat’s last thoughts before his death: 
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And all these memories ran through his imagination without calling up any feeling in him: 
no pity, no anger, no desire of any sort. It all seemed so insignificant compared with what 
was beginning and had already begun for him.145 
 
For Donna Orwin, however, Hadji Murat remains like the characters in The Cossacks, ‘a noble 
savage’.146 His heroism is the embodiment of Tolstoy’s celebration of the ‘spontaneity and 
confidence inherent’ in war or molodeschestvo.147 However, beyond the reach of ‘revelation’, he 
sacrifices himself for his ‘family’ rather than ‘humanity’. The insinuation that post-conversion 
Tolstoy thought the ‘noble savage’ to be beyond the reach of revelation is questionable. It sits 
uncomfortably with Tolstoy’s thought about the universality of reason and revelation. It would 
also seem to be contradicted by the text, which celebrates the Imam Mansur and his ‘Tolstoian’ 
conception of love and non-violence.  
That was a real holy man. When he was imam, all the people were different. He went 
around the aouls, and the people came out to him, kissed the skirts of his cherkeska, and 
repented of their sins, and swore not to do bad things. The old men said: Back then all the 
people lived like holy men – didn’t smoke, didn’t drink, didn’t miss prayers, forgave each 
other’s offences, even blood offences’.148 
 
Nonetheless, Orwin’s reading supports late post-‘conversion’ Tolstoy’s critique of the limits of 
‘familial’ love. Seeking to sacrifice himself for his ‘family’ rather than ‘humanity’, Hadji Murat offers 
Tolstoy the opportunity to clarify a contradiction at the heart of Anna Karenina. No matter how 
‘family’ was conceived, the glorification of ‘familial love’ perpetuated rather than prevented 
violence. The text seems to support this reading. Thus, Avdeev joins the military to spare his 
brother from war, a desire to protect his family leads Hadji Murat to kill Nazarov who himself 
works as a soldier to be the sole support of his poor family. It would seem Tolstoy concludes that 
no matter how self-giving, the elevation of familial love must end in murder. 
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 I understand the divergent readings of Hadji Murat to illuminate the contradictions that 
inhere in the late post-‘conversion’ Tolstoy’s thought. If Anna Karenina betrays a totalitarian 
tendency which enunciates a law for society that is legislated by the self, Hadji Murat reveals a 
rational hierarchy that orders ecumenism, a pluralism that prioritises unity. It matters little then 
whether a ‘noble savage’ may experience resurrection. What matters is that he must become 
rational first. In Hadji Murat, rational, disinterested love of humanity becomes the goal of human 
striving. It also becomes the standard for moral judgment which implicates individuals in the ‘sins’ 
of imperialism. For any discussion of what this form of loving entailed for the soldier and subject 
of empire requires an engagement with Tolstoy’s non-fiction.  
 
Love as Non-Violence: Tolstoy’s Anti-Imperial Epistles 
 In a time of empire, Tolstoy’s ‘law of love’ calls everyone to the task of introspection and 
non-violence. Grounded in his articulation of practical Christianity and his comparative study of 
world religions, ‘the law of love’ is ‘the means of deliverance’ from its anti-thesis: the ‘law of 
violence’.149Derived from the Sermon on the Mount, which Tolstoy placed at the centre of his 
Christianity, the ‘law of love’ necessitates non-violence. In this section, I examine Tolstoy’s three 
major anti-imperial epistles: ‘A Letter to a Chinese Gentleman’ addressed to the Confucian scholar 
Ku Hung-Ming following the Boxer revolt in 1899,150 ‘Bethink Yourselves’ published during the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1904,151 and ‘A Letter to a Hindu’ addressed to the Indian revolutionary, 
Taraknath Das following the 1908 Bengali swadeshi movement.152 Reading these letters alongside 
Tolstoy’s diaries and religious writings, I argue Tolstoy evokes the ‘law of love’ to both critique 
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political violence and prescribe the praxis of non-resistance to evil. Together they form the 
cornerstone of his doctrine of non-violence. However, for reasons forecast in the previous section, 
I conclude Tolstoy’s ‘law of love’ is anti-political, in an Arendtian sense. Consequently, his bequest 
to International Relations is inconsistency and paradox: an international praxis of radical 
individualism; a subversive form of politics that eschews politics, and a global movement of 
dissension with no room for the dissenting other.  
 
 The ‘law of love’ operates in Tolstoy’s thought as a standard against which all action is 
assessed. In the fin-de-siècle years, Tolstoy mobilises this ‘law of love’ to critique imperial violence. 
His critique extends to imperialism, its wars and the resistance it provokes. It extends to all who 
abet and condone this violence: politicians, soldiers, ministers, journalists, and citizens.153 It also 
extends to imperial subjects who seek to resist it. As Tolstoy elaborates in ‘Bethink Yourselves’, 
the ‘law of love’ demands 
 that I should submit to the will of God, and fulfil that which it requires of me, that I 
should love my neighbour, serve him, and act towards him as I would wish others to act 
towards me. Am I doing this, while ruling men, prescribing violence, executions, and, the 
most dreadful of all, wars?154  
 
For Tolstoy, the ‘law of love’ and its concomitant call to non-violence are synonymous 
with ‘religiosity’. He argues this lack of ‘religiosity’ is the only causal explanation for all violence, 
and thus the only antidote to it. As he confirms in ‘Bethink Yourselves’: ‘The evil from which the 
men of the Christian world suffer is that they have temporalily lost religion’.155Empire, is thus, the 
product of a lack of ‘religiosity’.  
Christian nations have conquered and subdued the American Indians, Hindus and 
Africans. They are now doing the same to the Chinese and are proud of it. But these 
conquests and subjugations really arise, not through the spiritual superiority of the 
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Christian nations, but on the contrary, because on a spiritual level they are far beneath the 
others….Rome conquered the world when it had freed itself from all religions. The same 
is happening, only to a greater extent, among the Christian nations. They all share in 
common an absence of religion and consequently, despite internal dissension, are united 
in one federate band of criminals where theft, plunder, debauchery, individual and mass 
murder are performed without the slightest pang of conscience and even with utmost self-
complacency….156 
Similarly, a return to ‘religiosity’, whether Confucian, Taoist, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim or 
Christian, is anti-imperial remedy. In what reads as apologetics rather than ecumenism, he counsels 
both Ku Hung-Ming and Taraknath Das, 
If only the Chinese people were to continue to live as they have formerly lived, a peaceful, 
industrious, agricultural life, following in their conduct the principles of their three 
religions: Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. All three coincide in their basics: 
Confucianism in the liberation from all human authority, Taoism in not doing to others 
what one does not wish done to oneself, and Buddhism in love towards all men and all 
living beings. Then of themselves all those calamities from which they now suffer would 
disappear, and no powers could overcome them.157  
 
Love is the only way to rescue humanity from all its ills, and in it you too have the only 
method of saving your people from enslavement. In very ancient times love was 
proclaimed with special strength and clarity among your people to be the religious basis of 
human life….If the people of India are enslaved by violence, it is only because they 
themselves live and have lived by violence and do not recognize the eternal law of love 
inherent in humanity.158 
 
 
As earlier outlined, this conception of ‘religiosity’ privileged rationality over dogma, a love 
of humanity rather than bounded community. Tolstoy clarifies that he prescribes,  
not that religion which consists in belief in the dogmas, in the fulfilment of rites which 
afford a pleasant diversion, consolation, stimulant, but that religion which establishes the 
relation of man to the All, to God, and therefore gives a general higher direction to all 
human activity…159 
 
Similarly, he elevates example over evangelisation.  
To love the yellow people, whom we call our foes, means, not to teach them under the 
name of Christianity absurd superstitions about the fall of man, redemption, resurrection, 
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etc., not to teach them the art of deceiving and killing others, but to teach them justice, 
unselfishness, compassion, love, and that not by words, but by the example of our own 
good life.160 
 
Seemingly subscribing to the mythology of Max Meuller that equated ‘the East’ with spiritual 
superiority and ‘the West’ with political and scientific superiority, Tolstoy’s ‘religiosity’ rejects 
‘modernity’ and the ‘the West’ that he imagined invented it. In so doing, he ironically perpetuates 
the same myth which sanctioned 19th Century imperialism. Whatever Tolstoy’s early ambivalence 
about the Westernising and Slavophile ‘camps’ in Russian thought, he comes to view Russia as an 
Eastern nation in the fin-de-siècle years.  
The vocation of the Eastern nations – China, Persia, Turkey, India, Russia, and perhaps 
Japan, if she is not yet completely enmeshed in the net of depraved European civilization 
– consists in indicating to all nations the true way towards freedom.161 
 
Ironically, his denunciation of ‘the West’ and its modernity is both Western and modern. Drawing 
on traditions of Rousseaunian anti-modernity and Kantian rationality, he cautions the Chinese and 
Indians against emulating Western modernity. 
To organise such a constitution, such an army, such a conscription, and such an industry 
as the Western nations have got, would mean to renounce all that by which the Chinese 
people have lived and are living. It would be to renounce their past and to renounce their 
rational, peaceful, agricultural life, that life which constitutes the true and only way of Tao, 
not only for China, but for all mankind.162 
 
What are wanted for the Indian as well as for the Englishman, the Frenchman, the 
German, and the Russian are not Constitutions and Revolutions, nor all sorts of 
Conferences and Congresses, nor the many ingenious devices for submarine and aerial 
navigation, nor powerful explosives, nor all sorts of conveniences to add to the enjoyment 
of the rich ruling classes, nor new schools and universities with innumerable faculties of 
science, nor an augmentation of papers and books, nor gramophones and cinematographs, 
nor those childish and for the most part corrupt stupidities termed art. Only one thing is 
needful: the knowledge of the simple and clear truth that finds place in every soul that is 
not stupefied by religious and scientific superstitions. This is the truth that for our life one 
law is valid: the law of love…163  
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Tolstoy’s evangelisation of the ‘law of love’ and his call to return to religiosity did not 
merely entail a retreat to an inner, spiritual world. His conception of non-violence as ‘non-
resistance to evil’ also necessitated a form of conscientious non-action that we now term, ‘civil 
disobedience’. 
All the seizures and plunder you are subject to from European nations take place only 
because there exists a government of which you recognize yourselves as subjects. If there 
were no Chinese government, foreign nations would have no pretext to commit their 
atrocities under the guise of international relations. And if, by refusing to obey your 
government, you will cease to encourage foreign powers in their acts of violence against 
you: if you do not serve the government in private, state, or military service: then there will 
not exist all those calamities from which you suffer.164  
As soon as men live entirely in accord with this law and hold aloof from all participation 
in violence, not only will hundreds be unable to enslave millions, but not even millions will 
be able to enslave a single individual. Do not resist the evil-doer and take no part in doing 
so, either in the violent deeds of the administration, in the law courts, in the collection of 
taxes, or above all soldiering, and no one in the world will be able to enslave you.165 
 
Tolstoy’s philosophy was expressed in his aphorism: Government is violence, Christianity is meekness, 
non-resistance, love.166 This doctrine of love as non-resistance to evil has been interpreted as Tolstoy’s 
articulation of Christian anarchism.167 That Tolstoy was profoundly influenced by Proudhon, 
admired and corresponded with Kroptkin and equated government (and all forms of political 
organisation) with violence, would seem to support this claim.168 Yet for all his agreement with 
anarchist assessment of the evils of political organisation, Tolstoy abjured the label for three 
reasons. First, he found an anarchist commitment to violence and revolution problematic because 
it relegated means to ends. Second, he thought any claim to build a better order was grounded in 
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hubris.169 Instead, he saw his thought on state (and empire) as an extension of his practical 
Christianity:  
I am counted among the anarchists, but I am not an anarchist, but a Christian. My 
anarchism is only the application of Christianity to human relationships. The same is true 
of anti-militarism, communism, vegetarianism.170 
 
Third, Tolstoy claimed not to share the same political aspirations as anarchists. The fact that he 
neither foresaw nor cared for the political consequences of non-resistance is evident in his diary 
entry from 1910: 
It is not anarchism, the teaching by which I live. It’s the fulfilment of the external law 
which doesn’t permit violence or, the participation in it. But will the consequences be either 
anarchism, or, on the contrary, slavery under the yoke of the Japanese or the Germans? 
That I don’t know and don’t wish to know.[…]171 
 
Tolstoy’s faith in non-resistance to evil as dictated by the law of love has been variously 
interpreted as a ‘form of the sybaritic Bohemianism of a wealthy count’; Burkean humanitarian 
scepticism; German historical determinism; a Doaist inspired faith in a self-correcting universe; ‘a 
scrupulously empirical, rational, tough-minded realism’.172 His disregard for consequences, 
however, had less to do with faith in an interventionist God or order and more to do with his 
Kantian commitment to epistemological humility and radical deontology. Although Tolstoy often 
wrote of assured ‘deliverance’ from following this path of non-resistance, this ‘deliverance’ referred 
to that of the conscience in this world.  
The real question is not whether it will be good or bad for a certain society that people 
should follow the love and the consequent law of non-resistance. But it is this: Do you, 
who today live and tomorrow will die, you ware indeed tending deathward every moment, 
do you wish now, immediately and entirely, to obey the law of Him who sent you into life, 
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and who clearly showed you His will, alike in tradition and in your mind and heart; or do 
you prefer to resist His will?173 
 
 
Tolstoy’s ‘law of love’ does not cleave to the hope of another world, whether that of 
anarchism or an after-life. Nonetheless, his thought is emblematic of much that Arendt asserts 
renders love anti-political. This is because his construction of ‘religiosity’ makes his prescriptions 
for praxis problematic. Reinhold Niebuhr argued Tolstoy’s thought represented a religious 
idealism that did not ‘relate the religious ideal of love to the political necessity of coercion’.174 
Niebuhr is right that Tolstoy subscribes to a dichotomous logic which understands love as 
constitutive of ‘religiosity’ and violence as constitutive of ‘politics’. As Elizabeth Frazer and 
Kimberly Hutchings attest, for Tolstoy,  
Politics is coextensive with violence – because the basis of political rule and government 
is the idea that: it is possible, through violence, to unite people in such a way that everyone 
submits, without resistance, to the same structure of life and guidance for conduct that 
results from it.175  
 
Tolstoy’s equation of politics with violence renders it anathema to religion and its ‘law of love’. 
Further, his problem with ‘politics’ appears to extend to all forms of assemblages and 
organisations. That the lifelong Rousseaunian should find in any form of human association a 
threat to freedom and human goodness is perhaps unsurprising. However, its effect is that 
Tolstoy’s ‘law of love’ neither imagines individuals coming together to dismantle a violent order 
nor to construct anything in its place. Camus would argue this is an inevitable outcome of Tolstoy’s 
Christ not being a rebel.176 Perhaps, however, it is because Tolstoy’s Christ was also a recluse. This 
is most evident in Tolstoy’s fixation with the inner life of self.  
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Jesus said, ‘Bethink yourselves,’ that is, ‘Let every man interrupt the work he has begun 
and ask himself: Who am I? From whence have I appeared, and in what consists my 
destination? And having answered these questions, according to the answer decide whether 
that which thou doest is in conformity with thy destination’.177  
 
Tolstoy’s emphasis on personal responsibility and moral agency is admirable. It lays the 
foundation for conscientious objection to military service. It pre-empts by four decades, the 
repudiation of the Nuremberg defence. However, for a system seemingly predicated on the love 
of the neighbour, one does not encounter an actual concern for the neighbour. If anything, the 
neighbour exists as an abstract object to be bestowed with beneficence rather than as participant 
in any kind of transformative political, or for that matter religious, encounter. Tolstoy’s privileging 
of the life of self does not imply a love of self. In fact, Tolstoy went to painful lengths to emphasise 
the abnegation of self and the reduction of self to spiritual abstraction. The absence of a particular 
neighbour and the erasure of an embodied self effectively depopulates Tolstoy’s world. Teamed 
with his lack of care for consequences, his thought appears eerily reminiscent of the misanthropic 
undertones of a conversation in The Kreutzer Sonata. This conversation ensues when the protagonist 
(espousing Tolstoy’s own view) argues humans ought to be celibate. 
‘You say, how will the human race go on?’ he said, sitting down again across from me, with 
his legs spread wide and his elbows resting low on them. ‘Why should it go on, this human 
race?’ he said.  
 Why? If it didn’t we wouldn’t exist’. 
 ‘And why should we exist?’ 
 ‘Why? In order to live’. 
 ‘And why live?...’178  
 
For Tolstoy, the end of the human race – proclaimed by science and religion –  was ‘as 
unquestionable as death’.179 As the life of the self was the only life that mattered, concern for 
people qua people or the world qua world was rendered irrelevant.  
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In his unworldliness, Tolstoy exemplifies what Hannah Arendt describes in The Human 
Condition as the violence wielded when the homo faber – as artist or philosopher – becomes legislator. 
For Tolstoy, this is a result of an emphasis on freedom that precludes plurality. It emanates from 
Tolstoy’s privileging of metaphysical idealism. As anticipated in Anna Karenina, the self becomes 
the site for legislating a law for society. Although seemingly predicated on the universality of reason 
and the plurality of revelation, it would seem upon closer analysis, that both these claims by Tolstoy 
are in fact qualified  
It is comprehensible that a heathen, a Greek, a Roman, even a medieval Christian, ignorant 
of the Gospel and blindly believing all the prescriptions of the Church might fight, and 
fighting, pride himself on his military achievements; but how can a believing Christian, or 
even a skeptic, involuntarily permeated by the Christian ideals of human brotherhood and 
love which have inspired the works of philosophers, moralists and artists of our time, - 
how can such take a gun, or stand by a canon, and aim at a crowd of his fellowmen, desiring 
to kill as many of them as possible?180 
 
Tolstoy would appear to ultimately understands revelation as Christian. Along with his emphasis 
on rationality and interiority, it reveals a hierarchy with an atomistic, disembodied, rational, 
Christian man at its apex. This hierarchy is evident in his conception of ‘rational resurrection’ and 
in the schema at the heart of The Kingdom of God is Within You. For all his proclamations of plurality, 
this commitment only extends to ‘religiosity’ that conformed with his conception of ‘Christianity’. 
There are echoes of this in Tolstoy’s anti-imperial epistles and his sense that Doaoism 
(Confucianism and Buddhism) were closer in spirit to his ‘Christianity’ than Hinduism. Thus, the 
embrace of Western democracy in China would mean the renunciation of the ‘rational, peaceful, 
agricultural life, that life which constitutes the true and only way of Tao, not only for China, but 
for all mankind.181 Whereas, for Hindus, the prescription was to ‘free (their) minds from those 
overgrown, mountainous imbecilities’ and ‘pseudo-religious nonsense’.182 As he argued in ‘Bethink 
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Yourselves’, without his ‘religiosity’, ‘people stand on the plane of animals and even lower than 
they’.183  
 
At his finest, Tolstoy critiqued the violent foundations of empires, their perpetuation of 
war, and offered as antidote a doctrine of non-resistance grounded in universalism and ecumenism. 
Through the people he inspired, he has contributed to anti-imperial, civil rights and pacifist 
movements globally. Yet, for all Tolstoy’s seeming commitments to plurality and epistemological 
humility, his project is undermined by his moral certitude.  
I’m not saying that anyone ought to take my path. It’s not a question of how one arrives, 
but where. But if we have come to Christ and want to live by Him alone, we shall not 
quarrel.184 
To the extent that Tolstoy’s ‘law of love’ is not open to the participation of the other, it becomes 
bereft of politics. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to illustrate that Tolstoy’s political and literary legacies are 
intertwined. A concern with the ethico-politics of love in the context of empire animates Tolstoy’s 
aesthetic works across his career. There is a certain artistic symmetry to the fact that much like the 
movement Tolstoy imagines in his political works between the individual, social and universal 
stage, his prescription of the object of love shifts from self, to family to the universal in his 
aesthetics. Thus, in The Cossacks, Olenin’s ethical quest ultimately centres on how best to love 
oneself, Anna Karenina exalts Levin’s love of family, and Hadji Murat offers indictment for a failure 
to love the unknown, Avar other. However, Tolstoy’s contribution to political theory is 
paradoxical and problematic. For all Tolstoy’s sensitivity and care representing the Cossacks, the 
                                                      
183 Tolstoy, “Bethink Yourselves”., p.19. 
184 As cited in McKeogh, Tolstoy’s Pacifism., p. 89.  
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capacity to love operates as a shibboleth rendering Homeric Lukashka and Christian Olenin’s 
moral worlds not just incommensurate but unequal. Despite his sensitive portrayal of Anna, the 
morality tale privileges the sanctity of her marriage over her agency; elevates the rational, prosaic 
love of Levin over the emotional, passionate love of Anna; privileges the love of a ‘small’ family 
of Russia over a larger vision family however conceived. Hadji Murat seemingly became the subject 
rather than object of a story. Yet, his moral status is ultimately linked to his capacity for ‘rational 
resurrection’. These contradictions in his aesthetics permeate his non-fiction. Hence, his critique 
of imperial violence and his affirmation of individual agency is prescient. However, to the extent 
that his law of love allows no room for collaboration or dissent, it is in itself violent. His attempt 
to articulate a plural, ecumenical, non-violent vision of conscientious political action is admirable. 
However, it was ultimately couched in a universal, hierarchical articulation of an idiosyncratic 
religion that regarded itself as antithesis of politics. Imbuing ethics with asceticism, anti-
imperialism with imperial undertones, non-violence with violence, Tolstoy’s law of love’s offerings 
to politics are thus full of promise and peril. This chapter began by noting the claim that, for some, 
Tolstoy the ‘prophet’ eventually annihilated the ‘artist’. Perhaps, however, there was never much 
distance between them.  
CHAPTER 4: RABINDRANATH TAGORE ON LOVING IN THE PARTICULAR 
 
Love is not mere sentiment; it is truth; it is the joy that is at the root of all creation.  
 
- Rabindranath Tagore. 
 
Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) is perhaps best known for being the first non-European 
to win the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1913. A polymath rather than just a poet, Tagore was also 
a playwright, composer, artist, educator, essayist and ecologist. Despite the proliferation of work 
on Tagore around his 150th anniversary in 2011, Tagore’s contributions to international political 
thought remain relatively unexplored. In part, this is because Tagore’s political legacy is complex 
and contested. On the one hand, he is celebrated alongside Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar on the 
Mount Rushmore of India.1 Ezra Pound once quipped that he probably did sing Bengal into a 
nation.2 Indeed, Tagore occupies the rare honour of having composed the national anthems of 
both India and Bangladesh. On the other hand, the latter half of Tagore’s career saw his fervent 
denunciation of nationalism and the nation-state. Despite once leading the swadeshi (own country) 
movement in 1905 and attempting to renounce his knighthood in 1919 in protest of the Jallianwala 
Baug massacre in Amritsar, Tagore eschewed politics. In his own admission, he was ‘nothing but 
a poet’.3 Internationally, Tagore suffered a similar fate. Although he enjoyed a moment of 
international celebrity on par with Tolstoy’s after being championed by the likes of William 
Rothenstein, W.B. Yeats and Ezra Pound, this was relatively short-lived. Garbed in silk, with his 
flowing white beard and his archaic translation of the Gitanjali he was appropriated – perhaps not 
unwillingly –into the Orientalist tradition of message seeking from the East only to be cast aside 
                                                      
1 Amit Chaudhuri, On Tagore: Reading the Poet Today (Peter Lang AG, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 
2012). , p. 171. Also, see the work of Ananya Vajpeyi who adds Abanindranath Tagore to this list. Ananya Vajpeyi, 
Righteous Republic (Harvard University Press, 2012). 
2 As cited by Anita Desai, ‘Introduction’, Rabindranath Tagore, The Home and the World (Penguin Classics) (Penguin 
Classics, 2005)., p. xxii.   
3 Chaudhuri, On Tagore: Reading the Poet Today., p. 170.  
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when he failed to live up to the expectations of an Eastern Christ.4 Indeed, he disappointed 
audiences in the U.S. and East Asia by delivering lectures not on esoteric Eastern philosophy but 
nationalism, war, race and internationalism.5 Tagore’s perplexing legacy defined by the antinomy 
imagined between poetics and politics is perhaps best described by E.P. Thompson who argues 
Tagore was perhaps the first theorist of ‘anti-politics’.6 By this, Thompson did not mean Tagore’s 
thought was anti-political in an Arendtian sense. Rather, Tagore mobilised another vision of 
politics focussed predominantly on ‘civil society’, understood ‘as something distinct from and of 
stronger and more personal texture than political or economic structures’.7  
 
In this chapter, I argue that Tagore’s philosophy and praxis of love is central to this 
commitment to re-conceive politics in his post-swadeshi (post 1907) writings. It comprises three 
sections. The first section provides some background on Tagore in a bid to contextualise his many 
contradictions. The second section focuses on the period from Tagore’s renunciation of swadeshi 
in 1907 to his renunciation of his knighthood in 1919. Focusing on Tagore’s three political novels 
from this time, namely, Gora, Chaturanga (Quartet) and Ghare Baire (The Home and the World), I argue 
they enunciate Tagore’s understanding of the intimate as international. The final section examines 
how Tagore’s distinction between abstract and particular loves shapes his dual critique of 
imperialism and internationalism, and underpins his commitment to a ‘politics of friendship’. 
 
Contextualising Tagore 
It is my contention that Tagore is an important and neglected figure in the study of 
international relations. What makes Tagore’s neglect perplexing is his impressive, international 
                                                      
4 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity (Penguin, 2006)., pp. 93-4.  
5 Krishna. Dutta and Andrew Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man (London: Bloomsbury, 1995)., 
p. 210.  
6 E.P. Thompson, “Introduction,” in Nationalism: Rabindranath Tagore (London: Papermac, 1991)., pp. 14-5. 
7 Ibid., pp. 14-5. 
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career. As earlier mentioned, he was celebrated internationally after winning the Nobel Prize in 
Literature in 1913. A true transnationalist, he then travelled to all the (inhabited) continents, but 
for Australasia, delivering lectures and disseminating work. He corresponded and communicated 
with key figures of the twentieth century, including Albert Einstein, H.G. Wells, Romain Rolland, 
Mohandas Gandhi, W.E.B. DuBois and Yone Noguchi. Further, most of his post-1910 work is 
either in English or easily available in translation. Perhaps one of possible reason for Tagore’s 
neglect is his elusiveness and evasion of easy classification. Oscillating between the poles of 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism, he rejects both labels. Offering astute critique of essentialism 
in his Indian works, he succumbs to self-Orientalising on the international stage. At the helm of 
the swadeshi (own-country) movement, he remained an Anglophile for much of his life and an 
apologist of the British empire for at least some of it. Tagore’s modest reception in international 
political theory is even more perplexing. His astute critique of imperial violence and the co-
constitution of race, caste, religion and gender would suggest an affinity with postcolonial studies. 
Yet, he is eschewed for his apparent elitism. His critique of the rational, atomistic individual would 
portray him an unlikely ally of liberalism. Yet, he is championed by Martha Nussbaum who places 
him at the centre of her liberal canon. Tagore was a complex and contradictory figure which 
understandably allows for his work to be appropriated and mobilised for a number of incongruous 
political projects. In this section I do not seek to systematise Tagore’s thought but to offer some 
background to help contextualise his many contradictions. 
 
An account of Tagore’s legacy is incomplete without reference to his birth into the ‘first 
family of Bengal’.8 The Tagores rose to prominence as middle-men in the British Empire. Tagore’s 
grandfather, ‘Prince’ Dwarkanath was a zamindaar or landowner whose Bengal estates were at the 
                                                      
8 Vajpeyi, Righteous Republic. 
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centre of the silk and indigo trade during the high noon of empire.9 Dwarkanath Tagore founded 
the Union Bank, which was the central commercial structure in Calcutta for over two decades; he 
pioneered tea-growing in Assam and supported ventures to industrialise and modernise Bengal. 
Ignoring conventions prohibiting (the priestly caste) Brahmins from overseas travel, Dwarkanath 
met the Pope, Sir Robert Peel and enjoyed several invitations from Queen Victoria and Prince 
Albert. He was the first Indian to be granted the Freedom of the City of London. A patron of arts 
and culture, he was well-acquainted with the German Orientalist and philologist Max Muller and 
the contributors of Punch. After his death, he was remembered by Charles Dickens as ‘the Oriental 
Croeses’, well-known across England. Not defined by the aristocratic company he kept, Dwarkanath 
fraternised with radicals and social reformers attending a march with the Chartists in Glasgow. His 
son, Debendranath Tagore, cut a much more conservative figure. He was a founding member of 
the Brahmo Samaj, an ‘Upanishadic Unitarian’ movement originally conceived by his father’s best 
friend, Rammohun Roy.10 Brahmoism, at its core, is a Hindu reform movement. Albeit a fairly 
small component of the religious matrix of India today, Brahmoism was to play a significant role in 
the shaping of Nehru’s – and by extension the Indian Constitution’s - conception of secularism.11 
Elevating the monotheism of early Hinduism over the polytheism of middle and late Hinduism, 
Brahmoism revived scholarship of the Vedas (ancient Hindu Scriptures) and denounced rituals, idol 
worship and the caste-system as anachronisms.12 Elaborating on the historical and theological 
affinities between Brahmoism and Unitarianism, David Kopf suggests that they both share a 
commitment to a ‘liberal’ or ‘rational faith’; the values of a Social Gospel and the idea of ‘universal 
                                                      
9 All biographical detail on Dwarkanath Tagore is from Dutta and Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded 
Man., pp. 27-33. 
10 For a detailed discussion of the collaboration between Rammohun Roy and Debendranath Tagore and their 
differences of theological opinion, see Michael Collins, Empire, Nationalism and the Postcolonial World : Rabindranath 
Tagore’s Writings on History, Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 2012)., pp. 26-34. 
11 Chaudhuri, On Tagore: Reading the Poet Today., p. 35 
12 Ibid., p. 83.  
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theistic progress’.13 However, whereas Unitarians emphasised the emancipation of slaves, the 
Brahmos’ emphasised the emancipation of women.14 Within Debendranath’s lifetime, a schism 
formed between the more conservative and Hindu, Adi (original) Brahmo Samaj and the more 
heterodox and universal, Sadharan (Common) Brahmo Samaj.15 This schism was to have a profound 
influence on his young son, Rabindranath Tagore, whose life’s works attest to his division between 
these camps.  
Rabindranath Tagore was a remarkable figure in his own right. The author of over 200 
books, creator of over 3000 artworks, he set up an art school, a university and a rural development 
institute.16 Indeed, he was a household name in Bengal long before he set sail to England in 1912 
to launch his bilingual career. That Tagore was subsequently celebrated by Wilfred Owen, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Amartya Sen, Jawaharlal Nehru and Isaiah Berlin attests to the reach of his literature, 
philosophy and political thought. Nonetheless, Tagore’s family history remains relevant for a 
number of reasons. It afforded him the privilege and platform to create and promote his work. 
The Tagores were at the centre of the so-called Bengal Renaissance and Rabindranath Tagore’s 
legacy is often understood in the context of his father’s and grandfather’s. What Dwarkanath 
Tagore accomplished in facilitating cross-cultural dialogue via trade and what Debendranath 
Tagore accomplished for humanism via theological reform, Tagore sought to accomplish via 
aesthetics.17 Indeed, for Amit Chaudhuri, the breadth of the Tagorean project was ‘a precursor to 
Beuy’s vision of “total art”…and a successor to the Wagnerian Gesamtkustwerk’ minus the 
messianism.18 Further, the syncreticism so central to Tagorean philosophy and politics emerges 
                                                      
13 David Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind (Princeton Legacy Library) (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2015)., p.3. 
14 Ibid., p.3. 
15 Collins, Empire, Nationalism and the Postcolonial World : Rabindranath Tagore’s Writings on History, Politics and Society., p. 
34. 
16 Vajpeyi, Righteous Republic., p. 89. 
17 Chaudhuri, On Tagore: Reading the Poet Today., pp.114-5. 
18  Ibid., p. 128. 
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less as idealistic contrivance and more a reflection of Tagore’s cosmopolitan upbringing. In 
Tagore’s own words, his ‘was the confluence of three cultures: the Hindu, the Mohammedan and 
the British’.19 In many ways, Tagore’s family history is also central to his conflicted legacy in 
international political thought. If too much emphasis on this history has led to Tagore being 
dismissed by postcolonial theorists, too little has led to Tagore being misunderstood by the liberals 
who champion him.  
 
Tagore was not a subaltern, which makes him a somewhat problematic figure for 
postcolonial study. As Michael Collins notes, ‘the type of historiography undertaken by the 
Subaltern Studies Collective, has – almost by definition – been unable to elucidate the historical 
significance of figures who do not easily fit into the Subaltern category; of which Tagore is a prime 
example’.20 Despite pioneering representation of the ‘clerk’, ‘postman’ and ‘maid’ in his aesthetic 
works, much of Tagore’s legacy is characterised by the accusation that he lacked a sense of the 
‘bastaab’ or ‘the real’.21 His seeming ambivalence about imperialism appears to consolidate this 
view. As was common of men of his social class, Tagore regarded the British colonisation of India 
as ‘providential’ at least until 1910.22 Somewhat perplexingly, he seemed to subscribe to this view 
even as he led the swadeshi movement which emphasised indigenous enterprise. In part, this was 
because Tagore like Tolstoy subscribed to Max Muller’s mythology about the innate political 
superiority of the ‘West’ and spiritual superiority of the ‘East’. Much of his career was thus 
dedicated to promoting dialogue and change along these essentialist lines. In part, however, this 
was because Tagore rejected the (still popular) thesis that there was a natural affinity between 
                                                      
19 Sisir Kumar Das, Vol.3: A Miscellany the English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore (New Delhi: Sahitya Academi, 2008)., 
p. 156. 
20 Collins, Empire, Nationalism and the Postcolonial World : Rabindranath Tagore’s Writings on History, Politics and Society., p. 
9.  
21 Dipesh. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2000)., p.156. 
22 Dutta and Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man., p.1. 
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liberalism and imperialism. For Tagore, imperialism was not the culmination but the contradiction 
of liberalism. Unlike Tolstoy, he also did not regard ‘empire’ as undifferentiated across time and 
space. Consequently, he argued there was a qualitative difference between the imperialism of the 
Moghuls who remained in India and adopted local customs and the British who administered from 
afar and transferred Indian wealth to the metropole. 23 Yet, for all of Tagore’s seeming ambivalence 
about nationalism and empire, he was the only Indian to renounce his knighthood in protest of 
the Jallianwalla Baug massacre in Amritsar. As his letter to Viceroy Chelmsford attests, his 
ambivalence about empire did not quell his capacity for critique. 
Knowing that our appeals have been in vain and that the passion of vengeance is blinding 
the noble vision of statesman-ship in our Government which could so easily afford to be 
magnanimous as befitting its physical strength and moral tradition, the very least I can do 
for my country is to take all consequences upon myself in giving voice to the protest of 
the millions of my countrymen, surprised into a dumb anguish of terror. The time has 
come when badges of honour make our shame glaring in their incongruous context of 
humiliation, and I for my part wish to stand, shorn of all special distinctions, by the side 
of my countrymen who, for all their so-called insignificance, are liable to suffer a 
degradation not fit for human beings.24 
 
Tolstoy’s ambivalent stance on imperialism and his critique of nationalism seems to place 
him beyond the pale of postcolonial veneration. Neglecting his work, however, does a great 
disservice to a thinker who made a significant contribution to the critique of nationalism, 
imperialism and social hierarchies. In fact, it is for some of these reasons that Martha Nussbaum 
places him with J.S Mill at the centre of her cosmopolitan, liberal canon. Given Nussbaum is the 
most prominent international political theorist offering the most extensive engagement with 
Tagore’s corpus, her understanding and representation of Tagore warrants some discussion. That 
Nussbaum champions Tagore’s political thought perhaps ought not be surprising. Both their 
philosophies centre on the political promise of love. Nussbaum understands love as a ‘cognitive 
                                                      
23 Sisir Kumar Das, Vol.2: Plays Stories Essays (the English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore) (Sahitya Academi, New Delhi, 
2008)., p. 421. 
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appraisal’, Tagore understands the mind or manas as the ‘centre for reason and judgment and 
emotion’.25 Nussbaum emphasises the importance of sentimental education for the cultivation of 
the cosmopolitan citizen, Tagore’s work is embedded in the Indic rasa tradition which understands 
aesthetics and the cultivation of emotion as intrinsically linked. As liberalism is protean, perhaps 
even Nussbaum’s reading of Tagore as a liberal is justified. Indeed, in Duncan Bell’s estimation a 
liberal is merely someone who has been understood as such for two generations of thinkers. 26 In 
Tagore’s instance, then, his celebration by the likes of Isaiah Berlin and Martha Nussbaum, 
however errant would be enough to shore up his liberal credentials.  
 
In Political Emotions Nussbaum understands Tagore ‘a morally satisfactory type of national 
unity’,27 conducive to cosmopolitanism. Nussbaum is not the only theorist who seeks to 
systematise or synthesise Tagore’ thought on nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Indeed, Tagore is 
variously read as a nationalist28 or cosmopolitan,29 both30 or neither.31 Like Tolstoy, changed his 
mind often over his sixty four year career. Over the course of this career, his views appear to 
oscillate between the endorsement of nationalism and cosmopolitanism.  Indeed, if Tagore’s 
swadeshi phase is concomitant with nationalism, his post-swadeshi (and some pre-swadeshi phases) 
are entirely consistent with the advocacy of ‘sentimental’ cosmopolitanism,32 ‘embedded’ 
                                                      
25 Lynch, Divine Passions: The Social Construction of Emotion in India (University of California Press, 1992)., 19 
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cosmopolitanism,33 ‘postcolonial’ cosmopolitanism and perhaps even ‘coloured’ 
cosmopolitanism.34 Any insight to be offered about Tagore is always an insight about Tagore at a 
particular moment in his career. To the extent that Nussbaum’s interest in Tagore centres on his 
post-swadeshi, ‘internationalist’ period, it is worth noting that any attempt to categorise him as 
nationalist or cosmopolitan is misleading. Tagore rejected both terms as he understood them. In 
his words, ‘neither the colourless vagueness of cosmopolitanism, nor the fierce self-idolatry of 
nation worship is the goal of human history’.35 To associate Tagore with nation-building as 
Nussbaum, or the Indian Academy of Letters, does is antithetical to his work in this period. 
Tagore’s interests in his own admission lay with society rather than the state. While reading Tagore 
in his post-swadeshi career as a cosmopolitan is valid, it is worth noting that Nussbaum renders 
Tagore’s cosmopolitanism rather ‘thin’. Perhaps in a bid to reach a wider international audience, 
Nussbaum decontextualises Tagore’s thought. His syncretic theory of sentiment, rooted in Hindu 
universalism, is reduced to a universal theory about love. In the process, Tagore’s embeddedness 
in non-Western debates is erased. While Nussbaum is quite right to mobilise Tagore’s thought to 
offer a critical revision of Comte, she fails to do justice to his engagement as a colonial subject 
with both ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ political thought. A decontextualised and dehistoricised 
account of Tagore effectively depoliticises him, reducing his espousal of internationalism to the 
very colourless variety of cosmopolitanism he sought to critique. 
 
In what follows, I attempt to provide a contextualised reading of Tagore’s three political 
novels written in the period roughly extending from 1907 to 1919. It is a key moment in Tagore’s 
anti-nationalism and ‘anti-imperialism’, extending from his renunciation of the swadeshi movement 
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to the renunciation of his knighthood. I argue Tagore’s concern shifts from proclaiming the ethico-
political promise of love to examining the political conditions of loving. To the extent that an 
openness to alterity and ‘selves’ in construction is central to his understanding of loving, I argue it 
comes to underpin his vision of amity and internationalism.  
 
The Intimate Is International: Tagore’s Post-Swadeshi Novels 
Tagore’s three political novels, Gora, Chaturanga (Quartet) and Ghare Baire (The Home and The 
World) are variously read as his engagement with nationalism and cosmopolitanism and the 
complex co-constitution of religion, caste, race, class and gender in the context of empire. 
Although they engage with all these themes, they represent Tagore’s reckoning with the swadeshi 
movement. Chaturanga and Ghare Baire, in turn, reflect Tagore’s growing concern about nationalism 
following the outbreak of the Great War. In what follows, I offer a reading of Tagore’s three 
novels as a critique of abstract loves and their propensity to wield violence in social movements 
and by extension politics. I argue the novel’s representation of the private lives of people reveals 
Tagore understood the intimate and international as co-constitued. Moving beyond the emphasis 
on indigeneity and isolationism in Tagore’s swadeshi writings, these novels advocate a loving in the 
particular which emphasises an openness to alterity, agency and dialogue. Together, they affirm 
relationships as sites for personal and political transformation.  
 
To provide some context about the swadeshi movement, it was precipitated by Lord 
Curzon’s decision to partition Bengal in 1905.36 Although the decision was ostensibly made on 
grounds of administrative expedience, it was also consistent with the British imperial policy of 
‘divide and rule’.37 Indeed, the vast majority of the population of the new state of East Bengal were 
                                                      
36 Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2013) Ch. 1 ‘Partition of Bengal’.  
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Muslim. The swadeshi movement had several elements. The foremost swadeshi historian, Sumit 
Sarkar, suggests a ‘fourfold classification’ that comprised 
Moderates; the trend towards self development without inviting an immediate political 
clash (which I have decided to call ‘constructive swadeshi’ for want of a better name); 
political extremism using ‘extended boycott’ or passive resistance in addition to self help 
efforts; and terrorism38  
 
Despite their differences, Sarkar notes that in the period extending between 1905 and 1908, all 
four groups  
opposed partition, supported boycott at least for a time and economic swadeshi 
throughout, participated to some extent in the national education movement, and talked 
(even if many often did not act) in terms of economic self reliance’39 
 
The significance of the swadeshi movement is that it provided a template for Gandhian politics, 
albeit without the commitment to nonviolence.  
 
Rabindranath Tagore was initially at the forefront of the swadeshi movement. 
Unsympathetic to moderates who sought rights and freedoms from the British, Tagore instead 
emphasised a ‘constructive’ programme which focused on indigenous enterprise, education and 
village reform long before the swadeshi movement took root.40 Sarkar suggests the movement’s 
appeal to indigeneity became conflated with Hindu revivalism.41 It led to an alliance between the 
upper-caste, upper-class, Hindu landholders or bhadralok which came to monopolise the 
movement.42 That he got swept up in a wave of religious revivalism is evident in the 
uncharacteristic ideas the once modern, anti-traditional, reformist Tagore came to espouse. 
We are now informed about the essential distinctness of oriental civilization and its 
superiority over the European; the traditional samaj is hailed as the real centre of Indian 
life, not the state; the Hindu past is invoked in poetic language; child marriage and 
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39 Ibid., Loc 923-927. 
40 Ibid., Loc 883. 
41 Ibid., Loc 227. 
42 Ibid., Loc 115. 
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restrictions on widows are declared to be not unjustified in the context of Hindu society; 
virtues are discovered in the functional specialization through caste; and even sati gets an 
honourable mention 43 
 
Tagore’s own break with the movement was gradual. In 1906, he began to disengage with 
the organised political elements of the swadeshi movement focusing instead on the development of 
institutions namely education initiatives and village reconstruction.44 His ashram in Shantiniketan, 
founded in 1901 was at the centre of this mission. Later he was to found the university Visva 
Bharati and the rural development institute that provided the blueprint for Elmhirst’s Darlington 
Trust, Sriniketan. That his education initiatives remained central to Tagore’s philosophy is evident 
in his letter to Gandhi in 1940 where he described Visva-Bharati as the ‘vessel which is carrying 
the cargo of my life’s best treasure’.45 In mid-1907, the outbreak of communal violence and the 
swadeshi movement’s growing association with terrorism saw Tagore distance himself from the 
movement. For Sarkar, however, this was an inevitable result of Tagore’s turn in 1906 to ‘deeds 
rather than words’.46 Tagore’s decisive break with swadeshi coincided with a period of silence and a 
return to literary work, notably the writing of Gora.47  
Gora 
Gora is the eponymous protagonist of Tagore’s first political novel. ‘Gora’ literally 
translates to ‘fair-skinned’ or ‘white’.48 A shortened version of the name ‘Gourmohan’, it evokes 
the medieval Bengali saint, Chaitanya Gourango (fairbodied) who advocated a spirituality based 
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on ‘love and equality rather than hierarchized differences’.49 Based on how ‘Gora’ is pronounced 
in Bengali ‘it is fairly close to goda meaning root, or gnoda, adjectivally orthodox, conservative, 
reactionary’.50As the title intimates, Gora is Tagore’s engagement with love, imperialism and 
orthodoxy. Although celebrated as a foundational text in India, Gora has not been the subject of 
international acclaim, but for two exceptions. When the text first appeared in (poor) English 
translation, Leonard Woolf wrote  
The subject of Gora is intensely interesting to me, and Mr. Tagore’s handling of it kept me 
absorbed throughout the book. His thesis is the social, political and psychological 
problems which confront the educated Bengali in Calcutta today.51  
 
In 2013, Martha Nussbaum placed Gora at the centre of her engagement with the cultivation of 
sympathy in just, liberal nations.52 Woolf and Nussbaum were both correct and mistaken. Serialised 
between 1907 and 1909 in a journal called Prabasi (Exile) and published in book form in 1910, 
Gora represents Tagore’s first novelistic engagement with his brief foray into the Swadeshi 
movement. However, the action of the novel commences in 1857 with the Indian War of 
Independence/Sepoy Mutiny and is set during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. This timeline 
allows Tagore to comment on a period that saw the passing of a civil marriage bill,53 oppression in 
the indigo fields,54 racial anxieties surrounding a Bill that allowed Indians to preside over criminal 
trials involving Europeans,55 a census that ossified the category of caste,56 and the rise of Hindu 
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nationalism.57 Similarly, while Nussbaum’s reading is seemingly endorsed by the Sahitya Akademi’s 
– or India’s National Academy of Letters’ – decision to reprint Gora at moments of communal 
violence,58 the idea of nation-building is deeply antithetical to Tagore’s novel. A thorough 
engagement with this rich and dense dialogical novel is beyond the purview of this text. In what 
follows, I offer a reading of the text as Tagore’s espousal of a politics of love as refuge and 
resistance to the violent co-constitution of religion, race, caste, class and gender. 
 
To offer a brief and selective summary, Gora is about an Irish foundling born in the midst 
of the 1857 Indian War of Independence/Sepoy Mutiny. After an Irish officer is killed by sepoys, 
his pregnant widow seeks refuge with a Brahmin family and dies in childbirth. Their son, Gora, is 
adopted by the family and ‘passed off’ as Brahmin. A brief reference to the second Anglo-Afghan 
war situates the novel in the late 1870s.59 When the action of the novel begins, Gora is the president 
of the Hindu welfare society,60 a social activist, a writer and neo-Hindu proto-nationalist. Western 
educated and unaware of his roots, he espouses a hyper-masculine, rational, orthodox Hindu 
nationalism grounded in caste-observance to combat the hierarchical and racialised imperial order. 
He equates his return to orthodox Hinduism with the decolonisation of his mind,61 a necessary 
step towards the mobilisation of the masses into realising “Bharatvarsha”, a Hindu mythological 
imagining of India. To the extent that Gora understands the self-fashioning of his religious identity 
in the context of larger questions of nationalism and imperialism, he is variously read as mirroring 
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the life of Brahmabandhab Upphadyay,62 Sister Nivedita,63 Swami Vivekanada,64 or indeed, 
Tagore’s swadeshi self.65   
 
Gora’s abstract love for Bharatvarsha and his fellow Bharatvarshis (Indians) leads to fraught 
relations with his loved ones. He refuses to dine with his mother who ‘threw orthodoxy to the 
winds’ and rejected caste the moment she fostered him.66 He calls for the dismissal of his Kristani 
(‘Christian-like’, pejorative for low-caste convert) maid, Lacchmia, who nursed him back to health 
when he had small pox as child.67 He parts company with his best-friend, Binoy over his decision 
to marry a Brahmo woman, Lalita.68 Finally, in pursuit of his perceived dharma (duty) to be an 
ascetic, he denies his love for the Hindu turned-Brahmo turned-Hindu orphan Sucharita 
(Radharani).69 Gora seeks to embrace the Brahman’s revival mantra, 
I must be extremely pure and clean…I do not occupy the same ground as everyone else. 
Friendship is not necessary for me. I do not belong to that ordinary category of people 
who delight in the company of women. And I must completely reject close intimacy with 
the base commoners of this land. They look up to Brahmans as the earth gazes at the sky 
in the hope of rain. If I come too close, who will save them?70 
 
Consequently, he occludes the many modes of love celebrated in the Hindu tradition, including 
the prema (love) linked to the rasa of vatsalya or parental love, the prema of dasya, humility of servant 
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to a master, the prema of sakhya or friendship and the prema of shingara or erotic love.71 Gora, 
however, seems impervious to the exclusionary nature of his abstract love of Bharatvarsha, a fact 
that creates a sense of foreboding given the novel’s publication date and corresponding 
administrative redefinition of “community” along religious lines in the Morley Minto reforms.72   
 
Seeking contact with the ‘real’ Bharatvarsha, Gora embarks on a peripatetic tour of Bengal. 
He witnesses brutal oppression in the indigo fields in Chor-Ghoshpur, a reference to the indigo 
revolt of 1860.73 There he is confronted with two stark moral decisions, which as Ana Jelnikar 
notes, centre on the acceptance of hospitality.74 First, Gora chooses integrity over caste-purity and 
stays with a ‘heretic’ Hindu barber who adopts a Muslim child rather than a corrupt Brahman 
involved in the oppression of the indigo farmers. He observes: 
What a great heresy we are committing in Bharatvarsha, making purity a matter of 
appearances alone! It would save my caste purity to dine at the home of a man who 
torments Muslims by creating all sorts of trouble, but I would lose my caste status in the 
home of a person who accepts such a torment to protect a Muslim boy, and is even ready 
to suffer social condemnation for it.75  
 
Next, Gora declines bail and legal representation when he is unjustly sentenced to a month’s 
imprisonment for a petty offence because the Magistrate assumes he is associated with instigating 
the indigo revolt.  
‘I don’t want to be free of lockup and handcuffs simply because I’m fortunate enough to 
have money and friends’ declared Gora. ‘According to our nation’s religious law, we know 
it is the ruler’s responsibility to ensure justice; it’s the ruler who must be blamed if his 
subjects suffer injustice. But in this kingdom, if subjects must rot in the lockup and die in 
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jail because they can’t afford the lawyer’s fee, if even under a king’s rule one must go 
bankrupt trying to buy a fair verdict with money, I wouldn’t spend a paisa on such justice’76  
Gora represents both Tagore’s (self) critique of the upper-class idealism that came to 
animate the swadeshi movement and the transformative potential of stepping outside that world. 
He does this via his engagement with Kipling’s Kim. Indeed, as Mehta notes, for all Gora’s 
differences from Kim, his most Kiplingesque moment is when he assumes the Brahmanical burden 
of enlightening the masses despite his lack of comprehension of the lives of his countrymen. 77 
Gora’s work in the villages helps him realise the shortcomings of his abstract love of (Hindu) 
community: 
But in the total passivity prevalent in the villages, where external pressures did not work in 
the same way, Gora saw his nation’s profoundest weakness completely exposed. The 
dharma that gave everyone strength, energy and wellbeing in the form of service, love, 
compassion and self-sacrifice, was nowhere in evidence. The practices that only drew 
boundaries, divided people and tormented them, that would even deny the intellect and 
keep love at arm’s length, were the ones that constantly hindered everyone in every respect, 
in every movement and activity…. it became impossible for him to continue deluding 
himself with the illusion of abstract thought.78  
 
Rather than assert the incommensurability of classes, races or castes, Gora’s work in the 
countryside speaks of the transformative potential of the encounter. Exemplifying a proto-
postcolonial historiography, Gora in fact discovers a history other than ‘Marshman saheb’s History 
of India’.79 Indeed, as Patrick Colm Hogan notes, his experiences in the countryside comes to 
embody those of figures like Ram Gopal Ghose who travelled through indigo fields drawing 
attention to the atrocities he witnessed or that of the Irishman, Reverend James Long, who was 
imprisoned for a month after he arranged the translation and publication in 1861 of Dinabandhu 
Mitra’s controversial play on the indigo revolt, Nil-darpan.80  
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Despite Gora’s moral evolution in this bildungsroman, he continues to suffer cognitive 
dissonance about caste until he learns the secret of his birth. This anagnorisis leaves Gora without 
an identity: 
What he was, where he was, he did not seem to understand. As if behind him there was 
nothing called a past, and before him, the future, so purposeful and clearly determined for 
such a long time, had completely vanished. As if he was simply floating like a momentary 
dewdrop on a lotus leaf. He had no mother, no father, no country, no caste, no name, no 
family gotra, no deity. All he had was a ‘No’.81  
 
Yet this news strangely emancipates him. He concludes ‘at dawn today, with my naked soul, I was 
born directly in Bharatvarsha’s lap’.82 Realising his former idea of Bhartvarsha was an abstraction, 
he observes,  
Creating an untroubled, unblemished abstract image of Bharatvarsha, how I battled on all 
fronts to keep my devotion safe within that impenetrable fortress! Today in a single instant 
my imaginary fortress has evaporated like a dream. Set completely free, I have suddenly 
arrived at the heart of a great reality! All Bharatvarsha’s virtues and flaws, joys and sorrows, 
knowledge and ignorance, have come directly close to my heart. Today I have gained the 
right to true service. The real field of action now lies before me. It is not in the arena within 
my heart, but the actual site for promoting the welfare of those hundred crore people in 
the world outside.83 
 
Gora is a dense dialogical novel. Characteristic of Tagore’s other works, it is open-ended. 
If the novel has a thesis, it is about the ethico-political potential of love.84 Indeed, Gora’s love for 
the universal remains abstract and stalled until he realises the particular loves of mother, friend 
and lover. In setting up a tension between abstract and particular, Tagore casts aside race, (at least 
a biologically immutable conception of) caste and gender as social construction. The most 
optimistic of Tagore’s political novels, Gora bears witness to Tagore’s belief in the soteriology of 
love. For Pandit, the central rasa is shingara, which is to say the novel is organised around the 
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aesthetic of the romantic love of Gora and Sucharita. 85 Albeit evoking the Vaishanvite motif; 
Sudipta Kaviraj notes that Tagore is engaged in the very modern project of promoting the 
interiority of romantic love. 86 Kaviraj establishes this via a conceptual history of love that traces 
the divesting of shingara (the erotic) from associations with the romantic in Tagore’s celebration of 
the interiority and moral development of characters. 87Indeed, Gora and Sucharita are less 
concerned with each other’s physicality and more interested in the selves they are constructing in 
conversation with the other. In many ways Tagore’s depiction of romantic love in the late 
nineteenth century is not very different from Benjamin Bagley’s account of love. 88 As Simon May 
observes ‘when it comes to love, the “long nineteenth century” extends not only into the 
twentieth…but well into the twenty first’. 89 This is not to suggest romantic love was a colonial 
imposition or an entirely modern construct. 90 Nonetheless, both Tagore and Bagley defend ‘a 
model of agency on which people can love each other for identities still being created, through a 
kind of mutual improvisation’. 91 Gora and Sucharita’s love for each other as they mirror each other 
and transition from Brahmo-to-Hindu-to beyond reflect this. Tagore’s innovation, however, is his 
syncretism: to take elements of modern romantic love and root them in a tradition of rebellious 
Hinduism. 92 
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Gora, however, is also about the soteriology of love in its many modes. In my reading, 
Tagore’s project is less about constructing a hierarchy of loves and more about advocating loving 
in the particular. Therefore, the plot would not be possible without the philoxenos and maternal 
love of Gora’s adoptive mother. Indeed, for Ashis Nandy and Martha Nussbaum, this is the central 
theme of the novel. 93 Similarly, it is enriched by the friendship or philia between Binoy and Gora 
who Supriya Chaudhuri suggests ‘constitute a sort of composite character…a kind of rational-
emotional dyad’. 94 The centrality of their friendship underscores Tagore’s understanding that love 
necessitates realising ourselves in others (Binoy and Gora) without abnegating the self. Binoy’s 
desperate desire to please leaves him with little self-understanding just as Gora’s desire to renounce 
relationships sets him on a path to asceticism. Finally, learning to love in the particular transforms 
Gora’s sense of Bharatvarsha or more generally what it means to belong. That he tells his mother 
at the novel’s conclusion: You have no caste, no discrimination, no contempt for anyone. You are the very image 
of goodness! It is you who is my Bharatvarsha!...’ is particularly revealing.95 As Chakrabarti notes, 
Bharatvarsha operates as: 
a heuristic concept, an ongoing and unfinished experiment: it serves as an open gesalt, an 
inclusiveness that accommodates disparities and differences in its hunger for wholeness, 
free from the totalizing and homogenizing impulse implicit in colonialism/imperialism as 
well as nationalism on the imperial model.96  
 
Gora finds his sense of belonging in a multiplicity of loves. However, it is worth noting 
this home is among exiles: orphans, outcasts and rebels. Indeed, Gora’s adoptive mother, 
Anandamoyi, is rendered an outcast from Brahmin orthodoxy by virtue of raising an Irish orphan. 
His best friend, Binoy, is an ophan as is Gora’s love interest, Sucharita. Binoy’s wife, Lalita’s anti-
traditional, anti-imperial politics lead to her being disowned by most of her family and 
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excommunicated from the Brahmo Samaj. Her father and Gora’s guru, Pareshbabu, faces ex-
communication owing to his heterodoxy. Although they are all upper-class, each of the characters 
occupy exilic positions in society. Their embrace of Gora only stands to compound this. That 
Tagore was cognisant of this reality calls into question his portrayal as an unalloyed idealist. 
Nonetheless, Gora is essentially an optimistic text. The text is ultimately about loving as a modern, 
syncretic, humanist form of resistance that seeks to respond to oppression: imperial and otherwise. 
It creates a space that recognises and celebrates the agency of the Hindu barber, the rebellious 
woman and the colonised foreigner. In Gora, love operates as a site of refuge and resistance from 
the hierarchies that inhere in imperialism and orthodoxy. In its emphasis on oppression and 
marginalisation rather than culture or religiosity, this ‘antipolitics’ imagines the formation of new 
alliances or even communities of the subjugated and the sympathetic across religious, racial, 
gender, class and caste lines. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, not long after Tagore wrote Gora, he set sail 
with his collection of poems The Gitanjali to Europe and North America.  
 
In 1912, Tagore’s family friend, William Rothenstein shared The Gitanjali with W.B. Yeats 
and Ezra Pound.97 In 1913, Tagore was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature and became an 
international celebrity. Continuing his speaking tour of US and the UK, he delivered a series of 
lectures in Harvard and Oxford published under the title Sadhana (Spiritual Stiving). Sadhana is 
Tagore’s espousal of a philosophy of love. In it, he asserted love was the ‘ultimate meaning of 
everything around us’.98 Hence, ‘(Love) is not a mere sentiment; it is truth; it is the joy that is at 
the root of all creation’.99 Tagore explains his philosophy of love by drawing on Vaishanavite 
poetry of the Gita Govinda, which centres on the love story between Krishna and Radha. 
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Developing the Vaishnavite allegory, it would appear as though the concepts of viraha or longing, 
abhisar or seeking one’s lover and milan or union/consummation are central motifs of love.100 For 
Tagore, they characterise – in a similar way to the Song of Songs – the eternal-love drama or eros 
between ‘God’ and person, infinite and finite, essence and appearance.  
 
In Sadhana, Tagore argues that although familial and communal loves are significant, they 
ought not militate against a love of humanity.  
It very often happens that our love for our children, our friends, or other loved ones, 
debars us from the further realization of our soul. It enlarges our scope of consciousness, 
no doubt, yet it sets a limit to its freest expansion. Nevertheless, it is the first step, and all 
the wonder lies in this first step itself. It shows to us the true nature of our soul. From it 
we know, for certain, that our highest joy is in the losing of our egoistic self and in the 
uniting with others. This love gives us a new power and insight and beauty of mind to the 
extent of the limits we set around it, but ceases to do so if those limits lose their elasticity, 
and militate against the spirit of love altogether; then our friendships become exclusive, 
our families selfish and inhospitable, our nations insular and aggressively inimical to other 
races.101  
 
In fact, for Tagore, civilisations were to be judged by their capacity for this love. 
Civilization must be judged and prized, not by the amount of power it has developed, but 
by how much it has evolved and given expression to, by its laws and institutions, the love 
of humanity102 
 
Or again: 
Civilization can never sustain itself upon cannibalism of any form. For that by which alone 
man is true can only be nourished by love and justice103 
 
Although Tagore’s advocacy of a love of humanity may seem at odds with his critique of 
abstraction, it is in fact entirely consonant with his commitment to monism. Much like Tolstoy’s 
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law of love which imagines itself to be the antithesis of violence, in Tagore’s monist philosophy, 
‘pain’ or violence is the product of a lack of love.  
Want of love is a degree of callousness; for love is the perfection of consciousness. We do 
not love because we do not comprehend, or rather we do not comprehend because we do 
not love…104 
 
Whereas for Tolstoy, the remedy is non-resistance to evil or a withdrawal from politics, for Tagore 
it entails constructive engagement or effort. 
The most important lesson man can learn from his life is not that there is pain in this 
world, but that it depends upon him to turn it into good account, that it is possible for him 
to transmute it into joy.105  
 
Nonetheless, Sadhana is an abstract, convoluted and sometimes self-contradictory and self-
orientalising text. Although Bertrand Russell dismissed Sadhana as ‘vague nonsense’,106 Tagore’s 
lectures captured the Orientalist imagination of Anglo-American audiences. It therefore came to 
them as quite a shock that when Tagore next embarked on the lecture circuit next in 1917, he 
spoke not about esoteric philosophy but offered a scathing critique of nationalism, imperialism 
and race. The major event that separates the tone of these lectures is the outbreak of the Great 
War, which Tagore came to see as animated by the same virulent nationalism of the swadeshi 
movement. Between these lectures, Tagore wrote Chaturanga and Ghare Baire, which offer insight 
into Tagore’s changing views. I argue that if Chaturanga is about how the loves of abstract, 
systematic philosophy militate against loving in the particular, Ghare Baire highlights the violence 
abstract loves wreak in the intimate lives of people. 
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Chaturanga 
Kaiser Haq translates Chaturanga as Quartet. For the Tagore scholar, William Radice, this is 
apt because it conjures 
the “four limbs” or “four parts” that make up the novella – the four chapters that were 
originally published separately in consecutive issues of Sabujpatra (November – February, 
1915-1916) but also, as in a string quartet, the interplay between the four characters that 
the chapters are named after. Since Tagore was always alert to the full meaning or 
etymology of names, perhaps we should also remember that a chaturanga in epic India was 
a complete army comprising elephants, chariots, cavalry and infantry….Finally, chaturanga 
as a name for a chess game (technically a four-player version of the game) evokes both the 
intellectualism of the book and its concentrated passion.107 
 
As the title suggests, the novel is about four protagonists, namely Jagmohan, Sachich, 
Damini and Sribilash(who also acts as the narrator). Their lives are linked by the figure of Sachich, 
the son of an orthodox Hindu who is raised and educated by his uncle, Jagmohan. Jagmohan is 
variously read as being modelled on Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar or the Scottish philanthropist, 
David Hare.108 He is a secular humanist and utilitarian committed to the teachings of Comte, Mill 
and Bentham. Jagmohan’s beliefs attracts his brother and community’s scorn. He rejects idol 
worship, the caste system and the notion of God, choosing to focus on humanity instead. As he 
tells his religious brother, 
Brahmos accept a formless deity who is invisible to the eye. You accept idols who cannot 
be heard. We accept the living who can be seen and heard – it’s impossible not to believe 
in them109  
 
When there is an outbreak of plague in Calcutta – a likely reference to the first outbreak of plague 
in 1899 –he decides to convert his home into a hospital for the low castes and Muslims in his 
community. He contracts the plague and dies, proudly acknowledging it as a badge of honour:  
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The creed I have lived by all my life has given me its parting gift…I have no regrets110  
Jagmohan’s conception of ethics and altruism were profoundly shaped by his atheism: 
Service to humanity was an important aspect of Jagmohan’s atheistic creed. The chief 
delight in such altruism lay in the fact that it brought nothing save financial loss – no award 
or merit, no promise of baksheesh from any scripture – nor did it placate any irate deity. 
If anyone asked, ‘What is there for you in the greatest good of the greatest number?’ he 
would say, ‘The greatest thing for me is that there’s nothing in it for me.111  
 
In a world without grace or redemption, moral standards for Jagmohan were uncompromising: 
He would say to Sachich: ‘Remember, my boy, our pride in being atheists requires us to 
be morally impeccable. Because we do not obey anything we ought to have greater strength 
to be true to ourselves’.112  
 
Jagmohan’s death leaves Sachich grief-stricken. He disappears for two years when his friend 
Sribilash discovers he has joined a cult in Chittagong led by Swami Lilananda, a figure variously 
read as Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda or the Brahmo-turned-Vaishnavite, Bijoykrishna 
Goswami. That Sachich was a discipline of Swami Lilananda leaves Sribilash dismayed: 
Once I couldn’t imagine how someone like Sachich could be an atheist; now I couldn’t 
understand how Swami Lilananda made Sachich dance to his tune. 113  
 
Indeed, the avowed positivist and humanist who had little time for ritual was found ‘dancing 
ecstatically, singing kirtans, playing cymbals, and rousing whole neighbourhoods into a state of 
excitement’ 114. It seemed to Sribilash that Sachich ceased to see him as an individual:  
The ‘me’ whom Sachich had embraced wasn’t ‘me, Sribilash’, it was the Universal Soul that 
inheres in all things, it was an Idea…Such an Idea is like wine; whoever is drunk with it 
will clasp anyone to his breast and shed tears; it makes no difference whether that one is 
me or another115 
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Sachich’s asceticism and celibacy are problematised by the figure of Damini, a widow 
bequeathed by a devotee along with his estate to Swami Lilananda. Once, Sachich attempted to 
rescue a widow who was seduced, abandoned and left pregnant by his married brother. He brought 
her to his uncle’s house and in an act of chivalry decided to marry her. The widow, Nonibala, 
however, killed herself before she could be wed. To Sachich’s consternation, Damini was no 
Nonibala:  
In Nonibala I saw one form of the Universal Feminine – the woman who takes upon 
herself the stigma of sin, who sacrifices her life for a sinner’s sake, who in dying adds to 
the contents of life’s cup of ambrosia. In Damini the Universal Feminine assumes another 
form. She has no truck with death, she is a celebrant of the vital force. Like a spring garden 
she is always brimming with waves of lovely fragrance. She doesn’t want to renounce 
anything in life; she is unwilling to play host to the sannyasi; she has sworn not to pay a 
paisa in homage to the cold north wind’116  
 
Sachich is disturbed by Damini’s attraction for him. In part, this is because he sees widows as 
objects deserving of charity rather than as subjects with agency. Damini is confronting because 
she refuses to embody the liminal space between the living and the dead that Hindu widows were 
meant to occupy.117 Prone to abstraction, Sachich identifies Damini with Prakriti, the ‘cosmic 
female’ or Nature and himself with Purursha or ‘consciousness’ or reason.118 In his quest for 
asceticism, he seeks to dismiss her:  
Clearly women are agents of Nature, whose dictates they carry out by adopting varied 
disguises to beguile the mind. They cannot fulfil their mistress’s command till they have 
completely enslaved thee consciousness. So to keep the consciousness clear we have to 
keep clear of these bawds of Nature.119  
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When Damini seeks to seduce Sachich in a cave, he fails to even recognise her as a human. Tagore’s 
representation of Sachich’s violent reaction suggest his asceticism and celibacy are forms self-
involvement and misogyny.  
The darkness of the cave was like a black beast – its moist breath seemed to touch my skin. 
It seemed to me like the first animal to appear in the very first cycle of creation; it had no 
eyes, no ears, only a huge appetite. It had been trapped for eternity in that cave. It didn’t 
have a mind; it knew nothing but pain – it sobbed noiselessly….I thought I would sleep 
outside the cave. But I had forgotten the way to the entrance…Finally I gave up…It 
seemed the primordial beast had thrust me deep into its saliva-drenched maw; there was 
no escape. The beast was all dark hunger, it would lick at me slowly and consume me. Its 
saliva was acidic, it would corrode me….At some point in that semi-conscious state I felt 
the touch of a deep breath close to my feet. That primordial beast! Then something clasped 
my feet. At first I thought it was a wild animal. But a wild animal is hairy, this creature 
wasn’t. My entire body shrank at the touch. It seemed to be an unknown snake-like 
creature. I knew nothing of its anatomy – what its head looked like, or its trunk, or its tail 
– nor could I imagine how it devoured its victims. It was repulsive because of its very 
softness, its ravenous mass. I was speechless with fear and loathing. I began pushing the 
creature away with both feet.120 
 
Sachich’s conflation of cave, woman and desire represents his commitment to the Prakriti-Purusha 
binary that was commonplace at the time.121 However, even as Damini relinquishes her hold on 
Sachich and acknowledges him as her guru who redeems her from desire, Tagore subverts the 
trope. Indeed, in the end, Damini rather than Sachich does the rescuing. It is Damini’s caustic 
comment about Swami Lilananda’s cult which finally enables Sachich to leave:  
Day and night you go on about ecstasy, you talk of nothing else. Today you have seen what 
ecstasy is, haven’t you? It has no regard for morals or a code of conduct, for brother or 
wife or family pride. It has no mercy, no shame, no sense of propriety. What have you 
devised to save man from the hell of this cruel, shameless, fatal ecstasy?122  
 
Although Sachich remains an ascetic in his quest for meaning, Damini challenges his capacity for 
moral-certitude: 
Once more the rumour went round, and the papers reported in abusive terms that 
Sachich’s opinions had been revised yet again. He had once loudly denied religion and 
caste; then one day he had just as loudly proclaimed faith in gods and goddesses, yoga and 
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asceticism, purificatory rituals and ancestor worship and taboos – the whole lot. And yet 
another day he threw overboard the whole freight of beliefs and subsided into peaceful 
silence – what he believed and what he denied became impossible to determine. One thing 
was apparent: he had taken up the welfare work he had done once in the past, but the 
caustic combativeness was no longer in him’123  
 
Damini eventually marries the narrator and Sachich’s best friend Sribilash. At the time, the 
novel was controversial because it challenged the cultural taboos surrounding widow-remarriage. 
For Tagore, Chaturanga corrected a deficit he deeply regretted in his swadeshi era novel Choker Bali 
where the widow Binodini chose asceticism over remarriage.124 Damini and Sribilash’s marriage is 
unconventional and defies caste and gender norms.  
I haven’t had time to be a householder, and – thank heaven – it’s not in my temperament 
to be a sannyasi. That’s why the woman I found as a companion didn’t become a 
housewife; she couldn’t be dismissed as maya; she was real. Till the end she remained true 
to her name, Damini, lightning. Who would dare call her a shadow?125 
 
There are many things I wouldn’t have written, if I had known Damini merely as a 
housewife. It is because I have known her in a nobler, truer relationship that I can tell 
everything frankly, whatever others may say.126 
 
Sribilash is fully aware of Sachich’s hold on Damini when he marries her but chooses to accept 
her as she is: ‘I had entered marriage into the full light of day, with full understanding of everything 
involved’.127 Because he sees her as she was, that is neither as a ‘clay doll nor the vibration of veena 
strings’,128 theirs was a happy and fulfilled relationship. Albeit shunned by society, they spend their 
days in service of the less fortunate. Damini dies a year from the injury Sachich inflicted on her in 
the cave with the words ‘My longings are still with me’ (or perhaps, I remain unsated). 129 
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Chaturanga offers insight into Tagore’s post swadeshi philosophy. For Radice, the coming 
together of four complex characters in a chess game is deeply illuminating: 
No one character in Chaturanga achieves this ideal in toto, but taken together – 
Jagmohan’s compassion, Sachich’s quest for truth, Damini’s passion, and Sribilash’s loyalty 
– they express it. This is the unity of the book. We find in it, so to speak, noble elephants 
in Jagmohan, perpetually questing chariots in Sachich, headstrong cavalry in Damini, and 
reliable infantry in Sribilash. Together they form Tagore’s army ‘on the field of Truth’, and 
the battle they fight on his behalf – or the chess-game that they play – is not ultimately 
with each other but against the world’s false gods, false gurus, and the fanatical followers 
of the world’s false gods and gurus. The battle cannot be won: both in the personal and 
social spheres of life, sadh mitila na. But that is not a reason ever to abandon the struggle.130 
 
Like Haq131 and Radice, I read Chaturanga as Tagore’s dual critique of humanism and orthodoxy. 
In my reading, what animates this critique is Tagore’s disdain for abstraction and atomism. 
Jagmohan, arguably, is the most admirable figure in the novel. However, his philosophy of the 
greatest good for the greatest number is found wanting. Tagore uses humour to first hint at this:  
His wife died in his youth, but he had read Malthus in the meantime. He never married 
again.132 
 
Later in the text, Tagore suggests utilitarianism offers no resources to help Jagmohan cope with 
his (brief) estrangement from his nephew. 
The greatest good of the greatest number, indeed! The statistical calculations of science do 
not apply to the mysteries of human nature. The person who is a single unit in a census is 
beyond the reckoning of statistics in matters of the heart. Sachich could not be categorized 
in terms of statistical units – one, two, three…He rent Jagmohan’s heart and pervaded his 
whole world.133 
 
There is no chapter dedicated to Swami Lilananda. Perhaps Tagore shares Jagmohan’s view of the 
ascetic:  
Coins that ring false are discarded as counterfeit; these sannyasis are like those fake coins, 
useless in life’s transactions. Yet they go around saying that they have renounced the world. 
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If one is of any use there’s no way one can slip out of the world of samsara. Dry leaves fall 
from the boughs because the tree shakes them off – they are trash after all.134 
 
Swami Lilananda is portrayed as being more concerned with affairs of the body: food, wealth and 
discipleship. Although Tagore commonly evoked the Vaishnavite language of love and longing in 
Sadhana, in Chaturanga he gives voice to his critique of the swadeshi movement’s elevation of a 
Vaishnavism or religiosity that emphasised devotion over service, abstraction over particularity.  
 
A few months prior to writing Chaturanga, Tagore wrote Streer Patra or a Wife’s Letter, which 
explicitly engages with how the institution of (Hindu) marriage subjugates women from their 
infancy.135 Streer Patra was Tagore’s first systematic engagement with the ‘woman question’. In 
Chaturanga, Tagore explores similar themes via the question of the agency of widows. Indeed, for 
all the differences between Nonibala’s seeming subservience and Damini’s rebelliousness, there is 
much they share by virtue of their shared ‘widowhood’. Nonibala becomes an object for male 
gratification and abuse as a widow. Although Sachich and Jagmohan offer her hospitality and 
protection, at no stage is she recognised as an agent. Once a ‘widowed daughter’ to her mother, a 
‘mother’ to her benefactor, Jagmohan, and a would-be ‘wife’ to her paternalistic suitor, Sachich, 
Nonibala’s only act of self-expression as an agent is in her suicide. Similarly, Damini, for all her 
willfulness cannot be free. Her refusal to conform to societal norms sees her further marginalised: 
disdained by Swami Lilananda; dismissed by Sachich and disowned by her family. However 
transgressive and redemptive her marriage to Sribilash may be, Damini remains unfulfilled living 
life on everyone else’s terms. 
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In its emphasis on interiority, Chaturanga marks Tagore’s narrowing emphasis on romantic 
love. An ideas novel, it offers insight into ‘the cross-currents of religious and reformative 
movements that rocked the Hindu society in Bengal in the second half of the nineteenth century.136 
In Tagore’s own admission, it was his attempt to offer an analysis into the psychological upheaval 
caused by the swadeshi movement and Great War. However, Chaturanga is a much more pessimistic 
text than Gora. Gora, a ‘not-quite-white’ Irish male outcast can discover his Bharatvarsha with exiles, 
but Damini in her womanhood and widowhood must remain unsated. Chaturanga represents 
Tagore’s revision or refinement of his philosophy of love in Sadhana. Tagore appears to come to 
the view that love cannot be soteriological, it cannot satiate in the absence of freedom and equality. 
The mere act of Damini loving Sachich or Sribilash loving Damini is inadequate so long as Damini 
cannot be free. Chaturanga’s focus on widowhood and the shortcomings of atomism and 
abstraction voice Tagore’s critique of loves not cognisant of alterity and agency. His controversial 
masterpiece Ghare Baire offers insight into how politics grounded in this atomism and abstraction 
impact the intimate and the international. 
 
Ghare Baire (The Home and the World) 
Ghare Baire (Home and the World) was serialised in the Bengali journal Sabuj Patra between 
May 1915 and February 1916, appearing in book form in 1916.137 Translated under Tagore’s close 
supervision into English by his nephew, Surendranath Tagore, it was serialised in The Modern Review 
from December 1918 and published as a book shortly after the first World War in 1919.138 Ghare 
Baire was unique in its capacity to unite feminists, revolutionaries and conservatives in their vitriol 
and condemnation for what they variously read as an anti-feminist, imperialist and modern text. 
Internationally, it fared marginally better. Admired by Rothenstein, Yeats and Lady Gregory, it was 
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also Tagore’s best known book in Germany.139 Yet, E.M Forster dismissed it as ‘a boarding house 
flirtation’ featuring a woman who mistakes a ‘West-Kensingtonian babu’ for the world..140 George 
Lukacs, in his woeful dismissal of or failure to comprehend context, referred to ‘The Home and 
the World’ as ‘Tagore’s Gandhi Novel’.141 Reading the text as a counterrevolutionary novel lacking 
the skill or substance of Dostoevsky’s Possessed, he argued,  
For a pamphlet – and one resorting to the lowest tools of libel – is what Tagore’s novel is, 
in spite of its tediousness and want of spirit. These libels seem all the more repugnant to 
the unprejudiced reader the more they are steeped in unctuous ‘wisdom’ and the more slyly 
Mr. Tagore attempts to conceal his impotent hatred of freedom fighters in a ‘profound’ 
philosophy of the ‘universally human’.142  
Nonetheless, for its enduring insights into nationalism in Bengal, India and elsewhere, Ghare Baire 
endures as Tagore’s best known novel internationally. 
 
The novel centres on a love triangle between Bimala, her liberal princely husband, Nikhil 
and his revolutionary friend, Sandip. Determined to have a companionate marriage, Nikhil seeks 
to persuade Bimala to leave the seclusion of purdah or zenana. After years of persuasion, Bimala 
concedes after being roused by Sandip’s speech on swadeshi. She invites Sandip to dinner, they 
become political allies and some kind of affair ensues. The love and longing between the three 
characters is set against the backdrop of the swadeshi movement which progresses from the 
advocacy of locally produced supplies to the boycott of foreign goods to communal (Hindu-
Muslim) tensions, terrorism and riots. Eventually repulsed by Sandip’s self-aggrandising ways, 
Bimala attempts to reconcile with her husband. However, the novel ends tragically with Sandip 
fleeing for his life, Nikhil critically wounded after riding unarmed into a communal riot and Bimala 
left alone to contemplate her future. 
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Ghare Baire has been read as allegorical from the time it was first serialised. Pramatho 
Choudhury, the editor of Sabuj Patra and a close friend and relative of Tagore, claimed Nikhil 
represented ‘ancient India’, Sandip ‘modern Europe’, ‘while Bimala ‘India today’ is poised between 
them and suffers from their opposing pulls on her life’.143 Following the common trope where 
woman is personified as nation, most interpretations imagine Bimala as Bengal or India. Nikhil, 
however, is variously read as a patriot (as opposed to a nationalist),144 a cosmopolitan145 or a 
liberal146 while Sandip is read as an (ethno)nationalist,147 nationalist148 or political realist.149 As 
Supriya Chaudhuri notes, all fictional truths are plural and I think all these readings can be 
substantiated by the text.150 Nonetheless, Rabindranath Tagore acknowledged that while all work 
bears the influence of the times, The Home and the World was ‘merely a narrative with no conscious 
allegorical intention’.151 For Supriya Chaudhuri, then, the novel is less about nationalism or 
swadeshi politics and more about the ‘social construction of personal life’.152 However, one reading 
does not preclude the other. In what follows, I offer a reading of The Home and the World as Tagore’s 
tragic tale about the destruction wielded by abstract loves. 
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The novel comprises a series of biographies or diary entries which Tagore uses to adroitly 
highlight the perspectival nature of truth. Nonetheless, as Tanika Sarkar notes, the effect is that 
‘the monologic form prevails’ reflecting ‘the fundamental, constitutive loneliness and mutual 
isolation of the three individuals, each locked into worlds of very different needs and 
perceptions’.153 Despite or perhaps because of Nikhil’s commitment to liberalism, he spends most 
of his time trying to make Bimala in his own image. At the conclusion, he therefore notes, ‘I have 
begun to suspect that there has all along been a vein of tyranny in me. There was a despotism in 
my desire to mould my relations with Bimala in a hard, clear-cut, perfect form’.154 Sandip frankly 
acknowledges from the outset, ‘I shall simply make Bimala one with my country’.155 In the process, 
it would seem that no one in the novel actually loves another for who they really are. Indeed, as 
Chaudhuri notes, even Bimala ‘wants intensely what she fears she will never have, a state of 
completeness or rest in her own being which she confuses now with her mother’s image, now with 
her husband’s love, now with material possessions, now with a lover’s flattery’.156 Tagore 
represents this expansive restlessness Bimala associates with herself and Bengal as eros or desire: 
In that future I saw my country, a woman like myself, standing expectant. She has been 
drawn forth from her home corner by the sudden call of some Unknown. She has had no 
time to pause or ponder, or to light herself a torch, as she rushes forward into the darkness 
ahead. I know well how her very soul responds to the distant flute-strains which call her; 
how her breast rises and falls; how she feels she nears it, nay it is already hers, so that it 
matters not even if she run blindfolded. She is no mother. There is no call for her of 
children in their hunger, no home to be lighted of an evening, no household work to be 
done. So; she hies to her tryst, for this is the land of the Vaishnava Poets. She has left 
home, forgotten domestic duties; she has nothing but an unfathomable yearning which 
hurries her on – by what road, to what goal, she recks not’157  
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The tragedy of Ghare Baire is that none of the relationships in the novel thrive because of 
the characters’ self-absorption and emphasis on abstraction. Nikhil comes to realise 
The time has come when I must divest Bimala of all the ideal decorations with which I 
decked her. It was owing to my own weaknesses that I indulged in such idolatry. I was too 
greedy. I created an angel of Bimala, in order to exaggerate my own enjoyment. But Bimala 
is what she is. It is preposterous to expect that she should assume the role of an angel for 
my own pleasure.158 
 
Sandip confesses, 
Goddess, I, also set you free today. My earthen temple could hold you no longer – every 
moment it was on the point of breaking apart.159 
In the process, they fail to ask what Bimala wants, evident when she reflects: 
‘But can freedom – empty freedom – be given and taken so easily as all that? It is like 
setting a fish free in the sky – for how can I move or live outside the atmosphere of loving 
care which has always sustained me?’ 160 
 
Nikhil and Sandip’s attempts to make Bimala in their image represent Tagore’s deepening 
engagement with ‘the woman question’, he began in Streer Patra. Even Nikhil’s conservative, 
traditional sister-in-law gives voice to this,  
I would not live my life again – not as a woman! Let what I have had to bear end with this 
one birth. I could not bear it over again.161 
 
In the context of the early twentieth century Bengal, it represents Tagore’s engagement with the 
inadequacy of the nationalist ‘resolution’ of the ‘woman question’ described by Partha Chatterjee, 
where the ‘home’ becomes ‘the original site on which the hegemonic project of nationalism was 
launched’.162 The novel’s mixed imagery and evocations of multiple goddesses come to 
problematise the nationalist conflation of woman with ‘home’ and ‘tradition’. Sandip’s nationalist 
veneration of Bimala moves from ‘Bande Mataram’ (Hail Mother) to ‘Bande Priyam’ (Hail 
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Mistress/Lover). In the novel’s confused Shakta and Vaishnav imagery, in the weight of 
expectation for Bimala to be Lakhsmi (goddess of domesticity), Kali (goddess of vengeance), Sita 
(virtuous wife) and Radha (adulterous wife), Tagore suggests the nationalist ideal of womanhood 
finds no basis even in Hindu mythology. Likewise, Nikhil’s attempt to ‘emancipate’ his wife leads 
to his realisation that she not only does not desire him but that they are fundamentally 
incompatible. Bimala, is not a particularly sympathetic character. She is selfish and cares little for 
the least privileged. However at the denouement, she is free of the two men who sought to free 
her and is left to survey the damage. Moving beyond what her husband and lover expect from her, 
freed from the need to create what Dippanita Datta describes as a ‘discursive third space’ between 
her husband and lover and their politics, she is finally free amidst the chaos ‘to reclaim her agency 
is non-normative ways’.163 
 
This love triangle comes to foreground the unfolding swadeshi movement. Nikhil, appears 
much like Tagore as an early advocate of a constructive swadeshi. He invests in indigenous 
enterprises, like Indian mill-made yarn,164  
he sharpens his Indian-made pencils with his Indian-made knife, does his writing with reed 
pens, drinks his water out of a bell-metal vessel, and works at night in the light of an old-
fashioned castor-oil lamp.165 
 
Yet despite his personal embrace of swadeshi, he refuses to banish foreign goods from his estates.166 
Bimala says his main qualm lay with ‘the spirit of Bande Mataram’, the deification and worship of 
the nation as a Hindu mother goddess. In Nikhil’s view,  
those who cannot find food for their enthusiasm in a knowledge of their country as it 
actually is, or those who cannot love men just because they are men – who needs must 
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shout and deify their country in order to keep up their excitement – these love excitement 
more than their country.167  
 
In concrete terms, this manifests itself in his critique of the movement’s tendency to further 
alienate and disenfranchise the low-class, low-caste and Muslim workers who profit from the sale 
of foreign goods and can ill afford to purchase locally made items. Bimala, in turn, gives voice to 
the upper-middle class sensibility that came to dominate the swadeshi movement. Casting aside 
purdah and entering political debate, she asserts 
I will tell you broadly what I feel. I am only human. I am covetous. I would have good 
things for my country. If I am obliged, I would snatch them and filch them. I have anger. 
I would be angry for my country’s sake. If necessary, I would smite and slay to avenge her 
insults. I have my desire to be fascinated, and fascination must be supplied to me in bodily 
shape by my country. She must have some visible symbol casting its spell upon my mind. 
I would make my country a Person, and call her Mother, Goddess, Durga – for whom I 
would redden the earth with sacrificial offerings. I am human, not divine.168  
 
However, her sense of anger and entitlement don’t extend to those whose lives are impacted by 
the swadeshi movement. Bimala is apathetic to the fate of Panchu, who loses his livelihood when 
his foreign stock is burned. Recognising how profoundly different they are, Nikhil observes,  
The fact is, Bimala is at heart what is called a ‘lady’. Though her own people are not well 
off, she was born a Rani. She has no doubts in her mind that there is a lower unit of 
measure for the trials and troubles of the ‘lower classes’. Want is, of course, a permanent 
feature of their lives, but does not necessarily mean ‘want’ to them. Their very smallness 
protects them, as the banks protect the pool; by widening bounds only the slime is 
exposed169  
 
Sandip is portrayed as an amoral, Nietzschean character. Often read as resembling Bipin Chandra 
Pal and Aurbindo Ghosh’s revolutionary politics, Sandip laments people’s inability to be truthful 
about who they are  
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Because you have your greed, you build your walls. Because I have my greed, I break 
through them. You use your power: I use my craft. These are the realities of life. On these 
depend kingdoms and empires and all the great enterprises of men170 
 
Sandip’s love for Bimala which seeks to make her one with the country, emerges in the 
final analysis ‘but a different phase of his covetous self-love’.171 However – this self-love which 
seeks to create lover and politics in its own image – is a characteristic all three share. Between the 
liberal Nikhil, upper-class Bimala and self-aggrandising Sandip, Tagore offers his commentary on 
the coercive tendencies that inhered in the swadeshi movement, social movements and perhaps all 
politics. It is tempting to read Nikhil as some sort of liberal figure, as an echo of Tagore. Indeed, 
we hear an echo of Tagore’s grievances, when he says,  
I have become unpopular with my countrymen because I have not joined them in their 
carousals. They are certain that either I have a longing for some title, or else that I am 
afraid of the police. The police on their side suspect me of harbouring some hidden design 
and protesting too much in my mildness.172 
 
However, that there is something lacking in his brand of swadeshi is evident from the outset. Bimala 
notes, ‘milk and water swadeshi does not appeal to anyone’. Similarly, conjuring the gendered, 
imperialist trope of virility, Nikhil’s viraha (yearning, unconsummated love, feminised eros) for 
Bimala mirrors his sense of impotence with promoting his vision of politics: ‘I had received the 
vital spark, but could not impart it to another’.173  
 
Most of the action of the novel unfolds in the home, signifying all three characters 
conflation of home and romantic love with the world. Sandip confesses,  
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‘It does happen at times,’ he said, ‘that a man’s whole world is reduced to a single spot. I 
have realized my universe in this sitting-room of yours, that is why I have been a fixture 
here’. 174 
 
Nikhil eventually realises his yearning for romantic love has consumed him: 
There are more things in life than the union or separation of man and woman. The great 
world stretches far beyond, and one can truly measure one’s joys and sorrows when 
standing in its midst.175 
 
However, in the meantime, he has naively housed and abated a terrorist. Bimala and Sandip betray 
little concern for anyone besides themselves. Nikhil, for all his philosophical emphasis on 
inclusiveness and the rights of the lower-castes and Muslims, never actually consults anyone. 
Instead, much like his relationship with Bimala, he seeks to impose his benevolence and 
enlightenment on the world ignoring individuals and their agency. Devoid of any grasp on reality, 
he rides into a riot unaccompanied and unarmed. Between his death and Sandip’s disappearance, 
the novel ends with Bimala left alone to survey the damage. However, she is also now free to 
reckon with her choices and rebuild a life unfettered by the weight of her husband’s and lover’s 
abstractions and expectations. To whatever extent Bimala in her contradictions and complexity 
represents Bengal or India, Tagore expresses his hope that she is finally free to be what she will 
be.  
 
Tagore’s three post-swadeshi novels give voice both to the soteriological promise of politics 
animated by plural loves and his critique of the violence wielded by abstract loves. Tagore’s most 
optimistic novel, Gora, portrays love as soteriological. In imagining a space for solidarity across 
racial, cultural and gender lines, it envisages a politics that resists orthodoxy and imperialism. Yet, 
the novel’s universalism sits uncomfortably with the text’s anti-imperialism and anti-traditionalism. 
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When Gora decides to set down his Brahmanical burden; refuses to take up the white man’s 
burden and chooses to be disciple, son, friend and lover, one wonders if Tagore is not actually 
endorsing quietism and quiescence. Chaturanga, Tagore’s most succinct articulation of his post-
swadeshi political philosophy, again highlights how atomism and abstraction are antithetical to his 
vision of politics. It does this via a dual critique of the abstractions that inhere in ‘Western’ 
philosophy and non-‘Western’ ‘religiosity’. Further, it begins to interrogate whether love can have 
any soteriological promise if the least privileged individuals, in this case widows, are free to love. 
However, to the extent that the text is focused on the middle classes, Tagore’s call to love in the 
particular may be construed as a call to ‘service’ not ‘praxis’. Ghare Baire, via the figure of Nikhil, 
suggests the emphasis on charity and benevolence is ineffectual. I am not sure whether Tagore 
sought to criticise or identify with Nikhil. In any case, he comes to embody the conservatism in 
Tagore’s thought that renders ‘good’ political loves little more than humanitarianism. I read Ghare 
Baire as an allegory about the violence of atomism and abstraction. To the extent that the three 
protagonists in the novel are first and foremost friends, their failure to come together in friendship 
to redress the root causes of the swadeshi movement represent the squandered political promise of 
love in the particular. For all its flaws, Tagore’s contribution to political thought lies in his critique 
of abstract loves. In his dual rejection of imperialism and orthodoxy and their complicit co-
construction of race, gender, class and caste, he imagines love as a space for an alternative politics. 
It is a space where (mostly middle class) outcasts, rebels, widows and other women can come 
together to critique, act and imagine another politics. Tagore’s speeches and essays provide insight 
into how this underpins his internationalism.  
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Of Amity and Internationalism 
Tagore’s critique of the violence wielded by abstract loves animates his critique of  
nationalism and cosmopolitanism, politics and economics. Like Tolstoy, I suggest this emanates 
from a discomfort about the coercive tendencies for mass politics. Unlike Tolstoy, however, it 
does not lead to a disavowal of politics altogether. Rather, in Tagore’s case it leads to his emphasis 
on two spheres: domestically, on the cultivation of civil society as a parallel polis and internationally, 
via an emphasis on the politics of friendship. 
 
Tagore’s disdain for politics and economics are similarly situated in his critique of 
abstraction. 
In political civilization, the state is an abstraction and relationship of men utilitarian. 
Because it has no root in sentiments, it is so dangerously easy to handle.176 
 
Tagore’s denunciation of the nation, which he comes to see as the antithesis of society and without 
hyperbole, the embodiment of evil, is an extension of this: 
A nation, in the sense of the political and economic union of a people, is that aspect which 
a whole population assumes when organized for a mechanical purpose. Society as such has 
no ulterior purpose. It is an end in itself. It is a spontaneous self-expression of man as a 
social being. It is a natural regulation of human relationships, so that men can develop 
ideals of life in cooperation with one another.177 
Or again, 
When this organization of politics and commerce, whose other name is the Nation, 
becomes all powerful at the cost of the harmony of the higher social life, then it as an evil 
day for humanity. 178 
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However, it is worth noting that as an imperial subject, Tolstoy’s conflated the ‘political’ and 
‘economic’ with the ‘imperial’. His emphasis on the social, then was largely motivated less by the 
need to renounce politics than to redeem it as a parallel polis. 
[Society] has also a political side, but this is only for a special purpose. It is for self-
preservation. It is merely the side of power, not of human ideals.179 
 
His imagining of civil society as an inviolate, in large part helped him sustain the myth that it was 
a sphere of influence, untouched by empire. Consequently, he argued that while in the West, the 
state played a role and was central to the welfare of the people, in India, ‘the real force of the 
country is concentrated in the society’, which was never ‘depended on the benevolence of kings 
and rulers, but …conducted its activities according to dharmas (duty/obligations)’.180That Tagore 
spent his time cultivating educational and rural development institutions in a bid to foster self-
sufficiency, that he corresponded with the likes of Nehru and allowed himself to be coopted by 
Gandhi, suggests Tagore was far less opposed to politics than his rhetoric suggested. Similarly, 
Tagore’s denunciation of economics, to the extent one may distinguish it from ‘politics’, was at 
best a reference to a kind of economics which equated ‘growth’ with ‘progress’. Again Tagore’s 
critique was not so much with ‘growth’ per se as an emphasis on growth which bore little concern 
with ‘exploitation’.181 Again, this disavowal of economics was not complete. Tagore’s longstanding 
critique of boycott from the swadeshi period to the Gandhian non-cooperation movement; his 
refusal to ban foreign goods from his estates and his support and investment in indigenous 
enterprise demonstrate that economics was central to both his vision of the social and the political. 
It is telling that Tagore’s former pupil, Amartya Sen credits Tagore for being central to the 
development of his economic and philosophic thought.182 Tagore’s rejection of a politics and 
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economics that is ‘dehumanising’ in its elevation of ideas over person is reminiscent of Arendtian 
yearning for a politics of action. In the imperial context, where the only form of agency in politics 
and economics was non-cooperation, Tagore conceived of civil society as an alternate, inclusive 
space for political praxis. 
 
Tagore’s emphasis on a politics that celebrated the plural and particular led to a 
commitment to what Leela Gandhi terms ‘the politics of friendship’.183 Following Derrida, Gandhi 
argues ‘the trope of friendship…(is) the most comprehensive signifier for all those invisible 
affective gestures that refuse alignment along the secure axis of filialtion to seek expression outside, 
if not against, possessive communities of belonging’.184 In sum, she argues, that a non-nativist 
conception of friendship, the creation of an affective communities are a rich and neglected source 
of anti-colonial activism. While it is impossible to gauge what Tagore would have made of Derrida, 
Michael Collins argues that ‘at a trans-imperial and cross-cultural level Tagore believed that 
building friendships and communicating ideas from East to West was a method – if not a model 
– for achieving political change and progress’.185 Tagore’s friendship with W.B. Yeats and William 
Rothenstein; his work in India with Leonard Elmhirst, Charlie Andrews and E.H. Thompson; his 
collaboration in the inter-war period with Gilbert Murray on ‘East and West’ which saw the 
publication of his correspondence with Albert Einstein, H.G. Wells, Bendetto Croce, Romain 
Rolland and Marguerite Wilkinson is testament to this. But to quote Elleke Boehmer out of 
context, Tagore also swiveled ‘this conventional axis of interaction laterally’186 forming friendships 
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with Okakura Tenshin in Japan.187 Partaking in the advocacy of what Nico Slate terms ‘coloured 
cosmopolitanism’, he formed a friendship with W.E.B. Dubois.188 Central to these interactions was 
Tagore’s emphasis on dialogue and a commitment to syncreticism that Isaiah Berlin describes as 
‘the difficult middle path, drifting neither to the Scylla of radical modernism, nor to the Charbydis 
of proud and gloomy traditionalism’.189 For all of Tagore’s nuance, this exercise was grounded in 
a somewhat essentialist view of the world, not uncommon for its time: 
Then again we have to consider that the West is necessary to the East. We are 
complementary to each other because of our different outlooks upon life which have given 
us different aspects of truth.190 
 
Whatever one makes of Tagore’s emphasis on an internationalism defined by fraternity, perhaps 
it is telling that one of his most consistent critics, Bertrand Russell wrote ‘of what (Tagore) has 
done for Europe and America in the way of softening of prejudices and the removal of 
misconceptions I can speak, and I know that on this account he is worthy of the highest honour’.191 
 
Much like Tagore’s fiction, his vision of politics is impacted by his latent elitism. His literature 
offers compelling critique of social hierarchies and abstract loves, but often fails to interrogate 
how his own class leads him to sometimes privilege charity over collaboration. Similarly, although 
his critique of abstract loves that animate nationalism and cosmopolitanism, political and 
economic are cogent, his vision of an alternative politics do not transcend the trappings of his 
social class. Indeed as Michael Collins argues the emphasis of Tagore’s internationalism on (often 
elite) individuals as representatives of culture and agents of change embodies the same bourgeois 
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politics of the Bloomsbury group.192 Entirely consistent with Tagore’s disdain for mass politics, 
perhaps there is nothing inherently problematic about this. However, it ultimately precluded the 
participation of the same non-elites Tagore sought to champion. 
 
Conclusion 
Tagore’s contribution to international political thought lies in his post-swadeshi critique of 
the violence wielded by abstract loves. In Gora, Tagore argues the exclusionary violence of 
nationalism and imperialism are co-constituted, militating against the love of people in the 
particular. In Chaturanga, Tagore offers a dual critique of Indic religiosity and Western humanism 
and their abstract loves which render persons qua persons invisible. Finally, Ghare Baire, exemplifies 
the violence wielded by abstraction and atomism. Courageous enough to change his mind, 
Tagore’s post-swadeshi philosophy marks an engagement with the soteriological potential of a love 
that recognises the particularity and agency of all individuals. Committed to syncreticism, Tagore 
roots this fundamentally modern commitment to the individual and their alterity in Hindu 
universalism. It forms the basis of his critique of the nation state and a vision of politics he 
associates with empire. It also forms the foundation of an internationalism that emphasised amity, 
the transformative potential of friendships. For all the promises of his diagnosis of a lack of 
sympathy as the source of societal ills; for all his advocacy of a politics and internationalism 
grounded in particular loves; for all his commitment to dialogue and syncreticism, Tagore 
remained deeply sceptical about the coercive tendencies of mass politics. In concrete terms, 
Tagore’s vision of domestic and international politics did little to promote the equal political 
participation of the disenfranchised lower classes. In the final analysis, while Tagore’s conception 
of love offers a potent critique of politics that alienates and disregards human agency, his praxis 
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of love in its emphasis on service and its disregard of structures succumbs to his own critique.
CHAPTER 5: ALBERT CAMUS ON LOVE, REBELLION AND UTOPIA 
 
If I had to write a book on morality, it would have a hundred pages and ninety-nine would be blank. On the last page I 
should write: ‘I recognize only one duty, and that is to love’. And, as far as everything else is concerned, I say no.  
 
- Albert Camus. 
The Jewish French-Tunisian essayist, Albert Memmi, once wrote that Albert Camus lived 
‘under the sign of contradiction’.1 By this, he meant to conjure the plight of the ‘leftist’ ‘settler 
colonizer’ who refuses the ideology of colonialism but lives and benefits from its actual 
relationships. Camus’ legacy is intrinsically bound to this contradiction. On the one hand, he is 
celebrated for his universalism, his commentary on the human condition, his astute critique of 
totalitarianism and violence. On the other, he is criticised for espousing a universalism predicated 
on the erasure of the particularities of Arab and Berber Algerians and the violence of colonialism. 
An engagement with Camus’ life and works bears witness to the pervasiveness of this 
contradiction. Camus moved to France in 1940 but never ceased to consider himself an Algerian. 
A pied-noir – the derogatory term the French used to describe Algerian settlers – Camus was the 
grandson of Alsace refugees on his father’s side and Spanish immigrants on his mother’s side.2 A 
staunch advocate of Algerian civil rights, Camus’ journalism on the unequal treatment of Arabs 
and Berbers led to his Algerian newspaper being shut down and what he came to describe as his 
‘exile’ to France.3 In France, Camus was a leader of the intellectual wing of the French Resistance 
and edited the Resistance newspaper, Combat whilst working in the Gallimard publishing house. 
After the Second World War, he became a vocal critic of communism which led to his acrimonious 
alienation from the French existentialist circle.4 The battles were waged largely over the question 
of Algerian independence. That the once committed combatant of inequality and injustice should 
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now deny Algerian decolonisation was understood as a betrayal. Indeed, it has become a major 
lens through which Camus’ literary and political legacy is often assessed.  
 
In this chapter, I argue that Camus’ conception of love, rebellion and utopia reveal an abiding 
interest in the relationship between the universal and the particular. This chapter comprises four 
sections, each chronologically representing four stages in Camus’ career. Unlike my previous 
chapters, I do not offer a detailed account of Camus’ political influence or seek to establish that 
his literary and political work was somehow linked. This is chiefly because there is a certain unity 
and coherence to Camus’ literary and political work. It is reflected in what he described as his 
planned ‘cycles’, each comprising a novel, a philosophical essay, and play that collectively explore 
a philosophical theme. Instead, in the first section, I offer a contextual engagement with Camus’ 
Algerian writings. Largely coinciding with the latter half of the 1930s, this encompasses his lecture 
on ‘Indigenous Culture’; his dissertation Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism and his journalism 
for the Alger Republicain. This period is important to understanding Camus as part of a distinctive 
pied-noir literary tradition. In these Algerian writings, he espouses a Mediterranean utopia where 
Greece triumphs over Rome, Hellenism over Christianity. I argue these themes not only animate 
Camus’ subsequent ‘cycles’ but form the context of his various attempts to rehabilitate love to 
render it proper for politics. The second section engages with Camus’ understanding of love as 
eros in what he described as his first ‘cycle’ on the theme of absurdity. Exemplified by the figure of 
Sisyphus, it comprised the philosophical essay The Myth of Sisyphus, the novel, The Outsider and the 
play, Caligula. The third section explores how Camus came to understand rebellion as a kind of 
love. Centred on the figure of Prometheus, the ‘cycle’ on the theme of rebellion comprised the 
philosophical essay The Rebel, the novel, The Plague and the play, The Just Assassins. Given my focus 
on Camus’ planned ‘cycles’ and his representation of Algeria, I do not engage with his novel The 
Fall. The novel did not form part of his planned works. Unlike all his major works, it is also set in 
Amsterdam rather than Algeria. Camus never completed his third ‘cycle’ on love that was devoted 
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to the figure of Nemesis. Rather than extrapolate from his diaries and notebooks what this would 
contain, I focus instead in the last section on the vexed question of whether Camus’ thought 
allowed for Algerian rebellion. Phrased differently, I ask whether Camus’ conception of a 
Mediterranean utopia placed limits on who may love. What this chapter contributes is an 
engagement with the important role love plays in Camus’ political thought. In situating his thought 
in a distinctive pied-noir tradition and in reading his literary work alongside his journalism, I hope 
to demonstrate that the ‘particular’ question of Algeria was never severed from his ‘universal’ 
concern with love and rebellion.  
 
Mediterranean Utopias, or Hellenism contra Christianity  
On 8 February 1937, Albert Camus gave a lecture entitled ‘Indigenous Culture: The New 
Mediterranean Culture’ to inaugurate a new Maison de la Culture in Algiers.5 Exalted for its espousal 
of ‘Mediterranean humanism’ and condemned for its latent coloniality, the lecture and its reception 
following the Algerian war of independence represent all the contradictions that have come to 
categorise Camus’ legacy. Indeed, Camus emerges from the lecture as both the disciple of ‘Saint 
Simoniens of the 1830s, whose idea of the Mediterranean can be broadly described as inclusive, 
multicultural and progressive’ and as (unwitting) evangelist of Eurocentric narratives of the ‘mission 
civilisatrice’.6 In this section, I argue that the tension between humanism and colonialism, subsumed 
in (or emanates from) the wider opposition Camus imagines between ‘Greece’ and ‘Rome’, 
‘Hellenism’ and ‘Christianity’. Permeating Camus’ works from the 1930s, I argue it is central to his 
subsequent, shifting reflections on the relationship between love, rebellion and utopia. 
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In ‘Indigenous Culture’, Camus argues that ‘the Mediterranean’ as a category ought to be 
rehabilitated and reclaimed ‘from those who have unjustly appropriated it’.7 Camus’ reformulated 
‘Mediterranean culture’, in turn, is premised on the shared phenomenology of ‘sun’ and ‘sea’, and 
more problematically on linguistic and historic unity. His lecture was an ‘informal manifesto’ of 
the 1930s literary movement Gabriel Audisio described as ‘E’cole d’Alger’.8 Evoking Audisio and 
Grenier, it sought to challenge Algerianisme: the literary school founded in 1921, which mobilised 
Louis Bertrand’s colonial ideology.9 The concept of ‘Latinity’ was central to this. As Patricia Lorcin 
elaborates, ‘Roman Africa’ was ‘at the centre of colonial cultural configurations’.10 Indeed, the link 
between Rome and France had acquired the status of a foundational myth in Algeria.11 The birth 
of a new race, ‘the Latins of Africa’, formed part of this mythology.12 It comprised the children of 
‘Spaniards, Sardinians, Italians, Corsicans and Maltese’ who were, coincidentally, granted French 
citizenship two years prior to emergence of this new race.13 This naturalisation of the children of 
European settlers, in turn, was a bid to both increase the French element of the population, and 
counter the Crimieux Law of 1870, which naturalised Algerian Jews.14 For the French republic, 
which sought to follow Tocqueville’s insight and ‘conquer’ Algeria by replacing ‘the indigenous 
people by the conquering race’,15 the politics of naturalisation and colonisation were intrinsically 
bound. 
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Camus’ critique of ‘Latinity’ in the lecture was clearly directed at the literary and political 
figure, Charles Marie Photius Maurraus, who, along with others, mobilised the concept to 
legitimise Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia.  
For some, the culture of the region is a reflection of Latin antiquity, the antiquity that the 
Renaissance sought beyond the Middle Ages. It is this Latinity that Maurraus and his 
friends are trying to appropriate. Following the Ethiopian invasion, twenty-four Western 
intellectuals sought to defend this Latin order by signing a degrading manifesto extolling 
Italy’s effort to civilize the barbarian African land.16  
 
Camus’ discussion of fascism in the Mediterranean was animated by his concern for its 
consequences for Algerian Jews. Given the historical context of ‘Latinity’, his lecture cannot be 
understood in isolation from French colonialism in Algeria. Camus’ attempt to reimagine the 
Mediterranean, as distinct from ‘Latinity’ bears witness to this acknowledgment.  
The Mediterranean is elsewhere. It is the very negation of Rome and of the Latin genius. 
It is a vibrant culture, which has nothing to do with abstraction. One can readily assent to 
Mussolini’s claim that he is the worthy successor of the Caesars and Augustus of antiquity, 
if by that one means that he, like them, sacrifices truth and grandeur to soulless violence.17 
 
Or again: 
There is only one culture: not the culture that feeds on abstraction and geometry, not the 
culture that condemns, not the culture that justifies the abuse and killing in Ethiopia and 
legitimates the lust for brutal conquest. We know that culture well and want no part of it.18 
 
Or perhaps most explicitly, in his expression of solidarity: ‘We stand here with the Mediterranean 
against Rome’.19 Camus, instead, posits that the ‘new Mediterranean’ ‘began in Athens’.20 Drawing 
on Weberian ideal types, Camus seeks to evoke the art, democracy and pluralism of early ‘Greece’ 
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to negate the violence and imperialism of ‘Rome’. Indeed, ‘Rome’s position as colonizer and 
subjugator…(is) reinforced by the fact that it had colonized Greece itself’21: 
What Rome took from Greece was not the life but rather the puerile abstraction and 
reasoning….What we take from Mediterranean culture is not the taste for reasoning and 
abstraction but the life – the streams, the cypresses, the bouquets of colour. It is Aeschylus, 
not Euripides, the Doric Apollos, not the copies in the Vatican. It is Spain in the sun, not 
the theatrical backdrops in front of which a dictator gets drunk on the sound of his own 
voice and subjugates the mob. What we want is not the lie that triumphed in Ethiopia but 
the truth that is being murdered in Spain22. 
 
Camus’ ‘new Mediterranean culture’ actively denounces nationalism as decadent and 
‘condemned by its deeds’.23 As a self-proclaimed internationalist, the only nationalism he allows 
scope for is phenomenological: ‘the nationalism of sunshine’;24 ‘a certain smell, a fragrance that 
can’t be put into words’,25 the presence of ‘smiles, sun and sea’.26 The emphasis on shared 
phenomena allows Camus to imagine the Mediterranean as distinct from the racially exclusive, 
anti-Semitic construction of ‘Latinity’. In somewhat romantic – what Edward Said might have 
subsequently labelled Orientalising – terms, he describes it as a region marked by the confluence 
of cultures: 
An international zone traversed by many currents, the Mediterranean is perhaps the only 
region in the world that brings together the great eastern philosophies. It is not a classical 
and orderly place but a diffuse and turbulent one, like the Arab quarters of any of its cities 
or the ports of Genoa and Tunisia. The triumphant zest for life, the sense of oppression 
and boredom, the deserted squares of Spain at noontime, the siesta – that is the true 
Mediterranean, and it is closer to the East than to the Latin West. North Africa is one of 
the only regions in which East and West cohabit. At this crossroads, there is no difference 
between the way in which a Spaniard or Italian lives on the Algerian waterfront and the 
way Arabs live in the same neighbourhoods. What is most essential in the Mediterranean 
genius may well emerge from the unique encounter of East and West.27 
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However, as one of Camus’ staunchest critics, Conor Cruise O’Brien notes,  
At the very moment when he wishes to affirm the unity of the Mediterranean world, the 
marriage of East and West, he reveals himself as incapable of thinking in any other 
categories than those of a Frenchman28  
 
Indeed, for all the seeming inclusiveness of a phenomenological nationalism and cultural 
confluence, Camus reveals his ‘Mediterranean truth’ is evident in ‘linguistic unity: the ease, when 
one knows one Latin language, of learning another’ and ‘unity of origin: the prodigious collectivism 
of the Middle Ages, chivalric orders, religious orders, feudalisms, etc’.29 Camus’ categorisations, 
whatever his intent, seem therefore to radically exclude the Arabic speaking, Muslim. Camus’ 
Mediterranean emerges, in the final analysis, premised on an internationalism and humanism that 
is ‘Western’ 
Internationalism is now attempting to restore the Western world’s true meaning and 
vocation. The principle is no longer Christian, however. It is no longer the papal Rome of 
the Holy Roman Empire. The principle is man .30 
 
Camus’ ‘new Mediterranean’, in addition, has a problematic spatio-temporal configuration. For 
Azzedine Haddour, Camus’ emphasis on phenomenology and the ‘perpetual present’ effectively 
erases or renders unimportant the historic injustices of settler colonialism.  
The E’cole d’Alger posed ‘the nondisjunction of opposites’; it projected a vision of a 
reconciled Algeria negating the initial antagonisms between colonizer and colonized. The 
writers of ‘Ecole d’Alger envisaged a Mediterranean Algeria free from racial tension. 
However, their ‘aesthetic of sun’ obfuscated colonial tension with the consequence only 
of perpetuating colonial formation .31 
                                                      
28 Conor Cruise O’Brien, Camus (London: Faber and Faber, 2015)., p. 12. 
29 Camus, Algerian Chronicles., Loc.2134-2138.  
30 Ibid., Loc. 2081.  
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In Camus’ lecture and mid-1930s literary works, Noces, Algeria is reimagined as a utopia: ‘a flight 
into unreality’32 beyond ‘history and politics’.33 It emerges, in effect, a terra nullius to be populated 
by a ‘new’ indigenous culture that assimilates rather than integrates. 
 
 A commitment to assimilation, in fact, formed the cornerstone of Camus’ Algerian politics 
in the 1930s. He was an advocate of the Blum-Violette plan which proposed to offer Algerians 
with educational qualifications and/or French military service full French citizenship alongside 
their right to retain their ‘personal status’ as Muslims. Albeit narrow in scope, the plan was to 
gradually expand franchise to all Algerians over time. As Foxlee notes of its accompanying 
manifesto, Projet Violette: 
Following the official line of not only the Algerian Communist and Socialist parties, but 
also of the Muslim  Congress, the manifesto described the Violette proposal as ‘a stage in 
the complete [integrale] parliamentary emancipation of Muslims 34 
 
It is worth noting that Camus’ biographer, Olivier Todd claims that Projet Violette, was in fact 
written by Camus.35 There is a risk, however, of subscribing to the same presentism Camus is 
accused of. However potent the critique against assimilation is today, in the 1930s advocating for 
the legal equality of Muslims was a deeply subversive act. In fact, the Blum-Violette plan was 
defeated not by the ‘left’ but by European settlers who opposed Arab-Berber franchise. For all his 
colonial contradictions, Camus was a consistent advocate of civil rights for the indigenous 
majority. Indeed Neil Foxlee argues that by the mid 1930s, Camus had been a member of the 
group which campaigned for the end of ‘special and discriminatory legislation for the indigenous 
majority’; helped edit the newspaper of the Muslim group, ENA; collaborated with the reform 
                                                      
32 Ray Davison, “Mythologizing the Mediterranean: The Case of Albert Camus,” Journal of Mediterranean Studies 
10(2000)., p. 78. 
33 Haddour, Colonial Myths., p. 29. 
34 Foxlee, “Contextualizing Camus.”, p. 89.  
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group, Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema, and founded the Franco-Muslim wing of the Maison 
de Culture.36 Prior to the Communist Party’s dissolution of the ENA, Camus was tasked with 
recruiting Arab nationalists and militants. In fact, when the Communist party’s allegiances took a 
pro-Soviet turn, Camus was expelled for refusing to tow the party line and denounce these same 
‘nationalists and militants’ as ‘provocateurs and even fascists’.37 
 
A singular emphasis on Camus’ speech or literary works might support the claim that 
Camus’ mythopoetics of the ‘Mediterranean’ in its recourse to abstraction is the twin of the 
Algerianisme it sought to repudiate. Whereas ‘Latinity’ sought to ‘entrench the colonialist 
position,…the Mediterranean served to transcend colonial specificities’.38 It is implicit in the 
tension Camus constructs between ‘Greece’ and ‘Rome’ which perpetuates a ‘mythic image of an 
Algeria untainted by mythos; …a myth in an ideological vacuum working to absorb Western 
mythos’.39 However, an engagement with Camus’ journalism and the political function of his 
elevation of ‘Greece’ over ‘Rome’ and Christianity renders these claims simplistic. Perhaps this is 
clearest in his eleven articles on the famine in the Kabylie, published in 1939 in the radical 
newspaper, Alger Republicain. The articles were based on extensive fieldwork in a remote area of 
Algeria not traversed by Europeans. Gently humanitarian today, at the time they impelled the 
Algerian Governor General Le Beau to visit Kabylie.40 They also led to the Alger Republicain being 
shut down, Camus being blacklisted as a journalist and what he described as his ‘exile’ to France.41 
Instead of abstraction, the articles are full of particulars; ‘statistics on food supplies, nutrition, 
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famine and education’.42 They critique the European origins of the caid system;43 the ‘artificial 
barrier between European and indigenous schools’;44 ‘the unpardonable self-interest’45 of 
European settlers which give rise to the ‘slave labour’ of the people of Kabylie.46 Appealing against 
‘charity, limited experiments, good intentions, and idle words,’47 Camus calls for justice cognisant 
of the fact that: 
We managed to come with the money to give the countries of Europe nearly 400 billion 
francs, all of which is now gone forever. It seems unlikely that we cannot come up with 
one-hundredth that amount to improve the lot of people whom we have not yet made 
French, to be sure, but from whom we demand the sacrifices of French citizens.48 
 
None of this is to suggest Camus’ articles on Kabylie are without limitation. Camus’ work in the 
1930s are paternalistic and riddled with all the contradictions of an anti-imperialist settler-colonial. 
Thus, in the same set of articles, he proclaims: 
It was there that I discovered the meaning of my investigation. If there is any conceivable 
excuse for the colonial conquest, it has to lie in helping the conquered peoples to retain 
their distinctive personality. And if we French have any duty here, it is to allow one of the 
proudest and most humane peoples in this world to keep faith with itself and its destiny.49 
 
Unable to abandon recourse to the civilising mission even as he seeks to subvert hierarchies, 
Camus urges his readers: 
Let us learn, at least, to beg pardon for our feverish need for power, the natural bent of 
mediocre people, by taking upon ourselves the burdens and needs of a wiser people, so as 
to deliver it unto its profound grandeur.50  
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Camus never offered a systematic, structural critique of colonialism like his Jewish Tunisian 
contemporary Albert Memmi did some two decades later.51 Despite his paternalism, however, his 
journalism evinces a profound concern with the implications of what he effectively describes as 
economic, educational and racial apartheid. This diagnosis emanates from rather than is obfuscated 
by his ‘humanism’:  
It is despicable to say that these people don’t have the same needs we do. If they don’t, 
then it is high time we showed them what they are missing. It is curious to note how the 
alleged qualities of a people are used to justify the debased condition in which they are 
kept, and how the proverbial sobriety of the Kabyle peasant lends legitimacy to his hunger. 
This is not the right way to look at things, and it is not the way we will look at things, 
because preconceived ideas and prejudices become odious when applied to a world in 
which people are freezing to death and children are reduced to foraging like animals even 
though they lack the instincts that would prevent them eating things that will kill them. 
The truth is that we are living everyday alongside people whose condition is that of the 
European peasantry of three centuries ago, and yet we, and we alone, are unmoved by their 
desperate plight’52  
 
Camus’ entire corpus hinges on the mythic and Eurocentric tension he constructs between 
Rome and Greece. Paul Archambault rightly questions the veracity of Camus’ classical sources.53 
He might add Camus’ work was ahistorical too. Nowhere is there reference to Greece’s military 
imperialism or Rome’s Republic. Camus’ objective, however, was not to provide historical 
commentary but to imagine a triumphant Greece as the basis of his ‘new Mediterranean’. His 
passage from Noces sums this up. 
Yes, it is true. Men and societies have succeeded one another in this place; conquerors 
have marked this country with their noncommissioned officer’s civilization. They had a 
vulgar and ridiculous idea of greatness, measuring the grandeur of their empire by the 
surface it covered. The miracle is that the ruin of their civilization is the very negation of 
their ideal. For this skeleton town, seen from high above as evening closes in and white 
flights of pigeons circle around the triumphal arch, engraved no signs of conquest or 
ambition on the sky. The world always conquers history in the end’54  
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As Alfred Zimmern’s Greek Commonwealth would attest, the ‘utopia’ of Ancient Greece had been 
previously evoked to legitimise imperial order. However, unlike Zimmern, Camus mobilises this 
mythic Greece to critique rather than justify. In December 1937 – about six months after his 
speech on the Mediterranean – Camus began drafting his articles on Kabylie. His first piece, 
entitled, ‘Greece in Rags’ begins with a description of Kabylie – much like the opening of Noces – 
evoking a Greece he was yet to visit. However, the article soon ‘turned travelogue into social 
protest: In no other country is the human body more mutilated that Kabylia’.55 Rather than 
(indigenous) Algeria being annihilated by a Mythic Greece, Camus returns to it to indict France.  
 
The abstractions of Greece versus Rome, Hellenism contra Christianity play a particular 
political function in Camus’ thought. Perhaps this is most clearly articulated in Camus’ 1936 
dissertation, Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism. An intellectual history of sorts, its main aims 
were to explore the ‘relations between Christianity and Hellenism’ and to ‘deal with the role of 
Neoplatonism in the evolution of Christian thought’.56 Camus’ classical scholarship is often flawed, 
but what emerges from his thesis is the conviction that the ‘principle themes of Christianity – 
Incarnation, Philosophy according to history, the misery and sorrow of the human condition’ 
substitute a ‘“Christian Man” for a “Greek Man”’.57 Much like Hellenism and Latinity, the ‘Greek’ 
is the antithesis of the ‘Christian’. Whereas ‘all Greek philosophy makes its sages God’s equals’, 
‘the irreducible originality of Christianity is the theme of Incarnation’.58 Whereas Greek time is 
cyclical, Christian time is linear.59 Whereas ‘moral evil is ignorance or error’ in Greek thought, in 
Christianity it becomes sin.60 Whereas the ‘Greek’ seeks to cultivate virtue; the Christian relies on 
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the divine arbitrariness of salvation and grace.61 Whereas Greek reason is embodied, passionate, 
alive and inheres in Beauty; in Christianity it is reduced to its role as ‘logical legislator’.62 For Camus, 
they constitute fundamentally different sentimental postulates.63 Epitomised in the differences he 
enunciates between his fellow North Africans, Plotinus and Augustine, this tension animates all of 
Camus’ works. Ronald Srigley is persuasive in his claim that all Camus’ works were versions of 
Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism.64 Indeed, over his short and productive career, Camus 
described the ‘passage from Hellenism to Christianity’ as ‘the true and only turning point in 
history’.65 He described himself as ‘the son of Greek philosophy’; as being ‘born in a pagan land 
in Christian times’; as ‘closer to the values of the classical world than to those of Christianity’.66 In 
fact, this opposition between Greece and Rome, Hellenism and Christianity animate Camus’ three 
meticulously planned ‘cycles’ of work organised around the themes of Absurdity or ‘Sisyphus’; 
Rebellion or ‘Prometheus’ and Love or ‘Nemesis’. Camus argued Christianity’s chief 
accomplishment was to ‘intellectualise’ and ‘humanise’ ‘sentimental themes’ 67 thus paving the path 
for the acceptance of its ‘providentialism, creationism, philosophy of history, a taste for humility’.68 
Given his contention that the fundamental difference between Greek and Christian thought exists 
on the ‘affective’ or ‘sentimental’ plane,69 it is only fitting that the rest of chapter should focus on 
Camus’ attempt to reclaim and rehabilitate ‘love’ for politics. 
 
 
                                                      
61 Ibid.. 
62 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
63 Ibid., p. 87.  
64 See ‘Translator’s Introduction’, Camus, Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism., pp. 1-2. 
65 Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (London: Penguin, 2013)., p. 305. 
66 Matthew Sharpe, Camus, Philosophe , p. 31. 
67 Camus, Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism., p. 65. 
68 Camus, Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism., p. 130.   
69 Camus, Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism., p. 39 and 65.  
 177 
Sisyphus, Christ and the Arab 
 Camus organised his first ‘cycle’ on absurdity around the Homeric-Hesiodic figure of 
Sisyphus. Published between 1942 and 1944, the ‘cycle’ comprised the philosophical essay The 
Myth of Sisyphus, the novel The Outsider, and the play Caligula. In this ‘cycle’, I argue that the love 
Camus idealises is eros. It entails an affirmation of life Camus deemed so central to living lucidly in 
an absurd world. However, this Greek ‘eros’ is anathema to Latin totalitarianism. Dissatisfied with 
its transience, its leads the (Roman) Caligula on a murderous rampage. The antithesis of agape, it is 
repugnant to the kind of Christian morality Camus claims underpins the French judicial system in 
The Outsider. However, to the extent that it appears indifferent to the murder of an Arab in The 
Outsider, I ask whether this eros is altercidal. 
 
The Myth of Sisyphus 
The Absurd ‘cycle’ emerged ‘amidst the French and European disaster’.70 This historical 
context is relevant to the content of The Myth of Sisyphus which questions whether ‘within the limits 
of nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism’.71 In sum, the text is an 
engagement with the question of whether suicide is legitimate. Accepting the absurd as his ‘sole 
datum’,72 Camus seeks to proceed within the limits of lucid reason.73 Absurdity, for Camus, means 
‘it’s impossible’ but also ‘it’s contradictory’.74 It is born from the confrontation between ‘desire’ 
and ‘disappointment’, between ‘the wild (human) longing for clarity’ and the ‘unreasonable silence 
of the world’.75 Remaining lucid – the absurd ‘method’ –  requires the acknowledgement both of 
‘the appetite for the absolute and for unity and the impossibility of reducing this world to a rational 
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and reasonable principle’.76 As Hochberg notes, there is nothing inherent about this tension.77 The 
eros for the absolute, he argues, really betrays Camus’ monism, which in turn is premised on a 
Plotinian presumption of ‘unity’.78 Similarly, it highlights Camus’ privileging of this methodological 
empiricism over his commitment to monism, evident when Camus declares: 
I can refute everything in this world surrounding me that offends or enraptures me, except 
this chaos, this sovereign chance and this divine equivalence which springs from anarchy. 
I don’t know whether this world has a meaning that transcends it. But I know that I do 
not know that meaning and that it is impossible for me just now to know it. What can a 
meaning outside my condition mean to me? I can understand only in human terms. What 
I touch, what resists me – this is what I understand.79  
 
Living lucidly, for Camus, 
implies total absence of hope (which has nothing to do with despair), a continual rejection 
(which must not be confused with renunciation), a conscious dissatisfaction (which must 
not be compared to immature unrest). Everything that destroys, conjures away, or 
exercises these requirements (and, to begin with, consent which overthrows divorce) ruins 
the absurd.80  
Its chief implication is a rejection of Christian metaphysics, which for Camus finds expression in 
theological and secular forms of nostalgia (or escapism) and eschatology (end of history/final 
judgment narratives). Modifying Kierkegaard’s conception of sin, Camus says the absurd is ‘sin 
without God’.81 Returning to Augustinian imagery of his Master’s dissertation, he argues, living 
lucidly necessitates a belief in the spatio-temporal enclosure of the saeclum (or the plane where the 
City of God and Man comingle). In what I read as an explicit evocation of Chapter 9 of The 
Confessions, Camus asserts: 
There is God or time, the cross or this sword. This world has a higher meaning that 
transcends its worries or nothing is true but those worries. One must live with time and 
die with it or elude it for a greater life.82  
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Rather than result in a rejection of ethics, Camus’ acknowledgment of absurdity merely rejects the 
possibility that any ethical system can derive from metaphysics. It gives rise to an epistemological 
humility which entails a recognition of moral equivalence, which is not the same as moral sanction. 
The absurd does not liberate, it binds. It does not authorize all actions. Everything is 
permitted does not mean that nothing is forbidden. The absurd merely confers an 
equivalence on the consequences of those actions. It does not recommend crime, for this 
would be childish, but restores to remorse its futility. Likewise, if all experiences are 
indifferent, that of duty is as legitimate as any other. One can be virtuous through a whim.83  
 
Camus’ rejection of metaphysics and consequently the theological concepts of Incarnation 
and Redemption, would seem to entail a rejection of any faith in the soteriology of love. In a world 
where all meaning is made, a prescriptive ethico-politics of love is inherently problematic. As he 
elaborates in The Myth of Sisyphus,  
What we call love binds us to certain creatures only by reference to a collective way of 
seeing for which books and legends are responsible. But the love I know only the mixture 
of desire, affection and intelligence that binds me to this or that creature. The compound 
is not the same for another person. I do not have the right to cover all these experiences 
with the same name.84  
Rather than reject love as irrelevance, his idolisation of Ancient Greece leads to his embrace of 
love as eros. Camus conceives of eros as a form of knowing, and (somewhat inconsistently) the life-
affirming basis of lucidity. For Camus, eros is a form of knowing because it mirrors the absurdity 
of life. In his Notebooks, he thus observes: ‘Death gives shape to love as it does to life’.85 In the play 
Caligula, the eponymous dictator devastated by the death of his lover (and sister), Drusilla, despairs, 
‘I’ve learnt the truth about love; it’s nothing, nothing!’.86 Erosic love is too fleeting, too unwieldy to 
be prescriptive.  
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On what should the heart base its actions? Love? Nothing is less reliable. We can know 
what the pains of love are like, but not love itself. Here, it is deprivation, regret and empty 
hands. I shall never have the courage; I am left with anguish. A hell where everything 
presupposes paradise. It is hell, nevertheless. What I call life and love is whatever leaves 
me empty. Departure, constraint, breaches of love or friendship, my heart scattered in 
darkness within me, this salt taste of tears and love.87  
 
Writing about Sartre’s Being and Nothingness in the early 1940s, Camus again reflected, ‘Nothing can 
be based on love: it is flight, anguish, wonderful moments or hasty fall’.88 Eros in its mirroring of 
absurdity entails for Camus an affirmation of life. For Camus, his mythological Mediterranean 
man, Don Juan, exemplifies erosic love. Don Juan’s appeal to Camus lies in the fact that ‘the love 
(that disturbs) Don Juan…knows itself to be mortal. Don Juan has chosen to be nothing’.89 
Cognisant of the impossibility of love and knowledge, the totalitarian Caligula goes on a nihilistic 
rampage. In contrast, Don Juan, embraces eros, ‘Loving and possessing, conquering and consuming 
– that is his way of knowing’.90 Camus was a polyamorist and this celebration of Don Juan had an 
obvious romantic dimension. However, for Camus, Don Juan also endorses an ‘ethic of quantity’ 
rather than ‘quality’, 91 an affirmation of life as the only good. To turn to Camus’ central figure of 
Sisyphus, damned to roll a rock up a hill for choosing this life over an after life, eros entails the 
lucid affirmation of an absurd life. 
He is, as much through his passions as through his torture. His scorn of the gods, his 
hatred of death, and his passion for life won him that unspeakable being is exerted towards 
accomplishing nothing. That is the price that must be paid for the passions of this earth.92 
 
In Camus’ novel The Outsider he imagines this ethic embodied in the protagonist, Meursault. 
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The Outsider 
As Sandra Smith observes, the French title ‘L’etranger’ conjures up the notion that the 
novel’s protagonist ‘Meursault is a stranger to himself, an outsider to society and a foreigner 
because he is a Frenchman in Algeria’.93 Illuminating Camus’ thesis on absurdity, the novel 
juxtaposes the lucid man, Meursault, alongside a judicial system that turns to metaphysics for 
morality. It declines, as Camus’ absurd man does in The Myth of Sisyphus ‘to explain the world, it 
wants to be merely a description of actual experience’.94 Thus, it tells of Meursault’s mother’s death 
in an old-age home, of Meursault’s interactions with Salamano, Raymond and Marie, Meursault’s 
murder of an Arab and his subsequent trial and execution through a first-person narrator whose 
‘physical sensations often got in the way of (their) emotions’.95 The entire plot hinges on the 
absurdity that ‘accused of murder (Meursault) was executed for not crying at his mother’s 
funeral’.96 Meursault appears to be the man Camus’ Mediterranean mythologises. Until the 
moment of his execution, his love of life exemplifies what Camus described in The Myth of Sisyphus 
as the ‘ethic of quantity’. To the extent that the French judicial system finds his lucid love 
objectionable, or incomprehensible, Camus mobilises eros as a form of political critique. To the 
extent that this critique is predicated on the murder and the erasure of the Arab, it is worth 
questioning to what extent this exaltation of eros was ‘altercidal’. 
 
One of the greatest ironies of The Outsider is the judicial system’s inability to recognise that 
Meursault ‘undoubtedly loved (his) Mama very much’, just ‘that it didn’t mean anything’.97 Indeed 
aside from his love of life, Meursault’s only certainty was his love for his mother. He returns to 
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her memory in his apartment,98 when he hears Salamano cry,99 on that fateful day on the beach,100 
in prison and before his execution.101 It is expressed in his passionate cry: ‘No one – no one – had 
the right to cry over her’.102 Meursault’s verdict then ultimately hinges not on his actions, not even 
on his emotions, but the extent to which these emotions conformed to the form prescribed by 
Church and State. Camus claimed Meursault was ‘the only Christ we deserved’.103 He elaborated 
that Meursault was willing ‘to die rather than lie’. In sum, he refused to ‘play the game’.104 Perhaps 
this was a bit disingenuous. Meursault was willing to lie and play the game when he deemed a 
matter to be of no consequence, for example, Raymond’s Arab mistress and her subsequent 
assault. Meursault merely did not lie when it came to metaphysics. Consequently, he repeatedly 
refuses redemption first from the Judge and then from the priest. Bearing witness to moral 
equivalence, he tells the priest 
Everyone was privileged. There was no one who wasn’t privileged. All those others, they 
too would one day be condemned to death. He as well, he too would be condemned to 
death. What did it matter if accused of murder he was not crying at his mother’s funeral? 
Salamano’s dog was as important as his wife. The little robotic lady was just as guilty as 
Marie, who wanted me to marry her. What difference did it make if Raymond was my 
friend as well as Celeste, who was a better person than him?105 
However, it is worth noting that while the knowledge of moral equivalence leads Caligula to 
murder with impunity, for Meursault it inhibits regret but not a sense of responsibility.  
I would have liked to explain to him, politely, almost with a hint of emotion, that I have 
never truly been able to regret anything. I was always preoccupied by what was about to 
happen, either today or tomorrow. But given the position I was in, I couldn’t actually speak 
to anyone that way. I didn’t have the right to show I had feelings or good intentions 106 
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Or again, 
When I was leaving, I was even going to stretch out my hand to shake his, but I 
remembered just in time that I’d killed a man107  
 
 
The Outsider critiques a judicial system which – unable to detect a sense of responsibility in 
the absence of regret – executes a man not for murder but for a failure to appropriately emote. 
For Conor Cruise O’Brien and generations of postcolonial scholars who followed suit, the novel 
can only articulate this absurdity by rendering the Arab irrelevant.  
But it is not easy to make the killing of the man irrelevant; in fact it can hardly be done 
unless one is led in some way to regard the man as not quite a man. And this is what 
happens. The Europeans in the book have names…The man who is shot has no name 
and his relation to the narrator and his friends is not that of one human being to 
another….When the narrator shoots down this blank and alien being and fires…the reader 
does not quite feel that Meursault has killed a man. He has killed an Arab.108 
 
The more invisible and insignificant the Arab becomes, the more Camus partakes in the settler 
colonial crime of erasure. Haddour, building on this reading, suggests this Camus’ ‘zero degree 
writing’ perpetrates this violence.109 It operates as an extension of a self-involved, hyper-present 
Mediterranean utopianism that must exterminate whatever transgresses the sanctity of sun and sea, 
be it ‘beggar, dog or Arab’.110 To the extent that Meursault embodies the aforementioned ‘ethic of 
quantity’, the Mediterranean myth triumphs – however briefly – and reveals itself to be ‘altercidal’. 
After all, Meursault facilitates a series of events that leads to the entrapment and abuse of an Arab 
woman, the exoneration of her assailant and then the murder of her brother. The text can only 
succeed in eliciting sympathy for Meursault as the universal, absurd man via the forgetting of this 
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sequence of events.111 The sympathetic reader therefore emerges with Meursault, and by extension 
with the author of The Outsider, as complicit in the crimes of colonialism. 
 
For David Carroll, there is much that is problematic about this narrative. For one, it fails 
to recognise that  
Everything depends on what it means in the novel to be a stranger to society, an Other – 
and perhaps even more important, on the significance of the fact that Meursault is 
condemned to death in the novel not for the murder of an anonymous Arab but for 
occupying the place of the Other.112 
 
Meursault’s repeated refusal of Christian salvation cast him in the place of the unassimilable 
Arab.113 Thus while the murder of the Arab elicits no interest from the metropolitan press, the 
deicide by ‘this Anti-Christ’ does. Carroll’s reading is compatible with a Camusian Mediterranean 
mythology that seeks ultimately to reimagine citizenry in solidarity with the alienated Muslim (and 
Jew). Indeed, Meursault occupies the often problematic, Orientalised, ‘shadowy’ world of the Arab 
that is populated in the novel by the sex worker, leper and prisoner. Camus appears to acknowledge 
as much, in an earlier journalistic piece, where he describes Arab prisoners being transported as 
being ‘stricken off the list of humanity’.114 Contrary to the popular claim that no Arab speaks in 
the novel, this reading is lent credence by the fact that Arabs do speak in the novel but only when 
they mistake Meursault to be on equal footing with them.  
The day I was arrested, I was locked up in a room with several prisoners, most of them 
Arabs. They laughed when they saw me. They asked me what I’d done. I said I’d killed an 
Arab and they all went quiet.115 
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Perhaps, it is expressed most poignantly in the parallel physical positions Meursault and the 
murdered Arab occupy when they lie down on their backs with their hands under their head 
contemplating the sun before their respective deaths.116 In my reading, this sun neither illuminates 
a perpetual present nor facilitates an evasion of responsibility. Rather, it evokes what Camus 
previously articulated as a phenomenological basis for solidarity. Indeed, it is the one experience 
in the novel that links Meursault to his mother, lover, and the man he murders. 
 
In his marginalia, Camus wrote the Arab in The Outsider was to act as a cipher.117 Indeed, 
in The Myth of Sisyphus, he argued ‘The only conception of freedom I can have is that of the prisoner 
or the individual in the midst of the State’.118 The trial for the murder of the first nameless then 
forgotten Arab incarnates the murderous logic of a justice and colonial system that like Meursault 
renders the Arab irrelevant. This is central to the plot, but I argue it is not in the way that O’Brien 
and his followers attest. Instead, to whatever extent Meursault occupies the place of the Arab when 
he is imprisoned and executed, to whatever extent the Arab is central to the narrative as cipher, 
the universal man is not Meursault. The universal man is the Arab that Meursault first kills and 
then dies like. If the absence of metaphysical certainty led the (Roman emperor) Caligula to 
murder, an embrace of metaphysical certainty resulted in the same murder by the (Christian) 
colonial State. The question of how to act in a totalitarian system born of either logic forms the 
basis of Camus’ next ‘cycle’ on ‘Rebellion’. 
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Prometheus, Saints and Men 
Camus came to conclude that the absurd taught nothing.119 His ‘cycle’ on rebellion 
published between 1947 and 1951, therefore embraces the figure of Prometheus. The ‘cycle’ 
comprises the philosophical essay The Rebel, the novel The Plague and the play Just Assassins. Some 
read this ‘cycle’ as signifying a radical break in Camus’ thought. Indeed, it coincided with his volte 
face on capital punishment for war-time collaborators and his growing disillusionment with 
communism. Understood as the articulation of his newfound moralism following the Second 
World War, The Rebel led to Camus’ estrangement from Jean Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and 
Merleau Ponty and his embrace by Simone Weil, Hannah Arendt and Martin Buber. While I 
suspect Matthew Sharpe’s representation of Camus as a systematic philosopher and virtue ethicist 
is perhaps overstated, I suggest there are more continuities than discontinuities between both 
‘cycles’. As Camus affirms, absurdity is about understanding suffering in the singular, rebellion is 
about resisting it for the plural.  
In absurdist experience suffering is individual. But from the moment that a movement of 
rebellion begins, suffering is seen as a collective experience – as the experience of 
everyone.120 
 
Similarly, if the absurd ‘cycle’ exalts eros as the affirmation of one’s own life, as Thomas Merton 
argues its logic lays the premise for the love of other.121 
 
The Rebel 
 For Camus, rebellion against the ‘irrational’, ‘incomprehensible’ and ‘unjust’ is the sole 
datum of the absurdist experience’.122 He defines rebellion as a ‘refusal (that) does not imply a 
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renunciation’.123 In sum, it comprises both a ‘no’ and a ‘yes’.124 While the ‘no’ attests to the existence 
of ‘limits’, the ‘yes’ affirms ‘the existence of certain things beyond limits’ the rebel wishes to 
preserve.125 Camus did not consider himself an existentialist because he believed, with the Greeks, 
that essence preceded existence. For him, rebellion revealed this ‘essence’.  
Rebellion, though apparently negative since it creates nothing, is profoundly positive in 
that it reveals the part of man which must always be defended126 
 
Rebellion thus affirms a common humanity and forms the foundation for fraternity.  
In our daily trials, rebellion plays the same role as does the ‘cogito’ in the category of 
thought: it is the first clue. But this clue lures the individual from his solitude. Rebellion is 
the common ground on which every man bases his first values. I rebel – therefore we 
exist.127 
 
Yet, this rebellion gave rise to a paradox: ‘I rebel, therefore we exist’ but when ‘one single human 
being is missing in the world of fraternity then this world is immediately depopulated. If we are 
not, then I am not…’128 Camus claimed The Rebel proposed ‘to follow, into the realm of murder 
and revolt, a mode of thinking that began with suicide and the idea of the absurd’.129 Indeed, if The 
Myth of Sisyphus questioned the legitimacy of suicide, The Rebel questions the legitimacy of murder 
and suggests both questions are inextricably linked. 
The moment life is recognized as a necessary good, it becomes so for all men. One cannot 
find logical consistency in murder, if one denies it in suicide.130 
 
Camus’ preoccupation with murder, in turn, is premised on his tragic acceptance that to rebel is 
to seek to transform, ‘but to transform is to act, and to act, nowadays, is to kill’.131 In The Rebel, 
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Camus thus asks whether political action is possible in an absurd world. He argues this question is 
of utmost importance: 
We shall be capable of nothing until we know whether we have a right to kill our fellow-men, 
or the right to let them be killed. Since all contemporary action leads to murder, direct or 
indirect, we cannot act until we know whether, and why, we have the right to kill.’132 
If Camus posits absurdity as the mean between nihilism and nostalgia, he posits rebellion as 
the mean between the utopianism of ‘absolute non- violence’ and ‘systematic violence’.133 He 
rejects both forms of utopianism as forms of ‘religiosity’ and ‘violence’. He argues this is reflected 
in their orientations towards time: in their ‘the philosophy of eternity’ and their attempt to replace 
‘God by the future’.134 This faith in a kingdom to come or ‘eternal city’ renders time and suffering 
irrelevant, punishment permissible.135 It leads what he describes as the ‘oscillation’ between 
‘sacrifice and murder’.136 Instead he posits rebellion affirms a limit: 
Heraclitus, the inventor of the constant change of things, nevertheless set a limit to this 
perpetual process. This limit was symbolized by nemesis, the goddess of moderation and the 
implacable enemy of the immoderate. A process of thought which wanted to take into account 
the contemporary contradictions of rebellion should seek its inspiration from this goddess.137 
 
However sympathetic Camus may have seemed following the Second World War to pacifism, he 
ultimately saw it as a form of nostalgia, the negative basis of slavery. Defending himself against 
the charge of pacifism, he claimed,  
I preach neither nonviolence…nor, as the jokers say, saintliness. I believe that violence is 
inevitable, the years of Occupation taught me as much…So I shall not say that we must do 
away with all violence, which would be desirable but is actually utopian. I say only that we 
must refuse all legitimization of violence, whether this legitimization of violence, whether this 
legitimization comes from absolute reasons of state or from a totalitarian philosophy. 
Violence is inevitable and at the same time unjustifiable. I think we should set a limit to 
                                                      
132 Ibid., p. vii. 
133 Camus, The Rebel.,p. 233. 
134 Ibid., p. 228 and p. 157. 
135 Ibid., p. 156. 
136 Ibid.,p. 222. 
137 Ibid., p. 238. 
 189 
violence, restrict it to certain quarters when it is inevitable, dampen its terrifying effects by 
preventing it from going to the limit of its fury. I loathe comfortable violence138  
 
Camus’ similarly invoked rebellion to critique ‘systematic violence’. In The Rebel, he elucidates this 
via the contrast he constructs between ‘rebellion’ and ‘revolution’. Thus rebellion seeks ‘unity’, 
revolution ‘totality’; rebellion is ‘creative’, revolution is ‘nihilist’; rebellion is ‘dedicated to creation’, 
revolution negates it;139 rebellion elevates the means, revolution the ends.140 Fundamentally 
different orientations towards time, rebellion prefers ‘We are’ to the ‘We shall be’.141 Fundamentally 
different orientations towards knowledge: ‘If…rebellion could found a philosophy it would be a 
philosophy of limits, of calculated ignorance, and of risk.142 Ultimately however, rebellion is distinct 
from revolution because it is animated by a different kind of love and thus affirms a different 
fraternity.  
He who loves his friend loves him in the present and revolution only wants to love a man 
who has not yet appeared. To love is, in a certain way, to kill the perfect man who is going 
to be born of the revolution.143  
 
Camus’ play, The Just Assassins, attempts to articulate how the different loves of the rebel 
and the revolutionary affirm different visions of fraternity. Set in Moscow in 1906, it tells the story 
of a terrorist cell tasked with killing the Grand Duke. Albeit both committed to the cause, Stepan 
Federov is the quintessential revolutionary and Ivan Kaliayev (Yanek) the quintessential rebel. 
Stepan Federov in his yearning for future, understands the ends justifying the means. He would 
kill two children to save thousands of children, he would ‘blow the world to pieces’ for his love of 
justice.144 Yanek in contrast, loves life, prioritises the present, and understands the means as 
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justifying the end. He kills the Grand Duke but refuses to do so when there is a risk he might kill 
two children. He kills the Grand Duke for the love of his fellow men but demands the gallows, 
choosing ‘death to prevent murder from triumphing in the world’.145 Articulating the ethic of the 
rebel, he says,  
I love the men who are alive today…and who walk on the same earth as I do! It is for 
them that I am fighting, and it is for them that I am ready to lay down my life! I shall not 
strike my brothers in the face for the sake of some unknown…distant city! I refuse to add 
to the living injustice around me for the sake of a…dead…injustice.146  
 
Although Camus’ conception of rebellion seemingly denounces utopianism, it continues 
to affirm his vision of a ‘Mediterranean utopia’. Returning once again to the opposition between 
‘Greece’ and ‘Rome’, ‘Hellenism’ and ‘Christianity’, ‘Nature’ and ‘History’, Camus clarifies, 
‘Thought at the Meridian’ privileges the world over history, men over divinity, the means over the 
ends.147 It is embodied in Camus’ conception of a rebellious love. 
Then we understand that rebellion cannot exist without a strange form of love. Those who 
find no rest in God or in history are condemned to live for those who, like themselves, 
cannot live: in fact, for the humiliated.148 
 
Underpinned by presentism and an affirmation of life and the world, it is hardly surprising that 
The Rebel was warmly received by Arendt who had just completed The Origins of Totalitarianism and 
was about to embark on The Human Condition.149 Although Camus’ characterisation of this ethic of 
love is resonant with Arendt’s privileging of cupiditas over caritas, although his affirmation of the 
world over history finds echoes in her notion of amor mundi, Arendt’s thought precludes emotion 
while for Camus the two are inseparable. Rather than reject love (as caritas or agape) as the most 
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‘antipolitical’ of human emotions,150 in his ‘cycle’ on rebellion, Camus therefore seeks to 
rehabilitate it. Much like the love of Prometheus, it is self-giving without being soteriological. In 
other words, it rejects the injustice of grace (and in fact, all eschatology). Consequently, Camus 
substitutes ‘Pisarev’s truth’ for the Pascalian wager: 
If man is the image of God then it does not matter that he is deprived of human love; the 
day will come when he will be satiated with it. But if he is a blind creature, wandering in 
the darkness of a cruel and circumscribed condition, he has a need for his equals and of 
their ephemeral love.151  
 
Camus writes of ‘a holy man…unable to endure the idea that a single soul was damned, he wanted 
to be damned too’.152 Modifying Johannine scripture, he writes, ‘It involved the love that is greater 
than all: the love of the man who gives his soul for a friend’.153 Camus’ reworked grace resembles 
philia –  
When I was young, I expected people to give me more than they could – continuous 
friendship, permanent emotion. Now I have learned to expect less of them than they can 
give – a silent companionship. And their emotions, their friendship, and noble gestures 
keep their full miraculous value in my eyes; wholly the fruit of grace154. 
 
Camus’ masterpiece The Plague articulates what he understood this praxis of philia to entail.  
 
The Plague 
 The novel The Plague is about the disease’s outbreak in the Algerian town of Oran. The 
Plague celebrates the momentary triumph of what Camus describes as ‘the strange kind of love’ 
that animates rebellion. However, the metaphor of the ‘plague’ has attracted some criticism. It is 
variously read as a turn to metaphysics that absolves humans of moral responsibility or as an 
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abstraction which in its seeming expansiveness entails the forgetting of Algerian colonialism. In 
what follows, I argue that if Camus’ expansive construction of ‘the plague’ bears witness to a 
humanist concern for the universal, his bounded construction of love bears witness to a political 
praxis which prioritises the particular.  
 
The Plague is about a rebellion against ‘the irrational’, ‘the incomprehensible’ and ‘the 
unjust’.155 Reading the ‘plague’ as a metaphor for Nazism, Susan Neiman, like Simone de Beauvoir 
before her,156 takes umbrage with Camus’ suggestion that “What is natural is the microbe”.157 The 
notion that  
the plague bacillus never dies or vanishes entirely, that it can remain dormant for dozens 
of years in furniture of clothing, that it waits patiently in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, 
handkerchiefs and old papers, and that perhaps the day will come when, for the instruction 
or misfortune of mankind, the plague will rouse rats and send them to die in some well-
contented city158  
 
for Neiman ‘comes perilously close to absolving particular human beings of 
responsibility’.159However, this reading ignores that Camus’ consistent commitment to the tragic 
entailed a refutation of an Augustinian conception of evil. Understanding evil as ‘the ignorance 
that thinks it knows everything and which consequently authorizes itself to kill’,160for Camus ‘what 
matters…is not to follow things back to their origins, but, the world being what it is, to know how 
to live in it’.161 It is expressed in Dr Rieux’s protestation to the Health Commission: ‘…it doesn’t 
matter whether you call it plague or growing pains. All that matters is that you stop it killing half 
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the town’.162 To understand Camus’ terminology of ‘the plague’ as evading questions of human 
agency is to fundamentally misunderstand Camus’ philosophy. It ignores the Pelagianism that 
underscores Camus’ thought. Camus understands absurdity as presenting us with a choice. “1) if 
the basic concern is the need for unity; 2) if the world (or God) cannot suffice. It is up to man to 
forge a unity for himself, either by turning away from the world, or within the world”.163 This 
interpretation suggests that Camus transposes ‘evil’ into the ‘tragic’ and ‘earthly’ questions of life, 
death and human agency. Therefore, while Camus might believe the plague is ‘natural’, he also 
states that ‘the rest – health, integrity, purity, if you like – are an effect of a will and a will that must 
never relax’.164 This makes Germaine Bree’s reading of the Plague compelling: 
The plague, therefore, in whatever context we consider it, symbolizes any force which 
systematically cuts human beings off from the living breath of life […] In a very general 
way it is death and, in human terms, all that enters into complicity with death: metaphysical 
or political systems, bureaucratic abstractions, and even Tarrou’s and Paneloux’s efforts to 
transcend their humanity.165  
Affirmed by Merton, in his reading the plague is a 
death dance, this propensity to pestilence, is something more than mere mortality. It is the 
wilful negation of life that is built into life itself: the human instinct to dominate and to 
destroy – to seek one’s own happiness by destroying the happiness of others, to build one’s 
security on power and, by extension, to justify evil use of that power in terms of ‘history,’ 
or of ‘the common good,’ or of ‘the revolution,’ or even of ‘the justice of God’.166 
 
Or in the words of Dr Rieux’s Spanish asthmatic: ‘But what does it mean, the plague? It’s life, 
that’s all’.167  
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Conor Cruise O’Brien argues this very expansiveness conceals the erasure of Algerian 
colonialism. O’Brien’s entire thesis rests on emphasising absences. Consequently, he contends, The 
Plague performs an ‘artistic final solution of the problem of the Arabs of Oran’.168 For other 
commentators, whatever might be admirable about Camus’ rhetoric about fascism and Nazism, it 
could not have possibly extended to the question of colonialism because Camus renders an 
Algerian town a European one, devoid of Arabs.169In fairness to Camus, he intended to use the 
plague as a metaphor that applied to all forms of what he would term ‘systematic violence’. The 
prelude to the book, from Daniel Defoe, makes this clear enough: 
It is reasonable to represent one kind of imprisonment by another, as it is to represent 
anything that really exists by that which exists not.170  
 
In fact, the question of Algerian colonialism is not only mentioned in The Plague but the novel’s 
rich metaphor of ‘health’ is used to signal that the ‘disease’ of Algerian colonialism predates those 
of the twentieth century. Thus, when the French journalist, Rambert interviews Dr Rieux about 
‘the living conditions of the Arabs…and their state of health, Dr Rieux told him that their health 
was not good’.171 In fact, Dr Rieux refuses to further cooperate with Rambert when Rambert 
reveals he is unable to ‘countenance a report without reservations’.172   
 
That Camus’ concern with the questions of Nazism or Fascism in The Plague or indeed 
Communism in the The Rebel created some cognitive dissonance about colonialism cannot be 
sustained. His journalism, in fact, critiques the very erasure Camus is accused of. Thus, in May 
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1945, before the end of the Second World War, long before the French intellectual elite took 
interest in the question of Algeria, Camus wrote in Combat 
As for the political dimension, I want to point out that the Arab people also exist. By that 
I mean that they aren’t the wretched, faceless mob in which Westerners see nothing worth 
respecting or defending. On the contrary, they are a people of impressive traditions, whose 
virtues are eminently clear to anyone willing to approach them without prejudice. 
 
These people are not inferior except in regard to the conditions in which they must live, 
and we have as much to learn from them as they from us. Too many French people in 
Algeria and elsewhere imagine Arabs as a shapeless mass without interests.173  
 
In The Rebel, Camus argued ‘The land of humanism in Europe has become the land of 
inhumanity’.174 In fact, in an article entitled ‘Contagion’, written a month after The Plague was 
published, Camus drew a direct comparison between the German occupation of France and 
French racism in the colonies.   
One year ago in Algeria, methods of collective repression were used. And Combat recently 
revealed the existence of the “spontaneous confession chamber” in Fianarantsoa…. 
(Madagascar) 
 
Three years after being subjected to a policy of terror themselves, Frenchmen are reacting 
to this latest news with the indifference of people who have seen too much. Yet the facts 
are there, the clear and hideous truth: we are doing what we reproached the Germans for 
doing…. 
 
In fact, the true explanation lies elsewhere. If the Hitlerians applied their shameful laws to 
Europe, the reason was they believed their race to be superior, hence the law for Germans 
could not be the same as the law for enslaved peoples. If we French revolted against their 
terror, it was because we believed that all Europeans were equal in rights and dignity. But 
if Frenchmen can now hear of the methods used in some instances by other Frenchmen 
against Algerians and Malagasies and not react, it is because they are unconsciously certain 
that we are in some way superior to those people and that it makes little difference what 
means we choose to demonstrate that superiority.175  
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Nonetheless, for Camus, accurately diagnosing ‘the plague’ pales in significance to the need 
to cure, combat and not spread it. Reiterating Camus’ ethic of rebellion and voicing what was to 
become Camus’ argument in Neither Victim Nor Executioners, Tarrou says, 
Consequently, I say that there are pestilences and victims, and nothing more. If in saying 
this I become a pestilence myself, at least I am not a consenting one. I am trying to be an 
innocent murderer…Of course, there should be a third category, that of true healers, but 
it’s a fact that one does not meet many of those, because it must be hard to achieve.176  
 
It is no coincidence then that the novel’s narrator and ‘hero’ is a doctor. Camus’ quintessential 
rebel, Dr Rieux, struggled ‘against the world as it was’177 in the full knowledge that all his ‘victories 
are temporary’.178 His rebellion is affirmed in his presentism, 
I don’t know what awaits me or what will come after all this. For the time being, there are 
patients who have to be cured. Afterwards, they can reflect on it all so can I. But the 
immediate task is to cure them. I am defending them as best I can, that’s all.179 
 
It is evident in his renunciation of ‘heroism’ and ‘sainthood’, 
Salvation is too big a word for me. I don’t go that far. What interests me is man’s health, 
his health first of all.180  
 
Or again, 
But you know, I feel more solidarity with the defeated than with the saints. I don’t think I 
have any taste for heroism and sainthood. What interests me is to be a man.181 
 
Like Camus’ rebel, he is also animated by a ‘strange form of love’. Dr Rieux understood  this love 
to be distinct from and more powerful than solidarity.  
And from distant parts of the world, across thousands of miles, unknown but fraternal 
voices tried awkwardly to express their solidarity – and did, indeed, express it, while at the 
same time exhibiting the dreadful powerlessness of all men who truly endeavour to share 
a pain they cannot see. ‘Oran, Oran!’ In vain the appeal crossed the seas and in vain Rieux 
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stood by, waiting; then, soon, eloquence would well up and make still plainer the 
fundamental division that made Grand and the speaker strangers to another. ‘Oran, yes, 
Oran! But no,’ thought the doctor. ‘To love or to die together, there is nothing else to be 
done. They are too far away182 
 
As previously discussed, this emphasis on loving and dying together, reveals Camus’ privileging of 
a political praxis of philia. It is premised on the coming together of people in their plurality. It is 
evident in the diverse composition of the health team and the text’s interweaving of the factual 
record of Rieux and the diaries featuring the moralistic testimony of Tarrou. This philia, in deeming 
both transcendence and totality irrelevant, appears the anti-thesis of the other-worldly agape of 
Father Paneloux. Therefore, despite Rieux imagining his experience in the health teams with 
Paneloux unites them ‘at a higher level than prayer or blasphemy’, despite Rieux’s offer to remain 
at his side while he died, Paneloux refuses stating: ‘Priests have no friends. They have given 
everything to God’.183 Or perhaps, more succinctly, ‘If a priest consults a doctor, there is a 
contradiction’.184 For Rieux, Paneloux’s ‘religiosity’ did not preclude the possibility of philia. Like 
Epicurean philia, this friendship was characterised by an openness to all in the polis including the 
Italian ‘exile’, Tarrou, and the self-proclaimed ‘stranger’, Rambert. What defined this philia for 
Rieux was the existence of a ‘common ground’. In sum, this loving was a form of shared valuing 
of the world and all its people. This philia privileges particularity over abstraction, a love of friends 
rather than a love of humanity. Camus, in fact, thought a love of humanity impossible. He 
understood it as ‘an impossible love which is the contrary of love’.185 This did not, however, 
preclude a concern for humanity. In fact, this concern emanates from an understanding of loving 
as human essence.  
Rieux: “Man is not an idea, Rambert”  
Rambert: ‘He is an idea and a very brief one, just as soon as he turns away from love.’186 
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To borrow from Michael Walzer, Camus’ ethicopolitics of love affirms, ‘reiteration and 
not…abstraction’.187 As Camus corroborates,  
Humanism. I do not like humanity in general. In myself I sense primarily solidarity with it, 
which is not the same thing. And then I love some men, alive or dead, with so much 
admiration that I am always jealous or anxious to protect or defend in all the others that 
which, by chance or on some day that I cannot foresee, has made or will make them like 
the former”.188  
 
In the next section, I ask whether Camus’ refusal to participate in or endorse the Algerian War of 
Independence contradicted his commitment to rebellion, and its praxis of philia.  
 
Can an Arab Rebel? 
 In the 1950s Camus supported the Hungarian Revolution and condemned the Algerian 
Revolution indicating for some a dissonance on Camus’ thought on rebellion. Camus, in fact, 
maintained the two contexts were distinct. He argued that while Algeria was in the last throes of 
nineteenth-century French colonialism, Hungary was about to be colonised by a Russian empire.189 
Further, unlike Hungary, Algeria had a large, hundred-year-old settler population to contend 
with.190 Nonetheless, for his detractors, Camus’ position on Algeria was tantamount to the denial 
of Arab rebellion. It was the culmination of twenty years of literary erasure of the Arab. Previously, 
I argued that Camus’ philosophy of rebellion affirms a common humanity, the foundation of 
fraternity. I also argued that Camus understood the praxis of rebellion to be animated by ‘a strange 
kind of love’. In this section, I therefore ask, did Camus think an Arab could rebel, or love?  Or is 
there something about his conception of rebellion that precludes the Arab from being human or 
friend? 
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The question of whether Camus thought an Arab could rebel is first a question of 
anthropology. Raimond Gaita, for instance, suggests that the acceptance of a person’s humanity 
hinges on the recognition that they share the same complexity and interiority as one’s self.191 There 
is much in Camus’ literature which would seem to deny the humanity of the Arab. Eros and its 
affirmation of life in ‘the absurd cycle’ is seemingly premised on the promise of a Mediterranean 
Utopia which forgets or erases the history of settler colonialism in Algeria. This forgetting 
culminates in the murder of a nameless Arab, who much like French colonialism, is also forgotten 
in an absurd trial which renders the murderer the victim of an unjust legal system. Even a 
sympathetic reading of the text, like the one I provide, at best offers commentary about an unjust 
colonial system and its tyranny of prescriptive ‘love’ or ‘affect’ which judges the ‘absurd man’ a 
transgressor, an outsider, an Arab. However much the novel indicts the colonial legal system, the 
Arab remains at best an object or ‘cipher’. Similarly, in the ‘cycle’ on rebellion, the characteristic 
of the rebel is his/her capacity for ‘thought at the Meridian’. Rebellion seeks to establish a 
Mediterranean Utopia and the kind of affirmation of life the reader encounters in the absurd 
‘cycle’. 
In the light, the earth remains our first and our last love. Our brothers are breathing under 
the same sky; justice is a living thing. Now is born that strange joy which helps one live 
and die, and which we shall never again renounce to a later time.192 
 
 
Conjuring all the criticisms of historical myopia, this presentism seemingly emphasises the 
ills of the European experience over those of Algerian colonialism, in The Plague. The ‘plague’ must 
be addressed first, the health of the Arabs can remain a conversation deferred. Again, reading 
Camus’ journalism from the same period alongside his literature, I have sought to argue this is 
inconsistent with his advocacy and intent. Nonetheless the fact remains that aside from a scarce 
reference to an ‘Arab quarter’, there is no reason for the reader to believe that any of Dr Rieux’s 
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patients or friends are Arab. This literary erasure of the Arab is seemingly contained in Camus’ 
denial of the existence of an Algerian nation.193 In The Rebel, more problematically, he argues, 
rebellion is a product of the ‘Western’ world: 
It is obvious that a Hindu pariah, an Incan warrior, a primitive native of Central Africa, 
and a member of one of the first Christian communities had quite different conceptions 
of rebellion. We could even assert, with considerable assurance, that the idea of rebellion 
has no meaning in those actual cases. However, a Greek slave, a serf, a condottiere of the 
Renaissance, a Parisian bourgeois during the Regency, and a Russian intellectual at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century would undoubtedly agree that rebellion is legitimate, 
even if they are differed about the reasons. In other words, the problem of rebellion only 
seems to assume a precise meaning within the confines of Western thought’.194  
 
Even in this example, it would seem that Camus excludes reference to the Arab and the long and 
rich history of Arab rebellion. In any case, rather than offering insight into an unequal 
anthropology, I understand Camus’ claim as being based on two overly general and 
unsubstantiated premises. First, Camus seeks to argue that all non-Western societies are dominated 
by myth rather than metaphysics.195 Second, he argues that non-Western traditions either owing to 
their bestowal of complete equality, or their legitimisation of inequality, cannot offer the conditions 
for rebellion.196 In Camus’ narrow frame, a necessary condition for rebellion is the existence of 
‘theoretic equality (that) conceals great factual inequalities’.197 The problem with Camus’ argument 
is that it would seem to radically undermine his own seemingly universal claim about the human 
potential for creativity in an absurd world. Nonetheless, despite Camus’ lack of imagination in this 
instance, the fact remains that the chasm between ‘theoretic equality’ of the universal person and 
the ‘factual inequality’ of Arabs and Berbers in French Algeria, formed the basis of Camus’ critique 
of the French Republic. To return to the language of The Rebel, the inequality ‘revealed the part of 
man which must always be defended’.198 Hence, in the 1930s, Camus campaigned for Arab 
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franchise and for the ‘capacity’ of the people of Kabylie to self-govern. In the 1940s, even during 
the War, he wrote articles condemning French violence and racism in the colonies. This 
commitment to a common humanity animated Camus’ critique of economic, educational and racial 
apartheid in Kabylie in the 1930s, just as it came to inform this critique of racism and police 
reprisals in Setif in 1945:  
When one discovers in addition that most newspapers (not including yours) applied the 
rather discreet term “disturbance” or “incident” to a minor police operation that cost the 
lives of seven people and left more than a hundred injured, and when one sees our 
legislators, in a hurry to get away on vacation, hastily dispatch the embarrassing corpses, 
one is justified, I think, in asking whether the press, the government, and Parliament would 
have been quite so nonchalant if the demonstrators had not been North Africans, and 
whether the police would have fired with such confident abandon if that had been the 
case. Surely the answer is no, and the victims of July 14 were to some extent the victims 
of a racism that dares not speak its name.199  
 
It also animated his many different positions on the Algerian question from the 1930s to his death 
in 1960. Indeed, he moved from advocating assimilation to a federation that recognised the dual 
legitimacy of Sharia and French law.200 If Camus’ position when he was living in Algeria in the 
1930s was subversive, perhaps his position in the late 1950s was out of touch with Algerian reality. 
Nonetheless, it was entirely consonant with anti-imperial activism in North Africa in the 
corresponding period. 201 
 
Camus’ position on Algeria was also shaped by geopolitical concerns. His countenancing 
of French empire in the form of his advocacy of an increasingly autonomous Algeria incorporated 
into a federal France, was in large part the result of a Cold War concern about the rise of the USSR 
and its meddling in the Middle East and North Africa. Camus’ sensitivity to imperial crimes made 
him particularly cynical about condemnation of French imperialism by another imperialist nation.  
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The Russian strategy, which is apparent from a glance at any world map, is to insist on the 
status quo in Europe – that is, recognition of its own colonial system – while stirring things 
up in the Middle East and Africa in order to encircle Europe from the south. The freedom 
and prosperity of the Arab peoples have little to do with Russia’s aims. Think of the 
decimation of the Chechens or the Tartars of Crimea, or the destruction of Arab culture 
in the formerly Muslim provinces of Daghestan. Russia is simply making use of these 
imperial dreams to serve its own ends. In any event, these nationalist and imperialist 
demands are responsible for what is unacceptable in the Arab rebellion, first and foremost 
the systematic murder of French and Arab civilians, who have been killed indiscriminately 
simply because they are French or friends of the French202  
 
Camus’ many shifting stances on Algeria also reveal that he prioritised the redressal of the injustice 
of French colonialism rather than a particular outcome. It many ways it betrays the logic of The 
Plague, which dismissed ‘vocabulary’ for action. In fairness to Camus, this extended to what was at 
least then a radical call for colonial reparations.  
The injustice from which the Arab people have suffered is linked to colonialism itself, to 
its history and administration. The French central government has never been able to 
enforce French law uniformly in its colonies. Finally, there is no question that the Algerian 
people deserve substantial reparations, both as a means of restoring their dignity and as a 
matter of justice203  
 
Nonetheless, Camus’ emphasis on ‘action’ over ‘vocabulary’, suggests for some an evasion of 
historical responsibility. Perhaps, this is most clearly reflected in his controversial claim that the 
pied-noir were in fact not colonisers but victims of French imperialism.  
The true responsibility for the current disaster rests primarily with a series of French 
governments, backed by the comfortable indifference of the press and public opinion and 
supported by the complacency of lawmakers. In any case, they are more guilty than the 
hundreds of thousands of French workers who scrape by in Algeria on their miserable 
wages, who responded three times in 30 years to the call to take up arms on behalf of the 
metropole, and who are rewarded today by the contempt of the very people they helped.204 
 
I read this less as an evasion and more as laying emphasis on an ethic of ambiguity amplified by 
Camus’ subject position as a pied-noir. Indeed, Camus’ personal experience of poverty and 
disadvantage may have coloured his perspective. Having lost his father to the First World War, 
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Camus grew up in a three room home with his grandmother, his mother, his uncle(s) and his 
brother. His mother had a hearing impairment, was largely non-verbal, illiterate and worked as 
cleaner. In his semi-biographical The First Man, Camus underscores this conflicted sense of identity 
in his (Jacques’) encounter with a student from the French metropole: 
When (Didier) spoke of France, he would say ‘our country’ and he accepted in advance 
the sacrifices that country might demand (‘your father died for our country,’ he would 
say to Jacques…), whereas this notion of country had no meaning to Jacques, who knew 
he was French, and that this entailed a certain number of duties, but for whom France 
was an abstraction that people called upon and that sometimes like that God he had 
heard about outside his home, who evidently was the sovereign dispenser of good things 
and bad, who could not be influenced, but who on the other hand could do anything 
with the people’s destiny. And this impression of his was even stronger among the 
women who lived with him. ‘Maman, what is our country?’ he asked one day. 
She looked frightened as she did each time she did not understand. ‘I don’t know,’ she 
said. ‘No’. 
‘It’s France’.  
‘Oh, yes.’ And she seemed relieved.205 
 
 
Much like his Mediterranean Utopia, Camus’ vision for what he described as a ‘Just Algeria’ 
gave voice to his hope that the pied noir, Arab, Berber and Jew could be indigenous Algerians and 
French citizens together. Thus, he remained until the very end an ardent critic of French 
imperialism even as he denounced the tactics employed by the FLN.  
“Everyone must choose sides,” shout the haters. But I have chosen. I have chosen a Just 
Algeria, where French and Arabs may associate freely. And I want Arab militants to 
preserve the justice of their cause by condemning the massacre of civilians, just as I want 
the French to protect their rights and their future by openly condemning the massacres of 
the repression206  
His torment over the question of Algeria is most evident in his denunciation on the one hand of 
the FLN and his secret advocacy efforts to have over 150 death sentences of the same activists 
commuted.207 Camus’ denunciation by the left and the right and his fear of lending credence to 
either one of their justifications of violence led to his silence on the Algerian question.  
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When the fate of men and women who share one’s own blood is linked directly or 
indirectly to articles that one writes so effortlessly in the comfort of one’s study, then one 
has a duty to weigh the pros and cons before taking up one’s pen. For my own part, while 
I remain sensitive to the risk that, in criticizing the course of the rebellion, I give aid and 
comfort to the most insolent instigators of the Algerian tragedy, I am also afraid that, by 
retracing the long history of French errors, I am, with no risk to myself, supplying alibis to 
the criminal madmen who would toss grenades into crowds of innocent people who 
happen to be my kin.208  
 
His literature from the same period bears witness to his dual and conflicted loyalties. Thus, in The 
Artist, it is hard to distinguish whether Jonah’s last piece of art spells ‘solitary’ or ‘solidarity’.209 In 
L’Hote, which signals both ‘guest’ and ‘host’, the pied noir teacher Daru offers hospitality and 
freedom to an Arab prisoner. His decision to neither explicitly set him free nor take him, as 
instructed, to the colonial authorities leads to his condemnation from both communities.210 
Perhaps, however, it is expressed most vividly in his anguished hope of a reconciled Algeria in the 
posthumously published The First Man 
‘Oh, me, I’m staying, and to the end. Whatever happens, I’m staying. I’ve sent my family 
to Algiers, and I’ll croak here. They don’t understand that in Paris. Besides us, you know 
who’re the only ones who can understand it?’ 
‘The Arabs’. 
‘Exactly. We were made to understand each other. Fools and brutes likes us, but with the 
same blood of men. We’ll kill each other for a little longer, cut off each other’s balls and 
torture each other a bit. And then we’ll go back to living as men together. The country 
wants it that way…211  
 
Camus broke his silence on the question of Algeria briefly after he accepted the Nobel 
Prize in Stockholm. In a heated exchange between Camus and a young Algerian student who 
supported the FLN, Camus was reported to have said  
I have always condemned terror. I must also condemn the blind terrorism that can be seen 
in the streets of Algiers, for example, which someday might strike my mother or family. I 
believe in justice, but I will defend my mother before justice.212  
                                                      
208Camus, Algerian Chronicles., Loc. 449. 
209 Rendered ‘independent’ or ‘interdependent’ in Albert Camus, Exile and the Kingdom: “the Adulterous Woman”; “the 
Renegade”; “the Silent Men”; “the Guest”; “the Artist” (London: Penguin Classics, 2002)., p. 80 
210 Camus, Exile and the Kingdom., See ‘The Host’. 
211 Camus, The First Man., Loc 2073-77. 
212 Camus, Algerian Chronicles., Loc. 2360-3. 
 205 
 
However, Camus, in fact said: 
People are now planting bombs in the tramways of Algiers. My mother might be on one 
of those tramways. If that is justice, then I prefer my mother.213 
 
Somehow, that sentence has been rendered ‘Between justice and my mother, I choose my 
mother’.214 There is a substantive difference in the meaning of Camus’ actual comment and the 
comments attributed to him. Nonetheless, despite this misconstrual, in all its meanings, Camus 
appears to privilege the love of his mother over some conception of justice. For Michael Walzer, 
Camus’ comment affirms his commitment to the particular rather than the abstract. Avowing his 
love for his mother and their poor pied-noir community, it epitomises the logic of the ‘cycle’ of 
rebellion and its message of ‘reiteration…not abstraction’. Indeed, such a reading is entirely 
compatible with Camus’ proclamation of the conditionality and boundedness of philia. It is also 
compatible with the emphasis on the particularity and plurality of human rebellion upon which 
Camus’ conception of politics rests. While Camus unquestionably loved his mother very much and 
cared for the wellbeing of his poor pied-noir community, this did not preclude a concern for the 
Arab or other indigenous Algerians. As Camus himself asserted in 1958, to subscribe to this view 
is to subscribe to a false dichotomy: 
The first group of people wants the universal at the expense of the particular. The second 
wants the particular at the expense of the universal. But the two go together.215  
 
Camus’ position on the Algerian question was never about the incapacity or illegitimacy of Arab 
rebellion. Rather it was a condemnation of revolution. Entirely consonant with his play The Just 
Assassins, his comment to the Algerian student reflects his elevation of the rebellious love of life 
over the revolutionary love of justice. Rather than proclaim an antinomy between love and justice, 
Camus emphasised two dissonant forms of love, fraternity and valuing. This dissonance 
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manifested itself in a choice of means, which Camus believed indiscriminate and disproportionate. 
It culminated in a vision of Algeria without the pied-noir other. Camus’ ethic of rebellion and his 
vision of a Mediterranean Utopia that underpins it might be what is in the final analysis 
problematic. Perhaps, its privileging of a love of life and the world may seem prescriptive and 
violent to individuals, who disinherited from the world, do not deem life worth living. It might be 
that it was blind to the power differentials. It might be that ‘the strange form of love’ that animates 
rebellion was ‘altercidal’ in its exclusion of the dissenter.216 It might even be that this ethic was 
inherently conservative. However, it was not an aberration in Camus’ political thought. An Arab 
could rebel, but revolt was always illegitimate.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have sought to argue that Camus’ anti-utopian thought is animated by 
his vision of a Mediterranean utopia which privileges ‘Greece’ over ‘Rome’, ‘Hellenism’ over 
‘Christianity’. Perhaps this would not have seemed antithetical to Camus. Indeed, he once wrote,  
In practical terms, it follows that the battle that will be waged in years to come will not pit 
the forces of utopia against the forces of reality. Rather, it will put different utopias against 
each other as they try to gain a purchase on the real, and the only choice remaining will be 
to decide which form of utopia is least costly.217 
 
As evident in his dissertation and each subsequent planned ‘cycle’, this exercise has an affective 
dimension that entailed Camus’ engagement with agape or Christian love. Thus, in his first ‘cycle’ 
on absurdity, he casts an eros for life and the world as the only ‘good’. In his second ‘cycle’ on 
rebellion, he recasts agape as philia: self-giving without being soteriological, particular rather than 
abstract, plural but not conditional. In its ultimate valuing of life and the world, Camus’ love both 
animates rebellion and limits it. If Tolstoy epitomises what Arendt describes as antipolitical love, 
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Camus’ worldly, life-affirming life appears to be its antithesis. Nonetheless, Camus’ universal, 
presentist utopia is subject to valid critique owing to its latent paternalism and Eurocentrism. I 
have sought to demonstrate that despite its limitations Camus is always cognisant and engaged 
with the problem of Algerian colonialism. In my view, Camus’ refusal to support the FLN’s vision 
of an Algerian revolution is entirely consonant with his political thought. A keystone of Camus’ 
post-war vision of rebellion is its insistence upon the proportionality of means and ends, its 
recognition of life as an inherent good. Indiscriminate violence – however noble the intent – was 
therefore anathema to him. Perhaps Camus’ vision of the integration and ‘indigenising’ of the 
settler colonial is more problematic. Perhaps what makes it so is that Camus’ vision of love, justice 
and rebellion emanate from a Mediterranean utopia, a ‘Just Algeria’ that for all its concerns for 
freedom, equality, fraternity and justice was ultimately prescriptive. Perhaps it was this recognition 
that led to Camus’ hopeless silence. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Love is the beginning of philosophy: it commands a quest, an inquiry into the sort of life that might be best for the beloved. 
- Heuristicus 
 
‘…Especially all lovers of the world are called the world’ 
- Augustine 
 
 In this thesis, I have sought to argue that to the extent that plural loves populate the polis, 
the examination of how these loves are conceived, evoked and mobilised ought to be integral to 
the study of international politics. My contention that plural loves populate the polis, in turn, is 
premised on an empirical and anthropological claim. The empirical claim is that love is a pervasive 
human phenomena that is accorded tremendous importance – at least since modernity – in 
theological and secular contexts. The anthropological claim is (partly) Augustinian: whatever 
humans may or may not be, they are constituted by their loves. Further, they deem the objects of 
their love to be valuable or good. The existence of multiple conceptions of love and indeed the 
good suggests that politics necessarily entails the negotiation of plural loves. If politics is 
inescapably about loves, it follows that what, how and why we love is inherently political. In the 
first chapter, I sought to argue that the assumption that love is monolithic, irrelevant or somehow 
improper for politics obscures the kind of contestation that surrounds what love is, ought and does. 
It conceals that for better or worse, loves are not only already part of the polis but that conceptions 
of politics already privilege and legitimise some loves over others. In a bid to render visible the 
kind of work love is already mobilised to do in international politics, I posit it may be helpful to 
conceive of love as neither anthropomorphic nor monolithic but as a part of a social imaginary 
hospitable to various (conflicting) ideologies and theories. 
  
 The rest of the thesis was focused specifically on some of the ways in which love was 
evoked in the period extending from the fin-de-siècle to circa 1960. The period itself is consonant 
with the rise and fall of empires, world wars, emerging international institutions and arguably the 
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emergence of the study of International Relations itself. To the extent that twin thematic of empire 
and internationalism are understood as constitutive of early twentieth century International 
Relations, I argue that love was an important part of this conversation. In this period, love was 
employed to theorise the international. Perhaps the legacy of nineteenth century ‘religions of 
humanity’; then fashionable theosophy; the post-war rise of religiosity and the beginnings of the 
cultural and sexual revolution helped make it so. Whatever the impetus, love was evoked – even 
in the academy – by ‘canonical’ figures like Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern; Herbert 
Butterfield and Arnold Toynbee; Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau. It was implicated in 
their articulation of order, history and power and their engagement with questions of 
internationalism, civilizational decline and the viability of the world state. Although each conceived 
of love differently, all represented love as a site for the negotiation of the universal and the 
particular, the imperial and the international. Despite Butterfield’s concern with humility, 
Niebuhr’s critique of imperial hubris and Toynbee’s call for anti-imperial atonement, however, all 
six figures appear to mobilise love to do little more than conserve the status quo. Turning to three 
liminal literary figures, each occupying a distinct subject position in one of the three most 
significant empires of the twentieth century, I examined whether and how they sought to animate 
love otherwise. In this chapter, I imagine and engage in conversation with Tolstoy, Tagore and 
Camus on this very question. Returning to the schema I proposed in the first chapter, I explore 
how their conception of what love is, ought and does was intrinsically bound to their disparate 
understandings of politics in a time of empire. Further, I query what is obscured by focussing on 
these three figures rather than a host of others. Finally, I return to the general premise of this thesis 
that love matters to the study of international politics to illuminate how a research agenda that 
centres on love(s) might contribute to the study of International Relations. 
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Love and Politics in a Time of Empire: An Imagined Conversation 
Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus never corresponded. Tolstoy was a profound literary influence 
on Camus, but died three years before he was born. In fact, Camus wrote with an image of Tolstoy 
on his desk and often measured his literary output against that of Tolstoy’s. Tagore was familiar 
with Tolstoy’s work. Yet although their educational endeavours shared much in common, Tagore 
was deeply critical of Tolstoy’s philosophy of celibacy and self-abnegation. Tolstoy’s son, Michael, 
corresponded with Tagore but there is no evidence that Tolstoy either knew Tagore or thought 
very much of him. Camus rose to prominence after Tagore’s death so there is little reason to 
believe Tagore would have known his work. However, they were both close friends and 
beneficiaries of the arts patron and publisher, Victoria Ocampo (1890-1979). Camus was also an 
avid reader of Andre Gide and would have had access to his translations of Tagore’s works. All of 
this is to suggest that although it is likely their lives intersected, any conversation between them 
on love and politics in a time of empire would have to be imagined.  
 
What Love Is 
Leo Tolstoy, Rabindranath Tagore and Albert Camus each understood love differently, 
even across their own careers. In the literary works I examine, Tolstoy emphasises Rousseaunian 
romantic love in his early career in The Cossacks, familial love in Anna Karenina in the 1870s and 
agape in his late career in Hadji Murat. Despite these shifts, I argue that these three literary works 
attest to Tolstoy’s commitment to agape or charitable or self-giving love as ideal. In The Cossacks, 
this was evident in his equation of goodness with the capacity for agape or sacrificial love. Thus, 
the pre-Christian ‘noble savage’ may have the capacity for amour de soi and natural morality but only 
the ‘civilised’ Christian Olenin is able to rehabilitate his amour propre and place it in right relation to 
amour de soi. In Anna Karenina, agape is idealised via an emphasis on its antithesis: eros. Much like 
Anders Nygren, Tolstoy would seem to understand eros as not-agape. In its incarnation of 
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passionate love, Tolstoy imagines it as destructive of the metaphorical and literal family unit. 
Destroying Anna’s family first with Karenin and then Vronsky, Tolstoy imagines the same erosic 
love to animate the Russian Volunteer Movement he deems so dangerous to the Russian nation. 
This idealisation of agape is not solely via an emphasis on its absence. Rather it is exemplified in 
the actions of Levin in his compassion for his peasants, his sympathy for Anna and his growing 
commitment to universalism and non-violence. Nonetheless, this idealised love is bounded by the 
particular. Foreshadowing the mid-century Herbert Butterfield, Tolstoy conceives of the 
neighbour as the person who enters one’s orbit. Governed by a narrow conception of the family, 
the object of love is what Martha Nussbaum would describe as a narrowly conceived Eudaimonia 
or ‘circle of concern’. A year after the publication of the final instalment of Anna Karenina, Tolstoy 
wrote The Confessions which many regard as the beginning of his post-‘conversion’ work. Yet, even 
in these works Tolstoy’s conception of love is far from settled. Indeed, between the writing of The 
Kingdom of God is Within You and Hadji Murat or any of Tolstoy’s anti-imperial epistles, Tolstoy 
changes his mind about love and abstraction. Whereas The Kingdom of God is Within You denounces 
abstract loves as delusional, Tolstoy’s later embrace of Kant saw him overcome his reservations 
about the abstraction that underpins the Categorical Imperative. So committed was Tolstoy to 
Kant that he fused the Categorical Imperative with the Johannine Gospel, producing his law of 
love. As the incipient pacifism of Levin foreshadowed in Anna Karenina, agapic love was the 
antithesis of erosic violence. In fact, this love was nothing more than a duty (or law) of non-violence. 
Much like Kantian practical love, it entailed beneficence. As a duty, it extended to all: individuals 
were phenomenologically replaceable by other individuals as objects of love. Further, this love of 
abstract neighbour was no longer moored by a love of self. Rather, as evident in the great lengths 
Tolstoy went to conceive of himself as “I” and “not-I”, this agape was not only imagined to be 
self-giving but self-emptying. 
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 Tagore’s three post-swadeshi works do not denote a shift in his conception of love as much 
as shift in a concern from love’s political promise to the political conditions for loving. Gora was 
Tagore’s first and most optimistic political work. It proclaimed the soteriological promise of plural 
loves: romantic, filial and familial. In Gora, Tagore idealises loving in the particular, that is, loving 
as a valuing relationship. This love does not negate the possibility of abstract loves of nation or 
humanity. Rather, it is the condition for loving in the abstract. Thus, Gora’s Bharatvarsha 
(mythological India) remains abstract and untenable until he overcomes his casteism, sexism and 
religious orthodoxy and learns to love his mother, friend and lover. Tagore’s broader political 
writings and activism suggest he never relinquished his faith in the transformative potential of 
loving relationships. Indeed, the tragedy of Chaturanga and Ghare Baire ensue from a failure to love 
in the particular, or value individuals qua individuals in the context of relationships. These next 
two novels, however, indicate a shift in Tagore’s concern away from plural loves to romantic love. 
For Sudipta Kaviraj Tagore’s preoccupation with romantic love was already present in Gora. Yet, 
I argue the worlds of Chaturanga and Ghare Baire are distinct, bearing little resemblance to the world 
of Gora. Written following the outbreak of the Great War, the world the protagonists inhabit in 
both novels are solitary and decidedly modern. As Tagore’s many debates with Gandhi attest, the 
post-swadeshi Tagore was not anti-modern. As the centrality of the Vaishanvite (romantic imagery 
from Hindu theology) motif to his life’s works would suggest, Tagore never regarded romantic 
love – as Tolstoy did – to be inherently dangerous or destructive. His narrow emphasis on 
romantic love – in the confines of heterosexual marriage – instead operate to perform a critique 
of some forms of loving. In stark contrast to Tolstoy, Tagore’s three, post-swadeshi novels 
problematize love conceived of as beneficence. This is because love understood in the context of 
a valuing relationship is predicated not merely on the freedom to love but on the equality of all 
agents (particularly women) in the relationship. Thus, in Chaturanga, Damini remains unsated 
because owing to her ‘inferior’ status as a widow, she is not free to love as she pleases. Similarly, 
in Ghare Baire, tragedy ensues when Nikhil and Sandip misconstrue loving and ‘liberating’ Bimala 
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with attempting to mould her to conform to the needs of their political projects. Unlike Tolstoy 
and Camus, Tagore does not engage in the same exercise of distinguishing or prioritising loves. In 
Tagore’s three novels, elements of erosic, agapic and filial love constitute most loving relationships. 
His emphasis, then, is less on prescribing what love is and more on detailing what loving entails.  
 
 The kind of love Camus valourises in his absurd cycle mirrors the absurdity of life. This 
love is tragic, fleeting, erosic. It entails an affirmation of life. In The Myth of Sisyphus, it is exemplified 
in the figures of Don Juan and Sisyphus, each regarding every moment to be ‘short lived and 
exceptional’. Repugnant to what Camus seemingly describes as Christian colonial structures of 
love in The Outsider, it is the antithesis of agape. In fact, erosic love is so transgressive that the French 
judicial system cannot even recognise (or value) Meursault’s loves in The Outsider. Distasteful to 
the dictator, Caligula, he despairs ‘love is nothing’. Whereas late post-‘conversion’ Tolstoy elevates 
agape over eros, Camus in the absurd cycle would seem to do the opposite. The embrace of erosic 
love becomes central to absurdity’s emphasis on leading a lucid life. However, Camus came to 
conclude that the absurd cycle taught nothing. His next cycle focussed on rebellion. Although 
Camus never quite relinquished his conception of love as tragic or erosic, his cycle on rebellion 
denotes a shifting concern with love as agapic and filial. Epitomised in his conception of rebellion 
in The Rebel, this love is agapic to the extent that it entails a willingness to lay down one’s life. It is 
filial to the extent that this willingness to lay down one’s life only extends to one’s friends. It is this 
emphasis on ‘living with’ and ‘dying with/for’ which Camus distinguishes rebellious love in The 
Plague from solidarity. Epitomised in the figure of Prometheus in The Rebel and ‘the healer’ in The 
Plague, this love is worldly and rejects all other worlds and lives for this tragic one. 
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What Love Ought 
In the first chapter, I proposed that theories on the role love ought to play in politics largely 
centre on three ideal-typical positions: retrieval, rejection or rehabilitation. The first position is 
consonant with the embrace of loves in its plurality; the second with the rejection of love(s) and 
the third with the alteration of love(s) to somehow render it proper for politics. Tolstoy and 
Tagore’s conception of love and the role it ought to play in politics would seem to resemble the 
‘rejection’ thesis. Wholeheartedly concluding that love is improper for politics, however, what they 
reject is politics rather than love. For Niebuhr, this was an inevitable result of the privileging of 
purity over praxis. It amounted to a realisation and rejection of the kind of coercion all forms of 
assemblage are premised on. Niebuhr offers an apt description of Tolstoy’s equation of politics 
with violence. To the extent that Tolstoy equates love with non-violence, it must necessarily abjure 
politics. Unlike Camus who seeks to mobilise love to imagine politics otherwise, Tolstoy’s 
evangelisation of the law of love is not animated by the same intent. A radical deontologist, 
Tolstoy’s commitment to individualism led to his disdain for the kind of speaking and acting 
together that Arendt imagines to be constitutive of politics. Tolstoy’s thought might have inspired 
Tolstoyan communes and Cherktkov might have campaigned to turn Tolstoy’s thought into a 
political programme of anarchopacifism. However, neither activity was espoused nor endorsed by 
Tolstoy. Tolstoy understood the coming together of people for political purpose as necessarily 
entailing the relinquishing of individual conscience. His law of love thus categorically entailed the 
rejection of politics. Yet, in practice, Tolstoy’s rejection of the polis was far from total. Indeed, 
despite the antipolitical elements of his thought, his conception of love as necessitating the 
rejection of politics remains pertinent to the polis for two reasons.  First, this turning away from 
politics was premised on an assessment of the polis which he communicated and disseminated to 
the masses. Second, this critique was coupled with a form of non-action, which despite Tolstoy’s 
own intentions, inspired the political praxis of love as non-violence.  
 
 215 
But for two brief forays into politics, Tagore like Tolstoy would seem to mobilise a 
conception of love that entailed a disavowal of politics. So much is implied in his need to carve 
the world up into social and political spheres and confine love’s work to the former rather than 
the latter. Yet a consigning of Tagore’s conception of love as antipolitical ultimately hinges on 
what one deems to be politics. The politics Tagore disavows are the political structures and 
processes he associates with the state and late British imperialism. His vision of individuals 
speaking and acting together in civil society, however, are entirely compatible with an Arendtian 
vision of politics. His vision of ‘politics’ would appear to be premised on the retrieval or embrace 
of love in its plurality. Indeed, it does not preclude abstract loves of community or humanity. 
Unlike Tolstoy, he does not deem erosic loves violent. Unlike Camus, he does not deem utopian 
loves murderous. However, plural loves for Tagore only contain political promise when they are 
conceived of in the context of a valuing relationship. The political promise of valuing relationships, 
in turn, rests on two convictions. First, for Tagore, loving relationships contain the promise of 
political power and transformation. The affective community in Gora; the missed opportunity to 
create them in Chaturanga and Ghare Baire; the promise of dialogue between the (sometimes 
Orientalising caricatures) of an abstract ‘East’ and ‘West’ are all evidence of this. Tagore’s efforts 
to cultivate transnational friendships, his educational endeavours including the founding of a 
school, university and rural re-development institute were also premised on this logic. Second, the 
very existence of relationships across racial and religious lines and (Indic) gendered spaces are a 
form of political resistance. However, these two premises co-exist uncomfortably in Tagore’s 
thought. There is a seeming tension between inclusion and resistance. For instance, it is unclear 
whether this ethic of inclusion ought to be extended to the perpetrator of 
religious/gendered/caste-based/racial violence. Further, in the absence of a fully articulated theory 
of non-violence, power or indeed sacrifice, Tagore’s praxis of love seems to rest only on a faith in 
love’s potency to overcome structural violence. 
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In the Absurd Cycle, Camus understood love as motivating political action but argued it 
ought not prescribe political praxis. Camus may have understood erosic love as essential to leading 
a lucid life, but this love as highly individuated could not provide a foundation for politics. 
Foreshadowing the arguments of Sara Ahmed, pre-war Camus asserted that the acceptance of 
plurality precluded prescriptive politics. However, Camus’ cycle on rebellion denoted a shift in his 
thought about the role love ought to perform in politics. To be fair to Camus, he never ceased to 
classify love as tragic. However, in the cycle on rebellion, he began to articulate how even in a 
tragic world, self-giving love and friendship were sites of meaning and resistance. Perhaps this is 
most clearly demonstrated in The Plague. In contrast to most of Camus’ solitary protagonists, Rieux 
and Tarrou are friends. As the form of the novel as memoir beautifully illustrates, although the 
two retain their voices and differences throughout the text, the intermingling of Rieux’s testimony 
with Tarrou’s demonstrate the world they see is shared. Much like Tagore, he conceived love in 
philia as a valuing, transformative relationship. However, Camus attempts to rehabilitate loves to 
attune them to this world in a way Tagore does not. Camus’ ‘world’ in turn prioritises a 
commitment to the valuing of human life in/and the present above all else. As Camus argued in 
his thesis on Neoplatonism, this required a movement away from the Christian toward the Hellenic. 
Despite both their preoccupations with the present, the disparate movements Tolstoy and Camus 
emphasise is illustrative. Tolstoy’s present was the ‘eternal’ present. His emphasis on action in a 
‘rational’, ‘disembodied’ world cared not for the consequences on embodied individuals. Camus’ 
present in contrast was absurd, embodied and populated by people. While loving in Camus’ 
present affirmed life and was a form of rebellion. Loving in the future was revolution and anathema 
to his project. 
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What Love Does 
Love as Critique 
Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus each mobilises love as a form of anti-imperial critique. They 
achieve this mainly via a critique of imperial violence. Thus, Tolstoy’s anti-imperial epistles 
categorise imperialism and its endless wars as embodying the ‘law of violence’; Tagore associates 
the violent, abstract loves of the nation state with late British imperialism and, Camus’ post-war 
theory of political violence emanates from a conception of common humanity constituted by a 
capacity to love. In fairness to Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus, they mobilised their conception of 
love to critique violence perpetrated by both agents and subjects of empire. Thus, Tolstoy urges 
Chinese and Indian imperial subjects to embrace the ‘law of love’ and its concomitant code of 
non-violence. Tagore echoing Tolstoy’s sentiments on mimesis, critiques nationalist and 
cosmopolitan violence. Further, he argues casteism is akin to racism; religious orthodoxy 
perpetrates violence much like the structures of imperialism. As the post-war Camus went to 
lengths to clarify, he was not a utopian and therefore not a pacifist. However, he increasingly 
mobilised love as a critique of indiscriminate (rather than targeted) killing in the context of the 
Algerian war of independence. 
 
This ‘use’ of love as critique is facilitated by all three literary figure’s understanding of love 
as a standard and/or site of judgment. The late post-‘conversion’ Tolstoy understands love, in 
effect, as a law of non-violence. In sum, it forms the standard against which all action is judged. 
For Camus, rebellious love is presentist and life-affirming. Against this standard, particularly in his 
post-war work, all forms of killing are understood as murder. As he articulates in Just Assassins and 
The Rebel, whether this murder is just or unjust hinges ultimately on the willingness of the murderer 
to atone and lay down his life for his crime. To turn to his metaphor of ‘health’ in The Plague, the 
ethic which he exalts instead is that of ‘the healer’ who combats pestilence and cures victims. For 
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Tagore, love operates both as a standard and site of judgment. It is a standard of judgment to the 
extent that his conception of universalism embraces distinct wholes. It is a site of judgment to the 
extent that what loving entails is not prescribed but determined in the context of a loving 
relationship. This universalism, this form of judgment underpins Tagore’s critique of ‘abstract’, 
unmoored, exclusionary loves of casteism, racism, sexism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism.  
 
Love as Resistance 
Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus conceive love not merely as critique but also as a form of 
action. Consequently, their work sought not only to dismantle but also to create. Partaking in what 
Anna Jonasdottir describes as love’s ‘world-creating capacities’218, this entailed first imagining and 
creating of a space for their vision of politics. Unsurprisingly for three literary figures, this act of 
‘making’ takes the form of art and internationalism. As previously articulated, late post-
‘conversion’ Tolstoy understands aesthetics as a form of communion; a medium for evangelising 
agape. Tagore’s artistic endeavours mirrored his political endeavours, interrogating exclusionary 
structures of gender, caste, religion and race (but seldom class) to inspire and normalise what were 
deemed transgressive relationships. Camus saw the demands of rebellion and love as partly 
aesthetic. His literary work explored the possibility of meaning making, and thus love and action, 
in an absurd world.  
  
 Their experiments in art often mirrored their internationalist or regionalist efforts. For 
Tolstoy, this took the form of his study of world religions and was expressed in his attempt to 
imagine Russia a part of a spiritual, non-violent East in contrast to a decadent, industrialised West. 
This vision, much like the one Tagore articulates in the inter-war years, was deeply problematic. 
                                                      
218 Jonasdottir and Ferguson, Love : A Question for Feminism in the Twenty-First Century., p. 14. 
 219 
In the case of Tolstoy, it necessitated little else than the ‘East’ refusing to succumb to the ‘law of 
violence’ of the West, all the while perpetuating the same mythology that sanctioned nineteenth 
century colonialism. Tagore’s vision of international dialogue rested on a similar essentialised 
premise. Its chief difference was that it sought not just for the ‘East’ to be some kind of spiritual 
exemplar, but also a participant in the kind of relational dialogue that lies at the heart of the 
Tagorean project. This ‘world-making’ also extended to what Michael Collins – borrowing from 
Leela Gandhi – describes as his politics of friendship. Cultivating relationships across the ‘East’-
‘West’, colonised-coloniser, and other structural binaries, Tagore sought to imagine and create 
spaces of resistance. To be fair to Tolstoy, he also partook of a similar project. His spatio-temporal 
engineering, however, emphasised rational or spiritual ‘interiority’, the fusion of eternal time with 
the present. The kind of ‘action’ or ‘resistance’ in this time and space, however, essentially 
resembled a flight from politics and the world. Camus’ work sought less to engineer a world than 
describe one. This act of description, however, was also very much an act of creation and valuation. 
Prioritising the empirical above all else, it affirmed a world that was embodied and absurd. Further, 
the kind of life-affirming love Camus’ ethics endorsed reifies a mythological Mediterranean. 
Camus’ vision of a ‘Just Algeria’ and his early attempts to re-conceive ‘Mediterranean’ culture 
illustrate the centrality of this imagined space to his art and activism. 
 
The resistance Tolstoy’s conception of love facilitates would appear to be deeply 
antipolitical. This is because his conception of cosmos does not allow for community and, in any 
case, his embrace of a rational, disembodied world effectively depopulates it. Nonetheless, his 
conception of love as non-action – divorced from the system that sustained it – became the 
lynchpin of non-violent resistance. Tolstoy might have conceived it as non-resistance to violence, 
but his endorsement of a refusal to partake in war or perpetrate violence or pay taxes proved 
tremendously important to civil disobedience movements in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. Just as Tagore’s early vision of swadeshi was what Sumit Sarkar describes as ‘constructive’, 
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so too was his post-swadeshi understanding of the role love ought to play in politics. This resistance, 
as he understood it, was embodied in relationships across caste, race, gender (though not across 
class) lines. It provided the impetus for institutions which sought to promote and normalise them. 
Camus’ conception of rebellion as a kind of love saw him participate in the French Resistance. It 
also animated his efforts to imagine Algeria part of a federal France. However, much like Tolstoy, 
this love did not always necessarily involve doing. Although Camus never quite retreated into 
himself – he campaigned behind the scenes to commute the death sentences of over 150 FLN 
activists – he realised his praxis of life-affirming (or preserving) love sometimes necessitated 
silence.  
 
Whose Love? Which Politics? 
In a bid to fairly represent the work of Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus and to illuminate the 
neglected history of love in international politics, this chapter has largely offered sympathetic 
expositions of thought. However, these three thinkers – or any three thinkers for that matter – 
cannot be representative of the kind of diverse conceptions of love and politics that populate the 
polis. Focusing on literary work in the same period, an engagement with Emma Goldman’s work 
on sexual love; Simone Weil’s work on sacrificial love and Anna Julia Cooper’s conception of love-
power would no doubt enunciate different visions of politics. The emphasis on Tolstoy, Tagore 
and Camus, is neither meant to endorse their conceptions of love nor their visions of politics. In 
fact, their political thought is far from unproblematic. Tolstoy’s attempt to portray his conception 
of love as non-violence, for instance, is misleading. His understanding of agape as self-emptying, 
self-abnegating love is violent. His commitment to deontology led to little regard for how such 
prescriptions of non-violence disproportionately harmed individuals at the bottom of social 
hierarchies. His radical individualism did not allow for the kind of solidarity or political power that 
arises from working together. Further, for its seeming inclusivity, Tolstoy’s entire vision of politics 
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was deeply hierarchical. His cosmology which imagines the unity of creation effectively has at its 
apex the rational, disembodied man. Although Tolstoy claimed he understood his Christian 
theology to be universal and inclusive of world religions, this was only true insofar as these 
religions were compatible with the rationality and self-abnegation at the heart of his project.  
 
Tagore’s vision of ‘politics’ – even as he disavowed the term – was far more plural than 
Tolstoy’s and Camus’. Although he identifies loving in the particular, or in a valuing relationship 
as the site of political transformation, he does not seek to preclude other loves from the polis. 
Similarly, he would seem to promote loving in its multivalence. This commitment to plurality, his 
conception of the intimate as international allows for Tagore to understand love as political even 
as he interrogates and advocates freedom and equality as conditions of loving. Nonetheless, 
Tagore’s vision of politics is not without limitation. First, it fails to resolve or address the tension 
between an ethic of inclusion and loving as a form of resistance. Second, despite its sensitivity to 
caste, gender, race and religion, it is largely indifferent to class. Although Tagore’s many 
educational initiatives focussed on rural uplift, the lower classes were effectively imagined as 
objects of charity rather than subjects in the kind of transformational relationships Tagore 
understood as the locus of politics.  
 
Camus’ vision of love and politics was post-foundational, presentist and largely 
unconcerned with metaphysics. Consequently, he re-imagined agape as earthly, grace as philia. 
Camus’ commitment to worldliness, led him to prioritise human life as inherently (and perhaps 
the only) good. However, this vision of politics as presentist and life-affirming was premised on a 
contradiction. As intimated in much of his literature, this ethic was facilitated by the erasure and 
the forgetting of colonial violence. I have sought to argue that Camus’ journalistic work and 
advocacy for the equality of Arabs and Berbers is unjustly forgotten in the need to caricature him 
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as an imperialist. Nonetheless, Camus embodied all the contradictions of a settler-colonial anti-
imperialist. Consequently, his mythological Mediterranean – although far more just and inclusive 
than the existing French imperial order - enshrined a hyper-presentist ethic that enabled 
absolution. This world elevated the needs, values and priorities of the European settler over the 
indigenous subject. Consequently, Camus’ ethic unwittingly exalted a conception of life and order 
that radically excluded the dissenter.  
 
Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus’ disparate visions of ‘politics’ each privilege some loves over 
others. My own assessment of the limitations of their political thought privileges a particular 
conception of politics. This conception of politics is (partly) Arendtian in that it values plurality 
and understands the coming together of individuals to think, speak and act together as the site of 
political power. However, I diverge from Arendt in valuing freedom and equality as preconditions 
for politics. I also find Arendt’s privileging of a Kantian rational, autonomous individual wanting; 
just as I find her vision of politics bereft of emotion illusory. To the extent that all Tolstoy, Tagore 
and Camus imagine love entailing ‘making’ and ‘doing’, ‘poiesis’ and ‘praxis’, ‘philosophy’ and 
‘politics’, I also question whether her vision of a polis that precludes the work of the hands and the 
body is not in fact utopian and perhaps even, violent. Arguably loving the world entails imagining 
it large enough to accommodate competing visions of love and politics. 
 
This thesis has sought to argue that love ought to be significant to the study of international 
politics. Engaging with the work of three literary figures and to a lesser extent, six ‘canonical’ 
figures associated with the discipline, I attempted to highlight how love has been imagined as part 
of the order that sustains the status quo, and as a form of critique and resistance in the period 
extending from 1880-1960. It has been evoked to endorse murder and self-sacrifice; hierarchies 
and equality; action and non-action; imperialism and atonement. To this extent, it is an important 
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part of the history of the early twentieth century and the emergence of  International Relations. 
This thesis, however, only begins to illuminate the kinds of work love ‘does’ in international 
politics. Treating love as a serious subject of systematic study might highlight love’s imbrication in 
other aspects of contemporary international politics. It might illustrate how love as a basis for 
regionalism and/or internationalism shapes foreign policy, humanitarian aid and military 
interventions. A conceptual history of love in various cultural contexts might emphasise shifts in 
understanding sociological structures like childhood, marriage, family and citizenship. These shifts 
might be reflected in the kinds of loves that international conventions pertaining to partnerships, 
children and guardianship, or laws pertaining to immigration prioritise. Comparative studies of 
constitutions and manifestos might reveal them to be underpinned by divergent understandings 
of love and fraternity. Similarly, there is scope to study the kinds of loves social movements and 
political campaigns, such as Black Lives Matter, the Australian campaign to legalise same-sex 
marriage #EqualLove, and the Irish anti-abortion campaign #LoveBoth mobilise. Taking love 
seriously might lead to interrogating whether it may offer a post-foundational, post-humanist site 
for theorising human rights. In any case, the avenues to study love’s work in international politics, 
much like the conceptions of love and politics that populate the polis, are abundant. 
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